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EDITORS’ NOTE

I

n 2000, world leaders gathered at the United Nations to
adopt the Millennium Declaration. The Millennium
Development Goals (“MDGs”), which grew out of this
Declaration, sought to unify the world around the achievement
of eight goals by 2015: (1) eradicate extreme poverty and
hunger; (2) achieve universal primary education; (3) promote
gender equality and empower women; (4) reduce child mortality; (5) improve maternal health; (6) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; (7) ensure environmental sustainability;
and (8) develop a global partnership for development.
Five years later, in September 2005, world leaders gathered
again in New York at the UN World Summit with the intent to
review progress towards the MDGs. Although much of the discussion was diverted by concerns with security and restructuring
the UN, participants exchanged ideas on the progress of the
MDGs, including whether it was even necessary to create a
“development agenda.” Sustainable Development Law & Policy
(“SDLP”) attended several of the events running along side the
General Assembly discussions, including “Investing in the
Environment to Fight Poverty” and “Achieving the Millennium
Development Goals for Water, Sanitation and Hygiene in Africa
with a Gender Perspective.” At these events, government officials and leaders from nongovernmental organizations generally
agreed that it is necessary to set goals, hold organizations
accountable, and translate priority-setting into action.
This issue of SDLP examines the MDGs and the international community’s efforts to establish a global development
agenda. Contributors to this issue discuss what is necessary to
turn these goals into action, and whether the MDGs are the most
effective means to mobilize countries, international organizations, and donors. Are the MDGs successful in unifying countries towards common goals even if they are not achieved?
What are the implications for cross-cutting issues such as sanitation and chemicals management that are not addressed in the
MDGs? Should aid focus on those countries that already have
existing capacity to manage the aid? While it might not be possible to create blueprint solutions for complex issues, global
development goals may be able to provide a strategy to alleviate some worldwide problems. Finding a way to link existing
global, national, and local development plans may be the best,
or only, approach to improving livelihoods worldwide.
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BRIDGING THE GAP:

HOW THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS ARE UNITING THE WORLD IN
THE FIGHT AGAINST GLOBAL POVERTY

T

by Kemal Dervis*
INTRODUCTION

he debates preceding the 2005 World Summit at the
United Nations in September 2005 helped us all realize
just how much the Millennium Development Goals
(“MDGs”) have caught the imagination of the development community and civil society, including non-governmental organizations, young people, and others across the world. Today there is
unprecedented global support for achieving the MDGs, the eight
goals agreed to by all UN Member States in the year 2000, which
include ensuring that all children get a primary school education,
reducing the number of child and maternal deaths, combating
HIV/AIDS and other diseases, as well as the overarching aim of
halving the number of people living in extreme poverty.
Sustainable Development Law & Policy (“SDLP”) is a publication
of American University’s Washington College of Law (“WCL”).
No portion of this publication may be reprinted without the express
written permission of SDLP. The views expressed in SDLP are
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the
SDLP staff or WCL. All correspondence, reprinting, and article
submissions may be sent to: SDLP, Washington College of Law,
American University, 4801 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Suite 631,
Washington, D.C. 20016. E-mail: sdlp@wcl.american.edu. Phone:
202.274.4057. Current and back issues are available on our website, at http://www.wcl.american.edu/org/sustainabledevelopment.
Please see the inside back cover for submissions and subscription
information.
American University is an equal opportunity, affirmative action
university.
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Support for the goals was especially apparent at the World
Summit when, from the highest levels at the UN General
Assembly to the various side events that brought together
celebrities, musicians, and artists, all agreed on the urgent need
to put in place the policies and resources needed to tackle global poverty. Part of the reason for this widespread backing lies in
the fact that the MDGs are so comprehensible. As an economist, I tend to think in terms of fiscal balance, the gross domestic product of countries, and per capita income. While all of
these dimensions of development are important, the beauty of
the MDGs is the way that they are concrete development objectives that people everywhere can relate to: ensuring that mothers do not die as a result of childbirth; that children live beyond
their fifth birthday; that people have access to basic necessities
such as clean water and sanitation. These tangible, measurable,
and time-bound goals have become globally accepted benchmarks of broad development progress. Supported by donors,
developing countries, and civil society, the MDGs have also
become a tremendous asset to all of us who work in the development field, mobilizing energy, political support, and resources
around the urgent development challenges we face.

THE FEASIBILITY OF THE MDGS

One of the key issues currently being debated is whether the
Millennium Development Goals are actually feasible. Is it really reasonable to say that by the year 2015 these objectives will
be met? It does of course depend on a range of factors. It
depends on the growth performance of developing countries and
of the world economy over the next five to ten years. Given that
many of the big failures in development are as a result of violent
conflict, it depends on whether countries can recover from conflict, or avoid it in the first place. It also depends on key issues
such as what kind of progress there is on trade, which is one of
the big drivers of economic growth, poverty reduction, and
human development. When we look at the facts, I do believe
that the MDGs are technically feasible and economically attainable in a very large number of countries. Since 1990 (the benchmark for measuring progress on the MDGs, with 2015 the deadline) much has been achieved in human development. As the
United Nations Development Programme’s 2005 Human
Development Report details, on average, people in developing
countries are healthier, better educated, and less impoverished.
There are three million fewer child deaths annually, 30 million
fewer children out of school, and more than 130 million people
* Kemal Dervis is the Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme.

This article is based on a keynote address delivered at the Center for Global
Development, September 22, 2005.
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who have escaped extreme poverty. These human development
gains should not be underestimated. Experience shows that
development progress is possible. Never before have we had
the resources, the technology, the knowledge and, critically, as
support for the MDGs show, the essential public support needed to lift millions of people out of extreme poverty. However,
in a world where more than one billion people continue to live
in abject poverty on less than one dollar a day, much more
remains to be done if the world is to demonstrate it is serious
about the fight against extreme poverty and promoting human
development for all.
Today there is something of a secondary debate that is related to the question of whether the MDGs are feasible in terms of
resources – how important is the volume of aid resources for
development? There are those who point to the past and say that
in last three or four decades billions of dollars have been spent in
developing countries with limited results. When one looks at the
data and analyzes aid and growth, it is the case that broadly
speaking, the productivity of aid has not been as strong as it
could have been. But one should also recall that one major structural feature of the past, which we can hopefully overcome in the
future, is that aid was very politicized during the Cold War. For
many decades foreign aid often had as its primary purpose – not
necessarily the only purpose – political and military objectives.
Since the end of the Cold War we have had a chance to refocus
these resources firmly on development objectives. If we reform
the architecture and conditions of aid with a single minded focus
on development and achieving the MDGs, I believe that we can
dwarf the results that were possible in the past.
Countries cannot, however, develop without domestic and
foreign resources. At least a doubling of global development
assistance over the next few years is necessary if countries are
to achieve the MDGs. As a former Minister of Economic
Affairs, I am all too aware of the budgetary and fiscal constraints governments face. However, compared to other components of budgetary expenditures, the aid component is still relatively small in most rich countries, making incremental increases feasible whilst maintaining overall fiscal responsibility. This
is particularly true in a world where for every one dollar rich
countries spend on aid, about ten dollars is allocated to military
expenditures.
While the deployment of resources by itself does not solve
the problem, today the message is: developing countries need
additional resources if they are to achieve the MDGs, but the
other side of the bargain is that there has to be the reforms.

CONDITIONALITY

I am the first to recognize that, ultimately, development is
up to the governments and people of developing countries themselves – to root out corruption, build up institutions able to
deliver services to their people, encourage private investment
and enterprise, respect human rights, and address inequalities.
Thoughtful conditionality can, however, be a tremendously useful instrument in supporting reform in developing countries, and
in preventing the moral hazard and failure of the whole aid
effort. I do, therefore, believe that there have to be conditions
3

THE UNITED NATIONS
MILLENNIUM
DEVELOPMENT GOALS
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals

Goal One: “Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger”

Reduce by half the proportion of people living on less than a dollar a day;
Reduce by half the proportion of people who suffer from hunger.
Goal Two: “Achieve Universal Primary Education”
Ensure that all boys and girls complete a full course of primary schooling.
Goal Three: “Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women”
Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education preferably by 2005 and at all levels by 2015.
Goal Four: “Reduce Child Mortality”
Reduce by two-thirds the mortality rate among children under five.
Goal Five: “Improve Maternal Health”
Reduce by three-quarters the maternal mortality ratio.
Goal Six: “Combat HIV/AIDs, Malaria, and the Spread of Other
Diseases”
Halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS;
Halt and begin to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases.
Goal Seven: “Ensure Environmental Sustainability”
Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies
and programs; reverse loss of environmental resources;
Reduce by half the proportion of people without sustainable access to
safe drinking water;
Achieve significant improvement in lives of at least one hundred million
slum dwellers, by 2020.
Goal Eight: “Develop a Global Partnership for Development”
Develop further an open trading and financial system that is rule-based, predictable, and non-discriminatory; includes a commitment to good governance, development, and poverty reduction—nationally and internationally;
Address the least developed countries' special needs, including tariffand quota-free access for their exports, enhanced debt relief for heavily
indebted poor countries, cancellation of official bilateral debt, and more
generous official development assistance for countries committed to
poverty reduction;
Address the special needs of landlocked and small island developing states;
Deal comprehensively with developing countries’ debt problems through
national and international measures to make debt sustainable in the long
term;
Develop decent and productive work for youth, in cooperation with the
developing countries;
Provide access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries, in
cooperation with pharmaceutical companies;
Make available the benefits of new technologies—especially information
and communications, in cooperation with the private sector.

on aid and relating to macroeconomics, as well as to income distribution and social and human development variables. Social
progress – what a country is doing for its people, what healthcare and education services are in place – these are all concerns
that should be at the heart of the development debate and part of
the conditionality of delivering increased resources.
There is, however, one big problem with conditionality, and
that is the legitimacy of the institutions that bring it. Without
BRIDGING THE GAP: Continued on page 7
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POST-CONFLICT CONVERGENCE OF DEVELOPMENT
PLANNING: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
RELATED MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS IN AFGHANISTAN

D

by Belinda Bowling and Dr. Asif Ali Zaidi*
INTRODUCTION

after the end of the period of conflict, a move towards more unified development planning is now visible. This is likely to
improve Afghanistan’s chance of meeting its goals in relation to
environmental sustainability.

evelopment was effectively lost in Afghanistan during
the period 1979 to 2001: economic growth stagnated,
the environmental resource base was severely degraded, millions of people were displaced, and institutional structures were eroded. The sentiment of the Afghan people after the
fall of the Taliban regime in 2001 is eloquently articulated by
former Washington Post correspondent Pamela Constable:

Today, all Afghans have high expectations of the new government. Two rounds of elections and government programs,
such as the National Solidarity Programme, have brought the
government to most villages around the country. International
support for Afghanistan remains strong. Yet, despite this
progress, the most recent Human Development Index still
ranked Afghanistan 173 out of 178 nations.2
Afghanistan is an agrarian-based, arid, least developed
country; the population of which is highly dependent on environmental resources, in particular natural resources. The effective implementation of Millennium Development Goal
(“MDG”) Seven on environmental sustainability is accordingly
of particular importance in the context of development planning
and poverty reduction.
Afghanistan’s post-conflict development planning – including the domestic implementation of the MDGs – has been fragmented and, to some extent, uncoordinated. However, four years
*Belinda Bowling is the Environmental Law and International Conventions

Expert for the United Nations Environment Programme (“UNEP”) Capacity and
Institution Building Programme for Environmental Management in Afghanistan.
She is based in Kabul, Afghanistan. She has a BA, LLB, LLM (environmental law)
from the University of Cape Town, and has been working for the past seven years
in the field of environmental law and policy in developing countries.
Dr. Asif Ali Zaidi is UNEP’s Kabul-based Programme Manager. Dr. Zaidi has
worked in the development field in Central Asia for the last fifteen years for
UNEP, the World Conservation Union, and the Aga Khan Development Network.
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In a country where over 80 percent of the population relies
directly on the natural resource base to meet its daily needs,
widespread environmental degradation poses an immense threat
to livelihoods. More than two decades of conflict, military activities, refugee movements, collapse of national, provincial and
local forms of governance, lack of management and institutional capacity, and over-exploitation have heavily damaged
Afghanistan’s natural resource base. The recent drought has had
an additional negative impact. As a result, the country’s vulnerability to natural disasters and food shortages has increased.
Of Afghanistan’s 655,000 square kilometres of total land
area, only twelve percent (7.9 million hectares) is arable and four
percent irrigated. An additional 46 percent is under permanent
pastures and three percent under forest cover. The remaining 39
percent is mountainous. Geographically, nearly 75 percent of the
Courtesy of United Nations Environment Programme

Kabul was still an atavistic city of survivors and
refugees, toughened by hardship and violence.
People had spent years crouching in caves and waiting for the next bomb to shatter the windows. It was
a place where each group of liberators had turned
into oppressors, where children had learned to shove
and kick and cheat and steal to eat, and where everyone had committed or endured shameful acts to survive. Removing the Taliban did not erase the habits
or memories burned into a generation. This was a
country with few heroes, only survivors, weighed
down by boulders of vengeance and greed and traditions. Change would come slowly, if ever; trust
would take a generation to rebuild.1

THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT

Loss of vegetation cover has caused serious erosion across Afghanistan,
such as in this village.

arable area is concentrated in three of the eight agricultural planning regions of the country – north, northeast, and west. Of the
total arable area, not more than half is actually cultivated annually, primarily because of water availability problems.3
Overall, the natural resource base continues to suffer due to:

• competing land use (agriculture, human settlements,
forests and rangeland, wetlands and protected areas);

• ambiguous legal status of ownership and access to
natural resources (land, water, forests and rangeland,

4

biodiversity, wetlands, and protected areas);

• lack of enabling policy, legislation, and regulatory

framework for managing natural resources, along
with weak governance and management of natural
resources; and

• negative impact of war, increasing population,

Courtesy of Heart Soren Hvilshoj, United Nations
Environment Programme (2002)

human settlements, drought, overexploitation, and
landmines on natural resources.
In the urban environment, humans are being placed at risk
by poor waste management practices and lack of proper sanitation, which are the main environmental factors affecting human
health, and are a major contributory factor to mortality amongst
the Afghan people.4
Nearly 75 percent of the urban population may be living in
slums. Due to the influx of returning refugees from neighboring
states, Afghanistan also has the highest rate of urbanization in
Asia at six percent a year, which puts an additional burden on
the already weak service delivery in urban areas.5
Other challenges for natural resource and environmental
management include still insufficient institutional capacities and
the current absence of legislation in many areas. Linked to this

Children collect scrap materials at Qamar Qalla dumpsite in Afghanistan.

is the need to develop sound information programs and monitoring systems, which would allow the government to establish
a link between the quality of health and environmental conditions. On the part of the communities, there is a lack of awareness on sound environmental practices, which needs to be
addressed simultaneously with the improvement of their livelihoods and economic conditions.
A failure to address environmental degradation would negatively impact the population’s health and increase poverty and
hunger. Environmental degradation, besides hampering economic growth in the agricultural sector, impacts in a particularly negative way on the lives of the poor. More specifically,
female-headed households with physically impaired members,
and households of landless or those farming small rain-fed plots
only are the most affected. Many of the human rights of these
people are not fulfilled due to environmental degradation; not
least, the right to life. Economic development that leaves out the
poor and enhances distributive injustices is not sustainable and
5

will be a source of subsequent conflicts. Environmental degradation in Afghanistan, often the consequence of socio-economic inequities, thus is to be seen as a factor contributing to prevalent insecurity.
This environmental background should be viewed now in
the context of Afghanistan’s development planning frameworks,
the home of MDG Seven on environmental sustainability.

POST-CONFLICT DEVELOPMENT PLANNING

After the fall of the Taliban regime in late 2001, representatives of various Afghan factions met in Bonn, Germany under
the auspices of the United Nations to map out Afghanistan’s
future.6 After laborious negotiations, the Bonn Agreement7 was
signed on December 5, 2001. The Agreement represents a
schematic, post-conflict roadmap and timetable for establishing
peace and security, reconstructing the country, re-establishing
some key institutions, and protecting human rights.
By the beginning of 2002, the United Nations had hurried
to align “resources, people and actions behind a common
nation-building strategy at the field level.”8 The National
Development Framework, born of the Bonn Agreement, was
agreed in April as the strategy to map the country’s economic
needs and direction. The Framework consists of three pillars:
human capital and social protection;9 physical infrastructure;10
and enabling environment for development.11 The document
soon became the coordinating document for all international and
national actors in the country.
Although none of the pillars of the National Development
Framework are concerned with the environment per se, the
environment is nonetheless recognized as an important crosscutting issue. In this regard, a structure called the Advisory
Group on Environment was established, which had as its primary purpose the mainstreaming of environmental issues into
the development agenda by means of input provided and recommendations made to the pillar sub-groups. The success of
this structure was, however, regrettably limited.12
In 2004, after the endorsement of the Millennium
Declaration,13 the Government of Afghanistan, in cooperation
with its international partners, prepared the Securing
Afghanistan’s Future: Accomplishments and the Strategic Path
Forward report. The report sets economic growth targets for
Afghanistan that are aligned with the MDGs, but are
Afghanistan specific.
The report gave rise to the Afghanistan National
Development Strategy (“ANDS”), a five-year strategy that complements the MDGs and which will, in due course, replace the
2002 National Development Framework. Through the ANDS,
the government will draft plans for full rural development to
benefit the poor, and for the building of infrastructure to manage
the country’s water, and for providing connections to markets.
Although the strategy remains a work-in-progress, it is important to note that environment has been highlighted as one of the
key components of Pillar One on infrastructure and natural
resources, which would indicate that it has been mainstreamed
as a priority issue within the development agenda, in line with
the MDG approach.
Confusingly; there are therefore currently three applicable
development frameworks for Afghanistan: the Bonn Agreement;
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

ed to complement those baseline years for which data exists. In
addition, some of the indicators have a 2020 achievement target,
rather than a 2015 one.
A further obstacle is that aid assistance from donor countries
has been spent primarily on security and democratization.
Development is the poor third cousin. Within the development sector itself, most donors do not see the environment as a priority,
ACHIEVEMENT OF MDG GOAL SEVEN
notwithstanding that Afghanistan is an agrarian-dependent counMDG Goal Seven focuses on environmental priorities relattry, the natural resources of which most Afghans depend for their
ed to sustainable development and poverty reduction. The
livelihoods. Regrettably, a mere fraction of the national developGlobal MDG Goal Seven framework includes three targets and
ment budget has been allocated directly to the environment.16
eight indicators for monitoring the status of forest cover, biodiInstability in relation to environmental governance has also
versity protection, energy use, emissions of carbon dioxide and
been an obstacle to the achievement of environmental sustainconsumption of ozone depleting substances, use of solid fuels,
ability. The environment mandate is a new one, introduced only
access to safe drinking water and sanitation systems, and access
in 2002, when the interim government was constituted. In May
to secure tenure.
2005, the mandate was transferred from the former Ministry of
The lack of baseline data on environmental indicators, such
Irrigation, Water Resources, and Environment to the newly
as forest cover, protected areas, energy use, and carbon dioxide
established National Environmental Protection Agency
emissions, and the shorter period of time within which
(“NEPA”), a standalone agency that reports directly to the
President. The sector mandates for water,
Figure One: Afghanistan’s current targets and indicators for MDG Seven
energy, agriculture, minerals, forestry,
biological diversity, public health, urban
planning, water, waste and sanitation
services, and the like are split amongst
the line ministries, unfortunately sometimes with a degree of overlap. Like most
fledgling institutions, NEPA now requires
time to establish itself properly within the
new government structure, and to determine the nature of its relationship with
these relevant line ministries.
The absence of any environmental
policy or regulatory framework has also
contributed towards paralyzing government efforts to achieve environmental
sustainability. The imminent promulgation of the Environment Act, framework
environmental
legislation
for
Afghanistan, will go some way towards
alleviating this development encumbrance, however. In addition to vesting
NEPA with institutional identity and regulating the relationships between different government actors in the environment
Afghanistan ought to attain the MDGs (owing to the late adopsector, the Act also sets out frameworks for biodiversity and nattion of the Millennium Declaration) are two obstacles
ural resource conservation and management, water resource
Afghanistan faces in achievement of Goal Seven. Without data
conservation and management, integrated environmental manone cannot set targets, many have argued. All data that did exist
agement (including environmental impact assessment), polluwas in the hands of international organizations, not the governtion prevention and control, and environmental information and
ment, and much of it pre-dated the 1979 Soviet invasion. Even
education. Importantly, the Act also contains the compliance
if the data were robust, the Government would encounter sigand enforcement provisions required to allow NEPA to effecnificant hurdles in meeting those targets within the shorter peritively enforce the Act.
od of twelve years.
Donor-funded, environment focused programs, which will
Accordingly, the Government has “Afghanized” the MDGs
hopefully assist the government in the achievement of the MDG
and defined the globally agreed objectives into country specific
Goal Seven indicators, also exist. The United Nations
targets, which balance ambition with realism and incorporate
Environment Programme (“UNEP”) is assisting the government
national development priorities. As can be seen from Figure One,
to develop an integrated policy, regulatory, and institutional
the baseline years for each Goal Seven indicator has been amend-

United Nations Environment Programme

the National Development Framework; and the nascent ANDS.14
Most signatories to the 2001 Millennium Declaration were
able to integrate the MDGs within a short time into their fiveyear development plans. However, for reasons set out above,
this standard approach has not been possible for most post-conflict countries, including Afghanistan.15

FALL 2005

6

framework (the cornerstone of which is the Environment Act),
which will encourage sustainable use and management of natural resources and conservation and rehabilitation of the environment. This framework may be used as the roadmap for achievement of Target Nine, namely integration of the principles of sustainable development into country policies. UNEP is also assisting the government in implementing the multilateral environmental agreements to which Afghanistan is a Party, most
notably – for the purposes of MDG Seven – the Climate Change
Convention (relating to carbon emissions) and the Montreal
Protocol on Ozone Depleting Substances, which will similarly
assist in the achievement of this target. Significant investments

are also being made in reforestation initiatives and renewable
energy. Other UN agencies, in particular UN Habitat, are assisting the government to achieve Targets Ten and Eleven.

CONCLUSION

In the four years since the demise of a quarter century of
war and conflict, the achievement of a single development planning framework for Afghanistan that meets its own unique
needs, environmental and otherwise, and also meets its international obligations (including those under the Millennium
Declaration) is within reach. Although achievement by 2015 of
the MDG on sustainable development is unlikely, significant
progress towards its realization is now almost a certainty.
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political legitimacy, conditionality can only achieve limited
results. If policy prescriptions are perceived as being driven by
“external” actors or interests, it is impossible to build the
domestic support necessary to implement them successfully and
in a sustainable manner. If policy conditionality is to be perceived as legitimate around the world, and if stakeholders in a
country are to be convinced that conditions should be met,
development institutions themselves need to be credible. How
to build a more legitimate system where good policy advice,
conditionality, and cooperation can take place, but not in an
environment where developing countries feel it is being
imposed from abroad, is a critical challenge for both the United
Nations as well as the Bretton Woods Institutions. Without this
legitimacy, the whole equation does not work. The grand bargain where, on the one side, rich countries mobilize more
resources for development, reform trade rules, and provide
enhanced debt relief, and on the other side, developing countries
commit to deep reform, tackling corruption, and adhering to
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and reintegration.
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community, representing donor countries, has indicated that Afghanistan is not
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good governance and opening markets, cannot succeed without
reform of these institutions so that they are legitimate reflections
of the world as it is today. Giving developing countries a much
greater say in the decision-making process would provide
greater legitimacy for global institutions and the policy prescriptions they offer.

CONCLUSION

The MDGs present us all with ambitious, yet achievable
goals. In order to achieve success, the necessary resources and
policies need to be in place and the legitimacy of international
institutions enhanced. While there is more to development than
the MDGs, progress towards meeting the MDGs reflects
progress towards human development and building a safer,
more prosperous, and more secure world for all. Achieving the
Millennium Development Goals is, therefore, one of the most
pressing challenges we face today.
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EDUCATION AS A LYNCHPIN OF DEVELOPMENT:

LEGAL AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN THE FORMATION OF THE EDUCATION
FOR ALL – FAST TRACK INITIATIVE CATALYTIC TRUST FUND
by Sophie Smyth and Anna Triponel*

M

INTRODUCTION

any of us share a common belief in the supreme
value of education as a central tool in the fight
against poverty, the achievement of growth, and the
empowerment of citizens in both the developed and the developing world. As put in the inimitable words of Amartya Sen,
“to build a country, build a schoolhouse.”1 But the provision of
education requires resources, and finding those resources is an
ongoing challenge. In the case of the developing world, where
some 115 million children remain out of school – two-thirds of
them girls, and most of them poor or otherwise disadvantaged,
this challenge is particularly acute. This need, however, is not
being ignored and efforts are being taken at several levels to
address it.
The formation of the World Bank’s Education For All – Fast
Track Initiative Catalytic Trust Fund is one such effort. This
article describes the background to the fund and analyzes the
legal and policy issues that arose in its formation. The article
concludes with some thoughts on lessons learned from the formation of the fund that are pertinent to the formation of future
trust funds for the provision of international development aid.

EDUCATION AS A DEVELOPMENT PRIORITY

Education has long been recognized as a lynchpin of development. Following the end of World War II, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the first international instrument
ever to list a number of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, asserted that “everyone has a right to education.”2
Further, in 1945, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”) was founded for the
express purpose of contributing to peace and security “by promoting collaboration among nations through education . . .”3
More recently, the importance of education has received
renewed impetus. Stark data gathered by UNESCO throughout
the 1980s showed, for example, that more than 960 million
adults worldwide were illiterate (two-thirds of them women)
and that more than 100 million children (60 million of whom
were girls) had no access to primary schooling, spurring
UNESCO to convene the World Conference on Education for
All in Jomtien, Thailand in 1990. The conference, attended by
155 countries and representatives from 150 organizations, gave
birth to the Education For All movement (“EFA”). EFA set as its
goals a massive reduction in worldwide illiteracy by the end of
the decade and, ultimately, the universalization of basic education worldwide.
Ten years later, at the World Education Forum convened by
FALL 2005

UNESCO in Dakar, Senegal to review progress in these goals,
the 164 countries participating renewed their commitment to the
goals of EFA and agreed on six targets for action, the Dakar
Framework of Action.4 These targets included a commitment to
ensure that “by 2015 all children, particularly girls, children in
difficult circumstances and those belonging to ethnic minorities
have access to, and complete, free and compulsory primary education of good quality.”5 This goal was subsequently adopted as
Millennium Development Goal Two, in the Millennium
Declaration adopted by the United Nations Millennium
Assembly in September 2000.6

THE NEED FOR FINANCIAL RESOURCES

But education costs money; a lot of it, and the key concern for developing countries concerning EFA was whether the
developed world’s renewed emphasis on the importance of education would bring with it the badly needed resources to make
access to education a reality. The rhetoric of Dakar held promise, as the Framework for Action stated that “no country seriously committed to Education For All will be thwarted in its
achievement of universal primary school completion by 2015
due to lack of resources.”7
Further, at the International Finance and Development
Conference held in Monterrey, Mexico in March 2002, the
developed and developing countries present forged the
Monterrey Consensus, according to which the developed countries committed to boost trade opportunities and the availability
of development aid to developing countries with sound development policies.8 The essence of the Monterrey Consensus was
the notion of “performance-driven aid,” namely, that international development aid should follow and support clear evidence of commitment to reform and improvement on the part of
the recipient country.9 A further component of the Consensus
was that international financial institutions and bilateral aid
agencies should facilitate and support replication of programs
found successful in one region of the world in other regions
(known as the process of “scaling up”). Three months after the
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THE EDUCATION FOR ALL – FAST TRACK
INITIATIVE CATALYTIC FUND

The Catalytic Fund, which is administered by the World
Bank as trustee, was initiated in November 2003 when the
9

Netherlands, Norway, Italy, and Belgium pledged a total of
$49.0 million to support the EFA-FTI.14 It provides short-term
transitional funding to countries15 that have developed poverty
reduction strategies and education plans that meet EFA-FTI criteria but who had too few bilateral donors to enable them to
implement those plans, i.e. it is targeted to donor orphans.16 The
funding provided is short term, varying from one to three years
in duration, because it is intended to have a catalytic effect. The
aim is to jump start the funding process for countries starved of
funds, with the idea that more long-term, sustained bilateral
funding will follow once a recipient of Catalytic Fund resources
is seen by the donor community as serious in its commitment to
education and capable of building a track record.

THE NOVEL FEATURES OF THE CATALYTIC FUND

A CENTRALIZED FUND TO FINANCE A DECENTRALIZED
INITIATIVE

Creating a centralized funding mechanism for a wholly
decentralized program, which depended for its credibility and
efficacy on being decentralized, presented a challenge. Usually,

Courtesy of World Bank Photo Library

Monterrey Consensus was forged, the World Bank launched the
Education For All - Fast Track Initiative (“EFA-FTI”), the first
attempt to put the principles of the Consensus into practice in a
sector-specific way.
The EFA-FTI is designed to accelerate progress towards the
attainment of universal primary education by providing enhanced
policy, capacity-building, and financial support to countries that
have sound poverty reduction strategies and education plans.10 It
is a global, decentralized partnership that includes donor and
recipient countries, UNESCO, and the World Bank. It is supported by a small secretariat, housed in the World Bank, which performs a knowledge sharing and coordination role.
The soundness of a country’s poverty reduction strategy
(which is developed by a country in consultation with the World
Bank) is determined by the World Bank. In accordance with the
decentralized nature of the EFA-FTI partnership, however, the
soundness of a country’s education plan is determined by the
donor agency representatives located in the country, working
together as an in-country group (known as a “Local Donor
Group”) with whom the country consults whilst developing the
plan. Countries’ education plans are assessed by the Local
Donor Group in accordance with EFA-FTI assessment guidelines and an Indicative Framework, agreed by the global partnership as a whole.11 Such criteria include the requirement that
universal primary education be a priority of the education plan
and that the plan focus on completion of primary education and
not simply on enrollment.12
The idea behind the EFA-FTI was that endorsement of a
country’s education plan would operate as a seal of approval and
a signal to donors interested in providing aid for education that a
country had a plan whose implementation was worthy of support. It was anticipated that countries that had developed such
plans would receive resources to implement them. It soon
became apparent, however, that relying on existing resources and
channels was not enough and that a major infusion of new funds
was needed. But several countries worked hard and expended
substantial political capital to put together plans endorsed by the
Local Donor Group, only to find no resources flowing from any
source for implementation. These countries complained of being
abandoned and alleged that donor countries had not lived up to
their commitments.13 The need for funds was particularly acute
for those countries which, for historical reasons, have very few
bilateral donors, known as “donor orphans.”
Additional pressure for funding arose from the fact that it was
becoming increasingly clear to the international community that
the Millennium Development Goal of universal primary education
by 2015 could not be attained unless more funding was made
available to developing countries for education. The Education For
All – Fast Track Initiative Catalytic Fund (the “Catalytic Fund”)
was formed as a preliminary step towards filling this gap.

Bangladeshi girl at school.

the provision of funding comes with strings attached. The trick
was to prevent any such strings from overwhelming the locally
owned and locally driven nature of EFA.
The sustainability of the education plans endorsed by the
EFA-FTI derived from the fact that the plans were designed and
driven by the countries themselves in consultation with the
Local Donor Groups. Ownership of the plans, commitment to,
and responsibility for their implementation was vested squarely in the developing countries. The donors to the Catalytic Fund
were adamant, therefore, that the fund should simply be a
financing mechanism for this pre-existing decentralized
process and not become a supreme governing body, dictating
additional terms and requirements to countries that had already
undergone considerable effort to meet EFA-FTI criteria. This
overarching concern of the donors, however, had to be balanced against the concern of the World Bank that it be given
adequate authority to discharge the fiduciary duties of a trustee.
Managing other people’s money is serious business and the
Bank, which serves as trustee for several hundred trust funds,
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

collectively amounting to over $9 billion in assets, has established policies and procedures for doing so, from which the
Catalytic Fund cannot lightly depart.

INNOVATIONS IN THE DESIGN AND SCOPE OF THE
CATALYTIC FUND

Balancing between these competing priorities gave rise to a
need for several innovations in the design and scope of the
Catalytic Fund. These included: (1) a two-tiered governance
structure; (2) an expansive group of eligible recipients, (3) flexibility regarding monitoring and supervision; and (4) flexibility
regarding coverage and disbursement procedures.

A Two-Tiered Governance Structure

Under standard World Bank trust arrangements, trust fund
donors enter into a trust administration agreement with the Bank
as trustee which sets out the broad objectives of the trust.
Thereafter, the donors more or less drop out of the picture. The
Bank, in its sole discretion, allocates the trust funds in accordance with the objectives, reporting after the fact to the donors
on how the trust funds have been spent. The Catalytic Fund
donors wanted a more active and ongoing role in the management of the fund than provided by this standard format.
Consistent with the importance they attributed to the Local
Donor Groups and the close working relationship between those
groups and the countries where they were based, they wanted a
mechanism that would reflect, in a dynamic way, the input of
those groups. To effect this need, it was agreed that the Catalytic
Fund should have its own sui generis governance structure.
The structure agreed upon provides for the formation of a
Strategy Committee (the “Committee”) to define and direct the
fund’s assistance strategy and for the allocation and commitment of fund resources in accordance with a two-step process.
The Committee is comprised of a senior representative from
each donor17 and a representative from the Bank’s senior management, who serves as the Committee’s chairperson. It meets
to select which countries will receive assistance from the fund
and how much each selected country will receive. All decisions
of the Committee are by consensus. Criteria taken into account
by the Committee in choosing between eligible candidates for
assistance include: (1) demonstrated commitment on the part of
the country’s government to fund primary education; (2) tangible efforts by the government towards achievement of the goal
of universal primary education for boys and girls by 2015; (3)
capacity to implement the education plan devised; and (4) the
relative unavailability of other external donor funding for the
country’s primary education program.
The Bank’s concern that it has sufficient discretion to discharge its fiduciary duties as trustee was met by separating the
process of selecting recipients and allocating funds from the
process of actual disbursement. The Bank wanted to retain the
discretion not to disburse funds to an entity if, in its judgment,
the entity did not have the financial management capacity to
monitor and report on the use of such funds. Thus, although the
constituent documents of the Catalytic Fund provide that the
Committee will make recommendations on what entity, within a
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country selected to receive assistance, should be the actual
recipient of any funds provided, the Bank has the final say on
who the actual recipient will be. Accordingly, following the
Committee’s selection and allocation process, the Bank as
trustee, in consultation with the government of the country
selected to receive funds, and with the Local Donor Group, and
mindful of the Committee’s recommendation, decides which
entity will be the actual recipient of allocated funds.

An Expansive Group of Eligible Recipients

A broad range of possible recipients qualify as “Eligible
Recipients” of the Catalytic Fund, including: (1) the ministries of “Eligible Countries” (countries that have a poverty
reduction strategy and an EFA-FTI endorsed education plan);
(2) country-specific trust funds established to support education in an Eligible Country; and (3) aid agencies of governments providing assistance to Eligible Countries and any
other Eligible Recipient approved by the Committee. The
donors’ goal in having this range of possible recipients was to
achieve maximum flexibility so that the fund could function
as a supplement to the ongoing coordinated efforts of the EFA
partnership and respond to needs identified by the Local
Donor Groups as part of that partnership rather than becoming a separate, disconnected initiative.

Flexibility Regarding Monitoring and Supervision

Countries seeking EFA-FTI endorsement of their education
plans have to comply with a plethora of substantive requirements set by the EFA. Donors to the Catalytic Fund did not want
to require countries that had met such requirements to comply
with an additional set of requirements as a condition of receiving funding. It was therefore agreed that the progress reporting
requirements on recipients should mirror those required under
EFA whereas the financial reporting, which enables the Bank to
fulfill its fiduciary duty of reporting back to the donors on the
money entrusted to it as trustee, is set by the Bank. Hence, the
review of progress is done in conjunction with the country’s regular schedule of reviews of its sector program with the participation of all other donors that support the country’s education
sector development program. Team leaders then report back to
the EFA-FTI Secretariat on progress concerning the Catalytic
Fund, in conjunction with their reporting on Bank support in the
sector. However, the World Bank steps in when it comes to fulfilling its duty of financial reporting. These accounting and
auditing requirements follow standard operational policies for
World Bank adjustment and investment loans and credits. The
Bank then ensures the donors receive the financial reporting by
making these assessments available to the Strategy Committee.
In its role as Trustee, the World Bank is also traditionally
required to supervise the activities financed under the Grant
Agreements. The provisions relating to supervision within the
Catalytic Fund allow for a certain flexibility as the Bank
supervises only when it is best placed to do so. The Bank
therefore supervises when the recipient of the funding is a
country government or a country specific trust fund for which
the bank already acts as trustee. If the money is granted to
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another recipient, the Bank is not liable for any supervision,
unless the Committee decides to the contrary. As the Steering
Committee makes decisions by consensus, this leaves the
Bank the last say on whether it is best placed to supervise the
activities in question.

Flexibility Regarding Coverage and Disbursement
Procedures

Prior to 2003, the Bank’s policy was not to finance recurrent expenditures, as by definition, these expenditures were
ongoing and a specific objective would never be achieved. This
changed in 2003 with the realization that certain objectives
could only be met if recurrent costs where financed. Education
provides an example of such an objective, as financing teacher’s
salaries and wages is key in the goal of achieving universal primary education. The Catalytic Fund was established shortly
after the change in Bank policy and was hence the first fund in
the Bank to finance recurrent expenditures.
The disbursement procedures used by the Catalytic fund are
also innovative. When the Bank acts as trustee, grant agreements traditionally follow a project based model whereby funds
are disbursed on the basis of receipts of evidence of expenditure.
The Catalytic Fund however uses as a preference a policy based
lending model that allows for a disbursement directly into the
budget. Recipients therefore do not report back on a particular
project with receipts of expenditures but report instead on the
achievement of certain targets related to education. This enables
a fast disbursement and allows the recipient country to use the
funding in line with national priorities. This policy based lending however also requires extra caution as there is less certainty
on where exactly the funds are being used. Therefore, when
there is a high fiduciary risk to using the government’s budget
systems, the Catalytic fund allows other disbursement methods
to be used.

THE EXPERIENCE OF THE CATALYTIC FUND

Total pledges and commitments to the Fund reach $288
million for the period 2003-2007. Nine developing countries

have been allocated grant assistance from the Fund, including
Gambia, Ghana, Mauritania, Guyana, Niger, Nicaragua, Yemen,
Madagascar, and Kenya.18 Additional related trust funds have
been established within the EFA-FTI partnership to further the
goal of universal primary school completion. In November
2004, for example, the multi-donor Education Program
Development Fund was created to make grant funding available
to those countries without education plans and weak capacity to
provide technical support and build the capacity required to prepare and implement a sound education plan. That fund also
finances knowledge sharing activities, designed to spread information on best practices and developing countries’ experiences
towards the goal of achieving universal primary education. A
separate trust fund has also been established to fund the costs of
the EFA-FTI Secretariat. More recently, certain donors are pursuing the creation of an EFA-FTI Expansion Fund to provide
ongoing support to countries’ primary education programs
beyond the short-term horizon of the Catalytic Fund.

CONCLUSION

The formation of the Catalytic Fund illustrates how the concrete nature and accompanying timetables of the Millennium
Development Goals can serve as a basis for galvanizing action
and mobilizing resources. To the extent that such effect results
in the flow of additional resources to development aid, the goals
serve a positive role. To the extent, however, that the goals result
in the re-allocation of existing resources with consequential distortions in priorities, their effect is clearly problematic.
Independent of the merits of that debate, however, it is clear that
the financing modalities used to handle a spike in aid to an area
targeted by the Millennium Development Goals, need careful
thought. The goals place a high priority on local ownership and
control that has to be balanced against fiscal responsibility. The
compromise achieved by the Catalytic Fund’s structure, scope
and policies, is a starting point for finding the appropriate middle ground between those competing priorities.
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PROMOTING GENDER EQUITY THROUGH GLOBAL EDUCATION TARGETS:
THE THIRD MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOAL
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orldwide, young women and girls are routinely
denied equal access to education that their male
counterparts are privileged to receive. In April
2000, Darkar, Senegal played host to the “Darkar World Forum
on Education,” which set a goal of worldwide equality in education by the year 2015.1 Based on this forum, the United
Nations also recognized the disparity in education and made its
third Millennium Development Goal (“MDG”) a resolution to
remedy gender inequality in primary and secondary education
by 2005 “and at all levels by 2015.”2
Achieving this goal by 2015 seems optimistic; the first
half of the goal was not fulfilled since a gender gap still exists
in primary and secondary education. In a report released in
2003, the United Nations International Children’s Emergency
Fund (“UNICEF”) urged that “accelerated action” must be
taken to get more girls into school over the next two years, otherwise other MDGs, including goals to reduce poverty and
improve the human condition, would also not be realized.3 By
keeping the girls away from the classroom, they will lack the
knowledge necessary, for example, to keep themselves out of
poverty and maintain a lifestyle free from HIV/AIDS.
According to the UNICEF report, at least nine million
more girls are kept out of school than boys every year, and
those who enroll drop out faster than boys.4 The report alleges
that girls are the first to be removed from the classroom due to
“persistent and often subtle gender discrimination” that is
prevalent in many of the societies where enrollment is low.5
Many families pull girls out of school when money is tight or
when a young girl becomes of marrying age. These instances
are telltale signs that the targets may be unrealistic, and explain
criticisms that they are “over simplistic and too quantitative” –
the targets do not take into account “differences among countries and cultures.”6 Unfortunately, there are no firm international statistics for cultural occurrences such as the phenomena of child-brides and violence against women – situations that
have a great deal of influence on how girls are educated.7
In December of 2003, UNICEF argued that the goal of equal
education by 2005 and 2015 could still be met if worldwide
donors followed through on their funding promises made in 1990
at the Jomtien Conference and World Summit for Children, and
again in 1996.8 Despite these promises, total funding to developing countries declined in the 1990s “and bilateral funding for
education plummeted even further.”9 A United Nations
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”)
report issued in 2002 found that between 1990 and 2001, funding
from the international community to education fell from five to
four billion dollars.10 The report also concluded that “an extra
$5.6 billion will be needed annually to achieve the universal primary education and gender goals alone.”11
Most telling about the progress of the goal is that the number of girls left out of school in sub-Saharan Africa has actually
increased from twenty million in 1990 to 24 million in 2002.12
The UN Secretary-General’s annual report on the progress of the
goals issued in 2005 admits that the exceptions to achievement of
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the primary education goal are sub-Saharan Africa and Southern
and Western Asia, and that even less progress is being made in
secondary education in those areas.13 It is likely that education
goals are not being met because of pervasive gender discrimination on all fronts – not just in education.
Gender discrimination in all forms, including ingrained
social norms, prejudices, and traditional customs, must also be
battled in order to recognize that education is a right, not a
privilege. According to the UNICEF report, “eighty-three percent of all girls left out of school live in sub-Saharan Africa,
South Asia, East Asia, and the Pacific,” countries where
women battle every day for their own safety.14 To be able to
provide equal opportunities to education for these girls, countries should also provide aid to combat HIV/AIDS, violence
against women, poverty, and human trafficking.
The goal of achieving gender equality in education cannot
stand on its own – it must go hand-in-hand with the eradication
of the obstacles standing in young girls’ way to that education.
All is not lost, however, with respect to the third MDG. The UN
Secretary General’s report found that Eastern Africa, Northern
Africa, Asia, and Southeast Asia are all approaching educational
equality with over ninety girls per one hundred boys in primary
and secondary education classrooms.15 As countries are given the
opportunity and assistance to develop, even more countries will
be able to realize the goal of education equality.
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THE MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE ACCOUNT:

A CRITICAL LOOK AT THE NEWLY FOCUSED DEVELOPMENT APPROACH AND ITS
POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
by Melanie Nakagawa*

O

INTRODUCTION

n March 14, 2002, while addressing the Inter-American
Development Bank, President George W. Bush
announced that the United States would increase its foreign development assistance by fifty percent as part of the U.S.
commitment to the United Nations Millennium Declaration,
which calls for “more generous development assistance” and
“enhanced debt relief” for less developed countries.1 Much of
the additional foreign aid from the United States would be
administered through the Millennium Challenge Account
(“MCA”) to countries that demonstrate they are ruling justly,
promoting economic freedom, and investing in their people.2
The MCA is implemented by the Millennium Challenge
Corporation (“MCC”). While the MCC is an innovative attempt
to achieve poverty alleviation, the MCA suffers from problems
in its design and presents potentially challenging impacts on
other donor organizations given its current implementation
scheme. This article seeks to open the door to debate the potential effectiveness of the newly-created, independent institutional home for the MCA funds, the MCC.
As described by the former MCC Chief Executive Officer
Paul Applegarth,3 “the MCC was established [on January 23,
2004] as a new innovative foreign assistance program by the
United States under the initiative and sponsorship of the
President to reduce poverty in some of the poorest countries in
the world by promoting sustainable economic growth.”4 The
MCA attempts to promote sustainable economic growth as a
mechanism to reduce poverty by funding results-based projects,
targeting countries, and having the financial support of a large
grant-based budget. The consequences of these three components have the possibility of exerting a significant influence on
how effective the MCA will be at poverty alleviation and economic development.
The approach characterized by the MCA is a departure from
the target-setting approach of the Millennium Development
Goals (“MDGs”). This article begins with an overview of the
MDGs, and how development needs to be structured around
these goals, their current status, and why the MDGs are unlikely to be achieved by the target date of 2015. The second section
describes the MCA by identifying the key components of the
MCA that make it distinct from other donor and development
models. The second section also analyzes the differences
between the MCA- and MDG-approaches to development assistance, such as the MCA’s country-initiated and country-owned
approach. The third section provides examples of how and why
the MCA might hinder the progress and efforts of donor organ13

izations to effectively provide foreign aid, specifically addressing the potential tension and friction between the MCA and U.S.
Agency for International Development (“USAID”). This article
concludes with open questions about how the MCA’s resultsbased and country-driven approach may have unintended consequences on U.S. development policy, including on donor
agencies such as USAID, and encourages debate on these
impacts that may extend to similar effects on other organizations
such as the World Bank.

THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS

At the September 2000 UN Millennium Summit, the international community marked the turn of the millennium by
adopting the UN Millennium Declaration, stating that “only
through broad and sustained efforts to create a shared future,
based upon our common humanity in all its diversity, can globalization be made fully inclusive and equitable.”5 Adopted as a
General Assembly resolution, the UN Millennium Declaration
built upon the international community’s previous commitments
including those to human rights, the environment, and poverty
alleviation. Over 150 heads of state of developing and developed nations unanimously adopted the Declaration, which
pledges “to spare no effort to free all of humanity, and above all
our children and grandchildren, from the threat of living on a
planet irredeemably spoilt by human activities, and whose
resources would no longer be sufficient for their needs.”6 The
global compact reached by these world leaders endorsed a set of
time-bound and measurable targets to combat issues such as
poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, environmental degradation,
and discrimination against women, which became known as the
Millennium Development Goals.
The MDGs provide a common language for this global
pledge by enumerating eight goals: (1) eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; (2) achieve universal primary education; (3) promote gender equality and empower women; (4) reduce child
mortality; (5) improve maternal health; (6) combat HIV/AIDS,
malaria, and other diseases; (7) ensure environmental sustainability; and (8) develop a global partnership for development.
Goals One through Seven are interconnected and directed at
reducing poverty in all forms. Goal Eight provides the means to
achieve the first seven goals. The MDGs set out quantifiable targets to measure country progress ranging from halving extreme
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poverty to halting the spread of HIV/AIDS.7 The targets are to be
achieved by 2015. However, every country, whether it is an aid
donor or recipient, is responsible for the determination and
implementation of policies to achieve these goals.
If reached, the overall impact of the MDGs in the developing world would be unparalleled. For example, if the goals were
met in just ten countries, the following would likely occur:
almost six million children will go to school for the first time;
24 million more people will be able to drink clean water; for
every thousand children under the age of five, one hundred of
them would be saved from dying unnecessarily; and more than
25 million people would be raised above the poverty level of
one dollar per day.8
The international community is far from achieving the
MDGs. In particular, the success of achieving the environmentally specific goals has been quite mixed. The United Nations
Development Programme’s Human Development Report 2003
provides a comprehensive status report on poverty trends.
This Report tracked the
progress in achieving the
MDGs, which use 1990 as the
baseline year for measuring
improvement. The Report
found that many countries had
moved forward in achieving
parity between girls and boys in
primary school enrollment and
universal primary education.9
However, the Report also found
that many countries’ rates of
economic growth were not on
target to halve income poverty
by 2015.10 Similarly, in dozens of countries the report found that
the standard of living had actually declined since 1990, and that
the number of income-poor in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia,
and Latin America combined has increased by approximately
ten million people each year over the same period.11 Similarly
grim, the Report noted that if developing countries do not accelerate their progress towards creating access to safe drinking
water, close to 2.4 billion people will still be without improved
sanitation in 2015, a number that is almost equal to the number
of people lacking clean water and basic sanitation today.12
The international community is in general agreement that
current trends indicate that meeting the MDGs by 2015 is not
likely. While there are a variety of factors involved in the projected failure of the majority of developing countries to achieve
the MDGs, three commonly cited explanations are worth discussing. The first is MDGs are too limited because they lack
specific accountability for the developed countries and provide
little guidance on how to meet the MDGs in the developing
world. Second, developed nations are not implementing the
goals in a consistent, coordinated fashion. This fractured
approach is exemplified by the United States, which has chosen
to break from the MDGs and follow its own plan for development. The third preferred explanation is that the overall amount

of funding is insufficient to achieve the great alleviation of
poverty sought by the MDGs.
First, civil society organizations have proposed that the
MDGs are too limited because they lack specific accountability
for the developed countries and provide little guidance on how
to meet the MDGs in the developing world.13 The MDGs’ limitations primarily result from the fact that countries wanting to
achieve the MDGs are not given adequate guidance on how to
do so. For instance, the MDGs do not offer policy or economic
suggestions, but rather leave the implementation aspects under
the purview of each country. Compounding developing countries’ frustration in attempting to enlist assistance from the
developed world is the fact that the MDGs do not effectively
engage the rich, developed countries in this process. Aside from
signing a global compact to support the MDGs, the MDGs lack
strong incentives or accountability measures for the developed
countries to actually implement or promote them.
Second, although world
leaders signed onto the MDGs in
2000, the developed nations
have not implemented consistent
measures to provide resources
and funding for the developing
world. Few donor countries have
met the goal of providing 0.7
percent of their gross national
product in foreign aid.14 This
inconsistent implementation of
measures to promote the MDGs
among developed nations was
most recently exemplified by the
U.S. attempt to renegotiate the
proceedings at the most recent
UN World Summit in September 2005 in New York City. The
United States has not only failed to provide anywhere near 0.7
percent of its GNP in aid, but has also broken completely with
the strategy for development in the MDGs. Prior to the 2005 UN
Millennium Summit meeting, the United States was no longer in
agreement with other nations promoting the MDGs as the internationally accepted approach for framing the development agenda. Rather, the United States considered the MDGs one approach
among others. The Washington Post reported that the “the Bush
administration has thrown the [world summit] proceedings in
turmoil with a call for drastic renegotiation”15 by introducing
more than 750 amendments to the draft agreement that all the
attending world leaders would sign. These amendments called
for “striking any mention of the [MDGs]. . . Instead, the United
States has sought to underscore the importance of the Monterrey
Consensus, a 2002 summit in Mexico that focused on free-market reforms, and required governments to improve accountability in exchange for aid and debt relief.”16 These changes
“mark[ed] a final break with the pledge [to support the MDGs]
agreed by the Clinton administration.”17
The third explanation for the projected failure to achieve
the MDGs is that there is insufficient financial support from the
international community. Jeffrey Sachs, head of the Millennium

There is a debate on how
[Millennium Challenge
Account]’s large budget,
new methodology, and
country selection process
will impact USAID.
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Project based at Columbia University, developed teams of
experts to examine policies and develop approaches necessary
to accomplish the various goals. Sachs believes that it is critical
for the developed world to recognize that without sufficient aid,
the poorest countries will be unable to generate the capital necessary on their own to develop and will remain in what he calls
the “poverty trap.” Sachs mentions that with “good governance,
planning, and sufficient funds in place, the final step towards
achieving the MDGs is the implementation of specific programs
and national strategies.”18 For instance, experts and engineers at
USAID have the capacity to make progress in certain areas such
as sanitation and infant mortality, but insufficient funding has
limited the application of this expertise.19 Criticism of Sachs
focuses on the fact that his economics-driven approach overlooks the social, political, and physical environments of recipient nations; however, adequate funding is at least one critical
factor in achieving effective development assistance.20
With less than a decade left before the target deadline for
the MDGs, donor organizations and governments recognize that
their current efforts are inadequate. The United States has
refocused its development
approach by institutionalizing a
new methodology and a new
agency with a relatively large
sum of money for development
assistance to address extreme
global poverty. This newly
focused approach, represented
by the MCA, could present a
unique opportunity for the current administration to significantly transform U.S. development policy and maximize its
global impact, or it could hamper the effectiveness of already
existing aid organizations.

MCA could yield the most fundamental changes to U.S. foreign
assistance policy since President John F. Kennedy introduced
the Peace Corps, USAID, and the Alliance for Progress in the
early 1960s by providing significant amounts of foreign aid that
is bilateral and country-driven.23 Policies promoting economic
growth stimulate a wide range of positive effects on the environment, women, health, and children. Economic prosperity can
improve people’s lives by providing families with options that
promote sustainable development rather than, for example,
unsustainable environmental degradation. If the United States
has indeed found a more efficient way to promote economic
growth through the MCA, the far-reaching effects will touch on
many of the MDGs.

AVOIDING COMMON DONOR DILEMMAS: REDUCING
BUREAUCRACY, PROMOTING ACCOUNTABILITY, AND
PROVIDING INCENTIVES

The MCA may provide a solution for the three key shortcomings of MDGs: (1) ineffective national implementation; (2)
lack of specific accountability;
and (3) insufficient funding. The
MCA’s streamlined organization
and independent status enable it
to avoid difficulties associated
with other donor programs’ massive bureaucracies. Its resultsdriven approach addresses the
typical problems caused by lack
of coordination with recipientcountry development strategies
and focuses on achieving results
rather than initiating sound policy and governance structures.24
The MCA avoids bureaucratic
difficulties by channeling its funds through an independent government corporation, the MCC. The MCC requires accountability in recipient countries and is designed to be an accountable and
transparent local institution itself. The eligibility criteria for MCA
funds also provide an incentive for countries to demonstrate a
strong commitment towards “ruling justly, investing in their people, and encouraging economic freedom.”25

It has yet to be seen how
coordination and
cooperation is progressing
between [the Millennium
Challenge Account and
USAID].

THE MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE ACCOUNT

In March 2002, President George W. Bush unveiled a new
foreign aid program, the Millennium Challenge Account, to
address development aid challenges. The Bush administration
hopes the MCA will be an effective mechanism by which the
United States can improve some of its foreign aid programs,
which have faced much criticism. For instance, USAID has been
criticized for its inability to achieve strong results in recipient
countries and the lack of accountability among its many levels of
bureaucracy. Similarly, USAID is often criticized for its highly
bureaucratic nature and competing self interests. Additionally,
the United States’ extensive practice of Congressional earmarking has forced USAID to allocate funds for politically popular
programs, such as disaster relief, instead of entirely allowing
USAID the freedom to determine on its own which programs
need funding.21 If the MCA proves successful, it is likely to have
a great influence on the way future development is implemented.
Domestically, the MCA’s success could lead to stronger
Congressional support for aid programs and general initiatives
supporting low income countries.22 If implemented properly, the
15

Reducing Bureaucracy

The MCA and the subsequent creation of an independent
implementation institution, the MCC, represent the United States’
attempt to address and resolve the bureaucratic problems faced by
other donor models and organizations. The MCC is designed to be
flexible and efficient in its contracts, program implementation,
and personnel management. The MCC sidesteps two major
bureaucratic obstacles common to other development agencies by
being an independent government corporation free from
Congressional earmarks, and by maintaining a relatively small
staff, congressionally capped at two hundred employees.
The MCC’s corporate structure is also an attempt to reduce
the effects of bureaucracy by keeping policy authority centralized in a few people organized as a “Board of Directors.” As a
corporation, it is managed by a Chief Executive Officer
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

(“CEO”) appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate. It is supervised by a Board of Directors composed of the
Secretaries of State and Treasury, the U.S. Trade Representative,
the Administrator of USAID, the CEO of the MCC, and four
non-government directors nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, with the Secretary of State acting as the
Chairman of the Board.26
The Board selects countries eligible for the MCA based on
sixteen indicators falling under the three categories: “ruling justly,” “encouraging economic freedom,” and “investing in people.” The Board has discretion to look at other factors drawn in,
but not limited to, consultation with experts and supplemental
information from the U.S. State Department Human Rights
Reports and Transparency International’s Corruption Perception
Index.27 In keeping with a streamlined approach and decision
making process to allocate development aid, the Board harmonizes the relationship between the recipient country and the
MCC by signing “Compacts” with these countries. Compacts
are agreements between the recipient country and the MCC
where the recipient country has the principal responsibility of
managing and implementing the compact, with the assistance of
the MCC. Also, because MCA eligible countries are tasked with
the responsibility of submitting proposals and providing oversight and monitoring, the MCC can remain a small institution in
staff size tasked with moving the MCA to countries signing
compacts. Instead of having a significant amount of MCC staff
in each country where a compact exists, the MCC relies on each
country to report back to them. This operational method has
been called a “foundation approach” to development.

Promoting Accountability

The MCA’s means to foster accountability and country
responsibility represent departures from other development
approaches and foreign assistance programs in four ways. First,
the MCA only provides development aid to countries that show
a commitment to sound development and economic policies.
Second, the MCA proposes greater recipient involvement that
includes a “foundation approach” where the MCC receives proposals from governments and chooses which will receive funding. This places the responsibility for program design and implementation on the recipient countries.28 The MCA’s implementing
charter, the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003, has focused
objectives aimed at economic growth and poverty reduction
through country-driven proposals and recipient country-monitored projects, unlike other foreign assistance programs where
the agency or organization determines where money should be
spent and for what purposes. Third, the MCA focuses on results
that require MCA recipients to delineate measurable performance benchmarks in their proposals for each request. The benchmarks must focus on substantive goals, such as increasing test
scores; raising immunization rates by a specific amount; and
institutional goals, e.g. improving auditing systems, strengthening legal codes, or training a certain number of teachers.29 These
benchmarks are more specific than the MDGs. Also, each project must incorporate aspects of monitoring and evaluating the
proposal’s progress. Fourth, the creation of the MCC to administer the MCA is meant to lower bureaucratic and administrative
FALL 2005

costs by maintaining a small accountable staff and providing
them with specific guidelines for aid allocation.

Providing Incentives

While MDGs do not delineate a plan for domestic implementation of policies geared towards achieving the goals, the
MCC provides incentives for countries seeking MCA funding to
demonstrate their commitment to “ruling justly, investing in
their people, and encouraging economic freedom.”30 As former
MCC CEO Paul Applegarth observed on the eligibility for MCA
seeking countries, “if they can get the policy environment right,
they will generate growth and capital.” Armenian Foreign
Minister Vartan Oskanian testified that this incentive-based
approach has had positive effects in that “inclusion in the
Millennium program had made [his] country ‘more focused’ on
governance, democracy, rule of law, and human rights.”31
While critics argue that the MDGs are inadequately funded,
U.S. President Bush proposed that the MCA receive funding of
five billion dollars per year within three years (by 2007), representing a fifty percent increase in official development assistance.32 The impact of the MCA funding is significant. As
Applegarth noted, “[w]hen the program is fully funded, each
[MCC] eligible country could receive as much as $300 million
in additional aid per year beyond its current foreign assistance.”33 Foreign aid and development expert Steve Radelet
describes the amount in the following manner:
For the first year, Congress has approved [one billion
dollars] in funding. If the administration’s list of firstyear qualifiers ultimately includes, say, [fifteen] countries, the average country could receive $67 million.
This is equivalent to about one-sixth of the average
total capital inflows (from aid and other sources) of
$384 per country for IDA-eligible countries.
Ultimately, if the MCA receives a total budget of, say,
three billion dollars (a figure more likely than the [five
billion dollars] proposed by the president), and 25
countries qualify, the average per country would reach
$120 million per year, equivalent to about one-third of
current capital inflows.34

The MCA’s relatively large budget, combined with the
small number of qualifying countries, could create a strong
incentive for countries to try to qualify, while enabling the contributions to make a significant impact on the developing countries that do qualify. How effective the MCC will be at achieving poverty alleviation by efficiently and effectively allocating
aid is still largely speculation. While many are optimistic about
the potential of this new methodology, others are wary that the
MCC’s country selection process and relatively small institutional size may have unintended negative consequences on the
poor developing nations that do not qualify for the MCA and
other donor agencies, particularly USAID.35

CRITIQUES OF THE MCA AND MCC

Critics of the MCA and MCC highlight a variety of problems in its design, as well as potential unforeseen or unintended
consequences. The potential design flaws include the indicators
for country selection, the administrative priority placed on the
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MCC, and the size of the agency. The possible negative consequences include the abandonment of the poorest performing
developing countries, and the neglect and undermining of the
already established USAID. This section will discuss the critiques of the MCC and MCA’s design, as well as the potential
effects on the poorest countries. The next section will address
the interplay and competition between the MCC and USAID.
The MCA country selectivity attempts to provide an incentive for developing countries to compete to qualify for funding.
To ensure that the selection process for countries eligible for the
MCA is on their merits, the MCA uses a numerical governance
ranking system developed by private research institutes and
international agencies. Eligible countries must perform above
the average score of all countries in a minimum of half of the
indicators within the categories of ruling justly,36 economic
freedom,37 and investment in
people.38 This median approach
is problematic because, as countries develop and improve, the
overall median will inevitably
rise. If countries grow at comparable rates, those countries
developing slower than the
average rate will fail to reach
the ever rising median score.
The effect will be to permanently exclude certain countries
from MCA eligibility. Thomas
Palley, the Director of the Open
Society Institute’s Globalization
Reform Project, provides the
following analogy to illustrate
this point:

Administration is prioritizing the MCA vis-à-vis other foreign
aid programs; and (2) whether the MCA has the staffing capacity to accomplish all it sets out to achieve. If the past year provides any insight, the MCA is high on the Administration’s priority list. The first MCA grant or “Compact” was signed on
April 18, 2005 with Madagascar, just over a year after the MCA
was established. Since then four other Compacts were signed
with over $600 million promised in aid.41 However, whether
this “Compact” approach is successful, and how results-based
aid translates into reality, is still unknown, but it is clear that the
MCA has momentum.
Some foreign aid scholars have questioned whether the
small MCC staff, with a cap of two hundred employees that is
one-tenth the size of USAID’s staff, will be able to handle all
these Compacts.42 As Steve Radelet noted, “[two hundred] people seems inordinately insufficient for a program with an
annual budget of [five billion
dollars].”43 He has also speculated the MCC has contracted
out many services, including
monitoring and evaluation, and
work through USAID staff in a
particular country.44 The MCC
may also contribute to deeper
fragmentation or confusion
among U.S. aid programs
through overlapping programs.
Critics fear the high profile of
the MCA could detract
resources from other U.S. programs such as USAID. The
coming year should shed light
on the interplay between the MCC and USAID.
In its current state, the MCA may achieve its own poverty
alleviation goals with the best performers of the developing
world, roughly the top twenty percent, but this may come at the
expense of the other eighty percent that will be left to seek funding from other sources.45 Because the country selection process
uses a ranking system with a shifting median, some poor performing countries are permanently unable to qualify. These
countries, the “basket case” developing countries that do not
meet the MCA standards, will be left on the doorsteps of other
donor organizations. Other donor organizations will then be
faced with more difficult challenges in providing effective aid to
countries suffering from a myriad of factors detrimental to utilizing assistance, such as corruption, lack of good governance,
and lack of political will. Further, because these countries are
poor performers, donor agencies will be required to use additional resources to assist these countries in improving and then
effectively utilizing the aid. One study concluded it unlikely that
other donors would increase their own commitments to MCA
countries in response to the U.S. presence.46 This study found it
“much more plausible that over time other donors will reduce
their assistance to MCA countries . . . and funnel some of their
aid to other countries.”47 The results of this shift can be either

The approach
characterized by the
[Millennium Challenge
Account] is a departure
from the target-setting
approach of the
Millennium Development
Goals . . .

[T]he problem can be understood in terms of a simple
analogy with two runners who are equally fast, but one of
which begins with a half mile advantage. Given that they
are equally fast, the disadvantaged runner never catches
up with his rival, even though both are moving forward.
The policy implication is that relying on relative performance (i.e. the group median) is problematic, and it is
better to find measures that are absolute in character.39

This shifting median may ensure that some countries
always narrowly miss MCA eligibility and will only be augmented by the currently proposed yearly expansion in the pool
of eligible countries in year three to include 28 nations with
average per capita incomes between $1,435 and $2,975.
Although these countries will be assessed with separate median
scores from the countries with average incomes less than
$1,435, nevertheless, “the nations potentially eligible in year
three also have much greater access to alternative sources of
financing, with higher private capital flows, savings rates, and
government revenues . . . including this new group would divert
aid resources away from countries with greater needs and fewer
financing alternatives.”40
Two issues remain to be fully examined because the MCC
is not yet fully funded or fully staffed: (1) how the
17

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

positive or negative. On one hand, more aid is freed up for nonMCA countries when donor organizations move their projects
out of MCA countries. On the other hand, donor agencies may
find that they are funding non-MCA countries incapable of successfully utilizing aid and therefore adding to the list of failed
projects.

MCA IMPACT ON THE U.S. AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The MCA could fail to achieve its goals in its own right, as
well as undermine the efforts of other donor organizations. The
MCA’s potentially significant impact on the USAID is an example of how the MCA may affect the allocation of development
aid. At present, there is a debate on how MCA’s large budget,
new methodology, and country selection process will impact
USAID. It seems inevitable that politics, institutional differences, and overlapping efforts between both agencies will cause
friction and tension.
With a budget growing to five billion dollars in 2006,
roughly doubling present U.S. spending dedicated to development, the MCA brings significant new resources to qualifying
countries. While the USAID budget remains significantly smaller than MCA’s, the MCA’s expanding funds are not only perceived by many as an affront to USAID, but also as indicative
of the Administration’s political leanings towards promoting the
MCA as a leader in foreign development. It is significant that
the Administration chose to create a stand-alone MCC, rather
than place it under the administration of USAID or the State
Department. This move has the potential to undercut USAID,
“by creating the impression that its programs are unlikely to be
as effective as those funding by the [MCC].”48 The impact the
MCC may have on USAID ranges from USAID and the MCC
working in harmony to shuttle countries from the Threshold
Program49 into the MCC’s eligible country list, to USAID and
MCC in competition for resources and struggling with interagency coordination, to USAID disappearing as a stand-alone
agency and instead becoming absorbed under another agency,
possibly the State Department or the MCC.
The MCA’s institutional structure was created to avoid the
problems faced by USAID and allow the MCA to function more
independently and with less Congressional interference. The
MCA has a relatively simple legislative framework governing it
with no legislative earmarks. In contrast, USAID faces multiple
demands from Congress each year, adding yet another layer of
bureaucracy into its aid allocation process. For example, the U.S.
Foreign Assistance Act, which determines the terms of international aid, is frequently amended and now contains 33 goals, 75
priority areas, and 247 directives.50 USAID often allocates funding for other programs and development projects because
Congress frequently engages in “earmarking,” where funds are
dedicated from the overall budget to specific, politically popular
programs.51 Congress has historically left foreign aid and
USAID missions “hamstrung with its annual list of assistance
earmarks . . . 274 at last count.”52 As one former USAID Foreign
Service Officer noted, “these earmarks . . . are more driven by
pork-barrel politics than developmental vision or knowledge of
best practices, and drastically reduce levels of flexibility, responFALL 2005

siveness and effectiveness for foreign aid.”53 This hinders
USAID in its efforts to maintain a consistent and clear budget.
Although the Administration claims that USAID and the
MCA will not compete for Congressional funds, both institutions might find themselves in competition for other resources,
such as employees and experts. USAID and MCA are independent agencies with separate budgets, and there is speculation
that Congress, under Republican leadership, will be more
inclined to fund the MCA and augment that budget in lieu of the
USAID, given that the MCC is the current administration’s initiative. The MCC “is likely to draw staff and resources from
USAID, further weakening the agency, possibly engendering
some resentment and making cooperation difficult.”54 On the
other hand, others argue that, given the drastically different
approaches to aid between the MCC and USAID, USAID’s
expertise will remain with the agency and with very few
employees will move to the MCC.55 Therefore, the MCC will be
weakened from not having the years of experience in development assistance that some USAID employees could impart on
this new agency. It has yet to be seen how coordination and
cooperation is progressing between the two organizations, and
this is likely to be under scrutiny as more of these Compacts are
signed in countries with a strong USAID presence.56
There is concern that politically less popular development
programs, such as USAID, will suffer from the reduction in the
quality of recipient countries after MCA, as a Bush
Administration initiative, picks the best performers. The deterioration of USAID recipient countries may increase USAID’s
difficulty in achieving successful development and lessen its
ability to attract Congressional fiscal support, thereby weakening the institution as a whole. In contrast to USAID’s struggle to
receive funding for growth-oriented projects, the MCA will
have five billion dollars for these projects. Therefore, a possible
unintended effect may be that USAID will become the organization whose mission will be to assist countries ineligible for
MCA funding, particularly the “threshold countries,” to improve
their domestic policy to become eligible for the MCA. This has
already begun with the “Threshold Program,”57 where USAID
allocated $40 million to help seven countries achieve MCA eligibility. To complicate the Program, threshold countries may
qualify one year and not the next. In this situation, confusion
may arise as these countries continually are shuffled between
USAID and the MCA.58 The ultimate trend signified by this
shifting of “threshold countries” is that, for better or worse,
USAID could become more of a supporting development
agency for countries seeking MCC eligibility rather than as its
own independent development agency.
The MCA has instituted a methodology for development
aid, an approach that selects only particular countries and is both
results-based and country-driven. If the MCA approach succeeds, there is likely to be an increase in pressure to reform
USAID and accelerate global demands for greater accountability in recipient governments. The MCA has the potential not only
to thwart substantive USAID development aid allocations, but
also to force USAID and possibly other institutions to reexamine
their current structure and effectiveness in foreign aid assistance.
18

CONCLUSION

The MCA is a significant attempt by the United States to
address poverty alleviation and sustainable development through
a different approach than the MDGs. However, the debate surrounding the effectiveness of the MCA and its approach leads to
a broader discussion on how to improve the MCA to better
achieve its goals and minimize the impact of the MCA on other
donor organizations. No easy solution exists, and since the MCA
is still in its beginning stages, this article hopes to foster debate
and discussion on the potential impacts of the MCA.
The following are a few questions for future consideration,
for those interested in how the MCA is impacting foreign development programs. For example, has the United States decreased
its financial commitments toward other development organizations such as USAID and the World Bank since the establishment of the MCA? Have donor organizations withdrawn their
funding or interest from certain countries as a result of the MCA
presence there? Has the World Bank noticed a decrease in countries requesting loans and are these countries instead seeking
MCA grants? Has there been a noticeable increase in the num-
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ber of developing countries not eligible for the MCA at the
World Bank or USAID?
This article has provided an overview of two development
approaches, the MDGs’ target-setting approach and the MCA’s
country-driven and results-oriented approach. The MCA is a
newly focused mechanism for foreign development aid and provides the United States with an opportunity to reassert global
leadership through an effective foreign assistance program.
With only five Compacts signed and awaiting allocation of
funds to begin implementing the various proposals, the future of
the MCA is unclear. The potential problems with the MCC as an
institution are still only speculative. Nevertheless the impacts of
the MCA could be considerable and merit considerable attention. These include the potential for leaving a significant portion
of developing countries at the door steps of other agencies and
leaving these agencies with countries where more resources are
likely to be needed to be effective.
It is hoped that this article serves as a starting point for what
will become a continued analytical discussion on the MCA and its
impact on both U.S. and international donor organizations.
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PROTECTING CHILDREN AND THEIR MOTHERS:

THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS PUSH LOFTY HEALTH TARGETS

T

by Frank Pigott*

FALL 2005

achieving these goals is an increase in investments to the targeted regions (e.g. sub-Saharan Africa). The vaccines, nutrition, and proper care needed, though simple and taken for
granted in developed countries, must be implemented in the
developing countries to ensure equal opportunities for children
and mothers. The United States, Great Britain, France, and
other developed countries must stand behind their promises to
achieve the MDGs and donate the necessary funds and supplies to the regions in danger of not reaching the MDGs. A
child’s fate and that of his mother should not be detrimentally
predetermined based on the country they live in.

Courtesy of Stuart Briggs (January 2005)

he Millennium Development Goals (“MDGs”) contain
two important health initiatives relevant to child and
maternal welfare: 1) Goal Four calls for the reduction
of child mortality by two-thirds; and 2) Goal Five appeals for
the reduction of the maternal mortality ratio by three-quarters.1
The daunting data on child mortality illustrates the need for
action. According to the World Health Organization (“WHO”),
over ten million children die each year in developing countries.2 In addition, children under five in developing countries
have a one in ten chance of dying, compared to a ratio of one
in 143 in wealthier countries.3
The United Nations Millennium Development Goals
Report 2005 (“UN report”) shows that child mortality is
strongly related to poverty level, as poor countries have less
access to advances in child survival treatments than wealthier
countries.4 Five diseases are responsible for fifty percent of all
deaths of children under five – pneumonia, diarrhea, malaria,
measles, and AIDS.5 The data suggests that nutrition is the
most important preventative measure, because malnutrition
weakens the immune system.6 According to the UN report,
safe water, better sanitation, education, and higher income levels can also increase a child’s life expectancy.7 Other measures
to reduce child mortality rates include breastfeeding, immunization, antibiotics for acute respiratory infections, oral rehydration for diarrhea, and use of insecticide-treated mosquito
nets and drugs for malaria.8
Maternal health, the fifth MDG target, is particularly
important because of its interrelation to the reduction in child
mortality pushed by Goal Four. Unfortunately, for many pregnant women, giving birth often results in death – over 500,000
each year.9 Mothers also face a life of disabling and painful
complications developed during childbirth.10 In sub-Saharan
Africa, a woman has a one in sixteen chance of dying during
pregnancy or childbirth, compared to a one in 3800 chance in
a developed country.11 Much of this difference is due to the
disparity in family planning, pre-natal services, and obstetrics
care between these two worlds. Thus, developing countries can
reduce maternal mortality by providing women increased
access to adequate reproductive health care.12 For example,
Egypt reduced its maternal mortality ratio by fifty percent in
only eight years by instituting a comprehensive program to
improve the quality of medical care through better management of obstetric complications, the presence of skilled attendants at births, and community support and family planning
services for pregnant women.13
The disparity between developed and undeveloped country mortality rates for children under five and pregnant women
demonstrates the need for a strong commitment to achieving
MDG Goals Four and Five. As with other MDGs, the key to

Children in South Africa
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THE POLITICS OF THE MILLENNIUM
DEVELOPMENT GOALS IN AFRICA:
IS GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP REALLY WORKING?

S

by Charles Mutasa*
INTRODUCTION

ome five years from the Millennium Declaration we are
faced with the inevitable need to reassess the current levels of poverty, the instruments that are in place for tackling poverty, and indeed the constraints that must be resolved.
The Millennium Development Goals (“MDGs”) represent an
unprecedented commitment by all nations and institutions,
including the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) and the
World Bank, to implement and realize the MDG targets that
need to be emphasized at all stages. The global ability to realize
the MDGs is partly dependent on the financing of such development. Aside from being affirmed as part of Goal Eight in the
MDGs, such understanding has also been reaffirmed in the 2002
Monterrey Consensus on enhancing financing for development.
MDGs are unique in that they represent the first global
compact among the heads of state of developed and developing

“Northern governments are guilty of
offering empty promises to the poor when
it comes to TRADE, AID, AND DEBT
RELIEF. While Least Developed Countries
face a complex of problems . . .efforts to
combat poverty have been systematically
undermined by Northern governments. On
trade, the industrialized countries have
operated a policy of highway robbery
masquerading as market access
preferences.”
– Kelvin Watkins, Oxfam International (2002)1
countries, the United Nations system, the World Bank, and the
IMF.2 The Goals have clear targets and achievable time-bound
indicators of success, which can galvanize support among citizens and governments alike. Throughout 2005, with ten years
remaining until the target year of 2015, civil society organizations, governments, and multilateral institutions will be focused
on meeting the Millennium Development Goals.
It is often said that global targets are easily set but seldom
met, and that for each success story there have been some setbacks. To many, the recent, September 2005 UN MDG+5
review, a summit that evaluated the progress towards the UN
Millennium Declaration, was much ado about nothing. Sadly,
issues of UN reform, peace and collective security, and human
21

rights and the rule of law overshadowed the MDGs’ review.
Deletions of key commitments to the MDGs, including a deletion of the timeframe of 2015, were the order of the day.4 On
issues of Official Development Assistance (“ODA”), the developed countries agreed to increase aid by approximately $50 billion a year by 2010.5 This commitment serves to track whether
the developed countries will live up to their initial aid commitment level of 0.7 percent of gross national product (“GNP”). No
mention, however, was made of the need to replace the much
abhorrent Highly Indebted Poor Countries (“HIPC”) debt sustainability framework.

BACKGROUND

Of particular importance to this article is Goal Eight, a late
addition to the MDGs, which outlines Northern governments’
commitment to a global partnership for development. If Goal
Eight is ignored, it is hard to imagine the poorest countries
achieving any of the other seven Goals. Goal Eight addresses
debt cancellation; trade justice; equitable governance in global
institutions; and political, social, and economic rights for the

“Will the legacy of our generation be more
than a series of broken promises?”

– Nelson Mandela, (2001)3

poor. These issues are an indispensable foundation for policies
that will enable sustained progress to end poverty in the South.
It is an important goal for holding developed countries accountable in advancing the MDGs.6 This goal is particularly significant, as it requires richer countries to reform their policies and
actions to contribute to the fight against poverty.
Developing countries, especially those in sub-Saharan
Africa, will not be able to mobilize enough resources to attain
the MDGs by 2015 unless there are radical changes in terms of
aid administration, international trade, and the resolution of the
burgeoning debt crisis.7 One big problem is the conditionality
embedded in each country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
(“PRSP”), the center and key to the much needed development
aid.8 The poorest countries are required to prepare PRSPs, under
the guidance of the World Bank and the IMF, in order to qualify for loans or debt relief. The PRSP itself is not an adequate
funding criterion, nor is it an important tool in MDG attainment.
The PRSP depends on a country having a Poverty Reduction
* Charles Mutasa is Executive Director of the African Forum & Network on Debt
& Development (“AFRODAD”).
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and Growth Facility (“PRGF”) program and meeting all the
conditions and benchmarks in the PRGF, which are not contained in the PRSP, but instead are hidden in the “Letter of
Intent” (which lays out the IMF’s recovery plan) between the
government and the IMF.9 Thus, the content of the Letter of
Intent is crucial in attaining the MDGs. Unless the MDG targets
are also included in the IMF and World Bank instruments, the
attainment of MDGs will remain a dream.
It is important to note that the global structures that maintain poverty and marginalize the rights of the poorest clearly
need reform, but the Northern governments' approaches to the
MDGs pay little attention to these major framework issues.The
UN should play a strong role in regular monitoring of the donor
countries’ progress on attaining Goal Eight. Additionally, the
framework for Goal Eight reporting should be revised to include
indicators on global governance and participation.
While a more equitable trade system is vital, donor ODA,
along with substantial debt cancellation, provides the essential,
additional financing capacities. This is particularly true for the
poorest countries’ progress in reducing and eliminating poverty.
Now is the time for the North to honor mutual commitments and
obligations in a spirit of genuine solidarity. Such commitments
are encapsulated in the Millennium Development Goals, in particular Goal Eight.
In this article, of particular interest are Goal Eight targets that:
• Further develop an open trading and financial system
that is rule-based, predictable, and non-discriminatory. This includes a commitment to good governance,
development, and poverty reduction, both nationally
and internationally.
• Address the Least Developed Countries’ (“LDCs”)
special needs. This includes tariff- and quota-free
access for their exports, enhanced debt relief for
heavily indebted poor countries, cancellation of official bilateral debt, and more generous ODA for countries committed to poverty reduction.
• Deal comprehensively with developing countries’
debt problems through national and international
measures to make debt sustainable in the long term.

Taking Nigeria as an example of an African country embattled with debt, trade, and aid issues, research reveals that four
decades after its independence in 1960, Nigeria remains a poor
country with a per capita income of $260 in 2000.10 At the dawn
of the third millennium, approximately 70 percent of the population still lived on less than a dollar a day – an indicator of extreme
poverty.11 Real gross domestic product (“GDP”) growth has
remained sluggish, averaging 3.5 percent per annum since 2000.
Nigeria is also a highly indebted country with total external debt
exceeding $31 billion in 2003.12 The debt service burden remains
crushing. Foreign aid in the form of ODA has been low and has
declined during the past decade.13 In 2002, ODA per capita was
less than two dollars,14 and total ODA was only 0.4 percent of
GNP. Clearly, Nigeria would find it difficult to attain the
Millennium Development Goals without massive assistance from
development partners in the areas of aid, trade, and debt relief.
FALL 2005

KEY CONCERNS WITH MDG GOAL EIGHT

The African Forum and Network on Debt and Development
(“AFRODAD”) has identified several key concerns with
Northern governments’ commitments to Goal Eight:15
• Donors have not been responsive to LDCs’ programming processes. ODA disbursement is often late, in
most cases coming after the national budget process.
This delays the implementation of poverty-reduction
programs. Donor funding is also inadequate and does
not cover recurrent costs, which comprise the bulk of
government expenditure in the priority sectors. For
example, Tanzania’s debt burden is increasing at an
alarming rate, even though it is on the HIPC
Initiative. There is evidence that, even after the HIPC
relief, debt sustainability levels will not be reached.
• Donor-imposed “Washington Consensus” policies
remain at the heart of PRSPs. Donors increasingly
use PRSPs as a guide to achieving the MDGs under
the largely rhetorical claim that these strategies are
“owned” by developing countries.

• Donor-imposed aid conditions affect the achievability of the MDGs in at least two respects: first, institutions like the IMF and World Bank use aid conditions
to channel aid based on their assessments of compliance to their policy prescriptions. Second, bilateral
donors channel significant MDG aid resources into
highly conditioned budget support for implementing
a country’s PRSP, or into sector-wide programs in
support of a line-ministry program in education,
health, or agriculture.16

• The MDG approach can potentially encourage the
development of a country-owned and credible longterm strategy for growth and poverty reduction. But
the policy-making process falls far short of that
potential. This is partly because implementation of
the MDGs is still driven by the PRGF´s macro-economic framework, and the poverty-reduction strategy
is pegged on the widely disguised HIPC initiative.
Basic policy priorities and operational frameworks
are also lacking and should be pursued under the
MDG framework to break from the poverty trap.
• The government’s role in most African economies has
changed radically after years of implementing World
Bank/IMF structural adjustment programs. From once
being a central player in the economy, the government
has now been pushed to the sidelines where it is supposed to play the role of facilitator and provide only
essential social services. Under the IMF’s Enhanced
Structural Adjustment Facility (“ESAF”) and later
PRGF, the government has embarked on a wide range
of public sector and parastatal reforms.
• Existing macro-economic policies insufficiently
address social issues and poverty-reduction. Policy
reforms have suffered from serious design weakness-
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es in relation to African-type economies because they
neglect the impact of structural constraints, the lack
of economic and social infrastructure, the weakness
of market development and the entrepreneurial class,
and the low private-sector production capabilities. As
a result, the new policy environment does not deliver
high growth rates.

• Genuine ownership of national development policy,
including PRSPs, is a meaningless concept without
effective state capacities to control aid allocation, formulate policy agendas, and monitor outcomes.17 It is
the lack of coordination on the part of donors’ aid
projects in individual countries that undermines the
sustainability of aid programs and negatively affects
resource allocation and growth. Moreover, the
volatility of aid-flows can result in financial instability and hinder stable macroeconomic development.

Aid Issues

Linking donor aid disbursements to donor country goods and
services affects the quality of aid.19 It is estimated that aid-tying
devalues aid for recipients by up to 30 percent.20 Aid-tying continues to be high for a number of donors, despite a recent
Development Assistance Committee (of the Organization for

“There are large areas of the aid system
that are in urgent need of reform.”

– Action Aid International (2005)18

Economic Co-operation and Development) agreement to untie aid
to the LDCs. To illustrate, conditions, such as requiring the privatization of water systems in towns such as Dar es Salaam, were
placed on aid to Tanzania.21 Action like this not only increases
water prices but exposes populations to water-born diseases.22
Donors dictate policies to countries through aid conditionality; failure to meet these conditions can justify delays in aid
disbursement, suspensions of aid, or outright withdrawal. Such
policies have made it difficult for poor countries like Malawi,
Zambia, and Mozambique to use aid for sustainable development, including poverty reduction. Another problem is that
donors’ priorities have not always been consistent with the government’s priorities.
Poor governance, political interference, and corruption
have also affected the effective and efficient use of aid. In
regards to aid to Malawi, the Danish Charge D'Affaires, Finn
Skadkaer Pedersen, said that “a weak administration” and “systematic intimidation of the opposition” in Malawi have interfered with development programs since 1995.23 In return,
Malawi’s former President Bakili Muluzi accused donors of
meddling in African politics “by using their aid money to influence political trends on the continent.”24 Relations between
Denmark and Malawi worsened late last year when an audit
report instituted by Danish ambassador Orla Bakdal revealed
anomalies in Malawi’s use of Danish aid.25
23

Debt Issues

Debt continues to inhibit growth and wealth redistribution
by reducing the amount of money available to governments for
investment in social services and welfare. Debt service has
resulted in a decline in the rate of economic growth that, in turn,
has been associated with a decline in per capita income.

“Debt is tearing down schools and
hospitals. The effects are no less
devastating than war.”

– Adabayo Adedeji, African Center for
Development Strategy26

According to data reported in the World Development Reports,
Malawi’s GNP per capita appears to have risen during the 1970s
and peaked at $210 in 1983. It thereafter decreased, reaching
$160 in 1987. It then rose again, reaching the previous peak of
$210 in 1992, ultimately rising to $220 in 1997. Since then, per
capita GNP has fallen continuously and now stands at approximately $195. The decline in the rate of economic growth has
been associated with a decline in education services that make it
difficult to attain the MDGs.27 The increase in primary and secondary school enrollments has not been matched with a commensurate expansion in resources. As a result, classroom
accommodation is inadequate, with many primary school pupils
having to learn in outdoor settings. Boarding accommodation in
secondary schools is also insufficient.28
Healthcare has experienced a similar fate. The increase in
budgetary allocation to the health sector has been inadequate to
meet the needs of a rapidly increasing number of patients. This
has resulted in increasing numbers of in-patients per government hospital bed, declining availability of drugs and other
materials, and inadequate numbers of doctors in relation to the
size of the population. The delivery of medical services in government hospitals and clinics has certainly become inefficient.
Instead, government resources must go to debt repayment. The
world’s poorest countries continue to pay more every year in
debt payments than they receive in grants and loans, repaying an
enormous £ 100 million every day to the rich North.29
Sustainable debt-financing on the part of the developing
countries is an important element for mobilizing resources for
public and private investment. Exclusion of domestic debt and
contingent liabilities in the debt sustainability analysis are a particular concern for the HIPCs because of their implications for
fiscal resources available for financing poverty reduction.30
The 2005 Gleneagles’ G-8 Debt Deal is a step forward and
sets an important precedent in terms of granting a full cancellation of debt to all severely indebted poor countries.31 However,
the deal only represents one-eighth of what Africa needs in
terms of debt cancellation, because the deal only cancels $40
billion out of Africa’s burgeoning debt stock of over $330 billion. The $40 billion debt forgiveness “represents less than ten
percent of debt cancellation required for poor nations to meet
the MDGs in 2015.”32 The plan is additionally insufficient in
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

that it leaves out heavily indebted and impoverished middleincome countries. Furthermore, the eighteen qualifying countries are less than a third of countries that would need full cancellation in order to meet the MDGs by 2015.33 A prior press
release issued by AFRODAD explained this problem:
The G-8 debt agreement does not address the real global power imbalances but rather reinforces global
apartheid. The question of creditor-debtor co-responsibility of the South’s debt remains unresolved, as issues
of odious and illegitimate debts continue to be swept
under the carpet. It is not a lasting solution in which all
stakeholders-debtors and creditors have a say. It is just
a piecemeal measure that seems to deal with the symptoms of the problems and not the causes.34

Trade Issues

Africa’s share of global wealth over the last two decades
has decreased tremendously on a number of fronts, even in an
era of reforms. World trade, world production, net financial
flows, and foreign direct investments have been hindered either
by poor governance, the heavy debt burden, or by conflict and
political instability.
Increased foreign direct investment is unlikely to help subSaharan Africa attain the MDGs, particularly, because attracting
a constant stream of foreign direct investment is improbable.
The strongest critics of foreign direct investment call foreign
investors “whimsical,” “Afro-pessimistic,” and “unreliable partners.”35 South African president, Thabo Mbeki, made the following comments:
In our own country, we have been assured that our economic fundamentals are correct and sound. We have
developed a stable and effective financial and fiscal
system. We have reduced tariffs to levels that are comparable to the advanced industrial countries. We have
reformed agriculture to make it the least subsidized of
all the major agricultural trading nations. We have
restructured our public sector through privatization,
strategic partners and regulation . . . Yet, the flow of
investment into South Africa has not met our expectations while the levels of poverty and unemployment
remain high.36

Market access opportunities for LDCs can only be effective
if LDCs are assisted in building their capacities to produce tradable goods of higher value and acceptable quality at competitive
costs. Using the foreign exchange earned from primary exports,
these countries must survive on exports of raw cashew nuts, coffee, tea, and cotton, while importing everything else in the form
of industrial goods from abroad.37
LDCs’ chances to attain the MDGs are also harmed by the
subsidies for agricultural products in developed countries,
which pose an impossible challenge to most developing countries’ efforts to export farm produce to European markets. Yet, it
is in this area where LDCs have a comparative advantage that
would enable them to attain MDGs if given an opportunity for
fair competition.38
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Under the U.S. African Growth and Opportunity Act
(“AGOA”), Africa has increased exports of goods and products
to the U.S. market, especially textiles and clothing, nuts, beans,
and tobacco.39 However, Africa faces a number of constraints in
exporting to the U.S. market that will affect its ability to attain
the MDGs. The problems include supply-side constraints, high
administrative demands by the U.S. government, the high cost
of credit, lack of diversification, and competition from low-cost
producers of textiles and clothing (subsequent to the WTO’s
decision not to subject Chinese exports to quotas.)

RECOMMENDATIONS

To Donors and Developed Countries

The global community needs to realize that placing exclusive emphasis on MDG targets, while delivering only development aid without more sweeping reforms, will serve to shift the
blame once again onto the impoverished countries and their
people when the MDG targets are not met. Rather, donor countries should instead refocus their actions and policies by using a
more inclusive assessment of what it will take to achieve a sustained development away from poverty.40
AFRODAD suggests several goals that donors and developed countries should prioritize:41
• In order to be effective, aid should make a positive
impact on income levels and on poverty reduction.
• ODA should be more predictable to allow for better
planning. To date, the domestic resource base has
proved more reliable and more predictable than external resources.

• Better coordination and harmonization of donor
countries’ activities and the channelling of more
resources through the budget process will ensure that
money is used for programs identified as national priorities.

• Aid should be untied and donor countries should provide technical assistance for capacity building. Some
donors have completely untied aid while others are
still constrained by their national policies and laws.

To LDCs

Similarly, AFRODAD recommends that LDCs focus on the
following principles:
• Maintain support to the priority sectors by increasing
their budgetary allocations.
• Commit to increasing domestic resource mobilization, upholding the principles of rule of law and good
governance, intensifying the fight against corruption,
and putting in place an environment conducive to
improving the effectiveness of aid and attracting
investments.42

• Link trade policy with other government policy documents on poverty reduction and economic growth.
Specifically, LDCs need to adopt appropriate measures to safeguard domestic industry and protect
investors who are threatened by market liberalization.

24

To reduce reliance on imports for basic commodities,
economic activities need to be protected in order to
serve household demands.

• Improve the quality and quantity of exports.
Capacity-building of domestic investors is needed to
facilitate better product quality and quantity. Foreign
direct investment should be encouraged in areas
requiring high capital outlay, rather than in low capital sectors that are more appropriate for local
investors.

• Retain the right to control investments and exchange
rate regimes so that foreign direct investments and
transnational corporations serve the needs of people
by contributing to locally and nationally determined
sustainable human development strategies. Financial
liberalization and deregulation have left capital flows
elusive to many governments and citizens in the
South.
• Take steps to domesticate technical assistance. Much
of the debt and ODA goes to technical assistance, but
that technical assistance merely funds expatriate consultants and contributed little to domestic capacity.

To Civil Society

While NGOs in the past have concentrated on service delivery, many more are now engaged in social mobilization and
advocacy, as well as serving as a bridge between local communities and government. Most donors have begun to regard NGOs
as an effective way of reaching the poor and a mechanism for
channeling a sizeable percentage of donor funds. AFRODAD
recommends that:
• Social activists must pressure the government to undertake an audit (review) of each of the projects/programs
for which the loans were incurred. Two reasons warrant
such an audit. First, audits would enable the government to truly verify the genuineness of the debts that
LDCs are servicing. Second, the responsible officers
who contracted the odious loans and/or those who
expended them should be prosecuted. Encouraging this
action would help social activists signal to the government the seriousness of accountability, as well as cure
the country’s battered image.

• Take an important and decisive participatory role in
the international regulatory and decision-making
processes. Locally, governments and transnational
corporations must be accountable to their citizens
through civil society organizations and locally-elected officials. Top-bottom decision making should give
way to a human rights-based approach to development where people are the masters of their own destiny able to make informed choices and decisions
about their own development. It is important to
remember that people are not developed but that they
develop themselves.

CONCLUSION

The implementation of MDGs will require substantial, new,
and additional resources from both domestic and external
sources. Strong commitments are required from developed
countries, LDCs, and civil society.
The key issue in trade development is the need to address
supply side constraints. The market access opportunities for
LDCs can only be effective if LDCs are assisted in building their
capacities to produce tradable goods of higher value and acceptable quality at competitive cost. The MDGs will be difficult to
attain for a debt-sustaining African country surviving on exports
of raw cashew nuts, coffee, tea, and cotton, while importing
everything else in the form of industrial goods from abroad.
For many African governments, close collaboration
among the different stakeholders is necessary to meet the
MDGs. Key actors include the government, civil society
organizations, the private sector, and the donors. At the
moment, a framework for collaboration among the various
players does not exist, and clarity of roles is lacking.
Therefore, a need to develop a collaboration framework will
be especially crucial for resource sharing and reviewing
progress. MDGs should be explicitly situated within a framework of existing human right treaties, such as the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and state
rights, such as the right to development. This focus on rights
stresses the obligations of all states, including Northern governments, to prioritize their responsibility to take specific steps
toward progress on social and economic rights for all.
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CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS:

PROGRESS TOWARDS THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS
by Blase Kornacki*

T

he Millennium Development Goals (“MDGs”) set the
lofty targets of ensuring universal primary education,
reducing poverty, combating infectious diseases, and promoting gender equality.1 Commitment to similar goals in the past
has not met with much success; however, evolving approaches to
social welfare give hope that progress towards the MDGs is possible. One such new approach is the Latin American phenomenon
of conditional cash transfer programs (“CCTs”).
Conditional cash transfer programs are transforming Latin
America’s approach to social welfare.45 CCTs provide money
to families living in extreme poverty in exchange for the commitment to invest in human capital.46 The programs aim at
replacing the “traditional supply-side mechanisms” with
“demand-side interventions to directly support beneficiaries.”47 Traditional mechanisms battled poverty with subsidies
or direct investments in public goods, whereas the new
approach channels support directly to the people and promotes
investment in human capital, using market approaches as an
incentive to use social services such as primary and secondary
education and local health centers.48 Like the MDGs, the CCT
programs focus on the long-term benefits of improved education and health services rather than concentrating merely on
short-term income objectives. By providing financial incentives to induce school attendance, the programs aim to give
children the opportunity to contribute to the family without
having to enter the workforce.49
Brazil’s Bolsa Familia (“family fund”)50 is Latin
America’s largest CCT program, and is poised to become the
largest CCT program worldwide as well.51 Bolsa Familia, like
many similar programs across Latin America, combines the
educational element that requires 80-85 percent attendance with
additional health and nutrition requirements. It provides income
to 7.5 million of Brazil’s poorest families, in an effort to offset
the need for child-earned income by providing heads of households with a basic monthly payment.52 Because the administrators believe women are more likely to invest the money in their
children, payments are made every two months to female heads
of household.53 In return, recipients must ensure that their children are properly vaccinated and that they regularly attend
school. Children who do not meet the program’s school attendance requirements risk suspension of their families’ benefits.54
The programs have met with varying degrees of success.
Studies show that while recipients of the cash transfers are
more likely to attend school, they are not less likely to work.55
Instead, children are increasingly expected to juggle both work
and school.56 Attendance rates have been difficult to gauge,
and media allegations of extortion accuse teachers of withholding small grants from the very poor families in exchange
for proper reporting of attendance to the authorities.57 A further
critique of the programs is their emphasis on attendance rather
than the improvement of the quality of public education.58
While these critiques point out the inefficiencies of the new
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approach, CCT’s positive impacts are laying a foundation for
the future elimination of these shortcomings.
The statistics show a generally positive effect that CCTs
have had on their education goals, particularly in terms of
increased enrollment rates for both girls and boys.59
Nicaragua’s twenty-two percent increase in primary school
enrollment in CCT areas exhibits the most drastic improvement.60 Colombia has noted positive effects of CCTs on the
enrollment rates in rural areas, but there is no impact in the
urban zones.61 CCTs have also seen some success in narrowing
the gender gap in education.62 Targeting gender inequality,
some countries offer higher grants to females as an added
incentive to stay in school.63
The CCT’s positive impacts on school enrollment rates and
preventive healthcare attest to the overarching success of the
programs. Despite its criticisms, the CCTs’ innovative approach
to the delivery of social services gives hope that evolving welfare structures will facilitate the attainment of future targets such
as those set forth by the Millennium Development Goals.
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ESTABLISHING SOUND CHEMICALS MANAGEMENT
A PREREQUISITE FOR ACHIEVING THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS

M

by Kelly Rain*
INTRODUCTION

odern society could not maintain its current standard
of living without chemicals; however, sound chemicals management is necessary to prevent harm to
human health and the environment. The United Nations
Environment Programme – along with governments, relevant
intergovernmental groups, nongovernmental organizations, and
other stakeholders – has begun the process of establishing a
Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management
(“SAICM”). The importance of this process is far-reaching,
demonstrated by the fact that hazardous chemicals hinder the
achievement of development targets, such as the Millennium
Development Goals (“MDGs”).
This article explores the nexus between sound chemicals
management and achievement of all eight MDGs, a link not
explicitly stated in the MDGs themselves. Sound chemicals management plays a vital role in ensuring that the MDGs are reached.
Recognizing this linkage is necessary to achieving the MDGs.

THE NEED FOR A STRATEGIC APPROACH TO
SOUND CHEMICALS MANAGEMENT

Virtually every manmade good involves the use of intentionally produced chemicals. It has become clear that global
chemicals production has the capability to impact environmental sustainability, human health, and the global economy in both
poor and wealthy countries.
The chemical industry accounts for approximately seven
percent of global income and nine percent of international
trade.1 Reporting $587.8 billion aggregated sales in 2004; the
global output of chemicals is projected to increase by 85 percent
in the next twenty years.2 The worldwide chemical industry is
highly diverse in terms of size and geographical location.
Employing more than ten million people worldwide, the industry has experienced continuous growth over the past 30 years.
As a result, the value of chemical shipments has increased and
has created a truly global industry with sixteen countries
accounting for about 80 percent of global production.3 It is projected that by 2020 one-third of the world’s chemicals production and consumption will occur in developing countries.4
With the increase of chemicals on the market, public concern has risen due to various studies linking hazardous chemicals to cancer, respiratory diseases, reproductive diseases,
impairment in the physical and emotional development of children, neurological diseases, and more. As a result of this international attention, numerous multilateral environmental agreements have evolved, including the 1987 Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,5 the 1998 Rotterdam
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Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for
Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International
Trade,6 and the 2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent
Organic Pollutants.7 However, the international community
continues to recognize an increasing need for a global, integrated approach to chemicals regulation since chemicals are produced, consumed, and pollute on a worldwide scale. Such a
need was formally addressed at the World Summit on
Sustainable Development, held in Johannesburg in 2002. The
Johannesburg Plan of Implementation formally recognized the
goal that by 2020 use and production of chemicals would be
done “in ways that lead to the minimization of significant
adverse effects on human health and the environment.”8 The
action plan encouraged further development of a strategic
approach to international chemicals management, encouraging
international stakeholders to work closely in this cooperative
effort.9
The ongoing process of establishing SAICM includes a
focus on developing synergies between existing multilateral
environmental agreements and programs related to chemicals.
SAICM promotes an environmentally sustainable approach to
international chemicals management; in particular, assisting
developing countries balance an increasing chemical industry,
while protecting the environment and human health.

RELATIONSHIP OF THE MDGS TO SOUND
CHEMICALS MANAGEMENT

Progress in all eight of the MDGs depends on both the safe
and affordable availability of needed chemicals and protection
from the environment and health impacts of toxic substances.
Recognition of this critical reality will lead to an increased likelihood of achieving the MDGs.

GOAL ONE: ERADICATE
AND HUNGER

EXTREME POVERTY

A strong and clear connection exists between poverty
reduction and sound chemicals management. Poverty has been
slowly declining in most parts of the world; for example, in Asia
the amount of people living on less than one dollar a day
dropped by nearly a quarter of a billion from 1990 to 2001.10
However, extreme poverty still exists throughout the world with
more than one billion people surviving on less than one dollar a
day and two and a half billion people living on less than two dollars a day.11
* Kelly Rain is a JD candidate, May 2007, at American University, Washington
College of Law. Ms. Rain wishes to thank Dan Magraw and Glenn Wiser, at the
Center for International Environmental Law, for their invaluable assistance. Ms.
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Poor populations are often constantly surrounded by toxic
substances. Exposure occurs at home and at work, and the consequence can range from contracting diseases that may interfere
with an individual’s ability to retain employment to death. The
hazards related to chemical exposure are some of the most critical burdens suppressing those trapped in poverty, and without a
collective action to manage chemicals, extreme poverty cannot
be eradicated. In urban settings, the poor often reside in areas
close to landfills, incinerators, hazardous waste sites, or other
industrial zones. Wealthier economic classes generally find such
areas undesirable, since the environment is often saturated with
hazardous chemicals. Unfortunately, most low-income populations lack knowledge of such dangers. Poor populations living
in rural areas do not fare any better. Three quarters of the
world’s poor live in non-urban areas, and most are dependent on
the agricultural sector for work.12 For these laborers, improper
use, storage, or management of
pesticides and other chemicals
increase their exposure to these
hazardous materials.
Those living in poverty are
often perpetually ensnared in
occupations, like agriculture,
that constantly expose them to
chemicals. The great need for
sound chemicals management
in the workplace is clear from
the fact that the International
Labour Organization (“ILO”)
estimated that, of the 2.2 million
workplace fatalities that occur
each year, almost 440,000 are
caused
by
chemicals.13
Additionally the ILO reports that, of the yearly average of 160
million work-related diseases, 35 million are due to chemicals.14
At the same time, chemicals play an invaluable role in society. The sound use of chemicals can be essential to improving
agricultural and industrial productivity. Over 800 million people
do not have an adequate food supply to meet their daily caloric
needs.15 The responsible use of chemicals can improve agricultural yields and help lift people out of poverty and hunger.
Therefore, society must strike a delicate balance between sound
chemicals management to reduce the risk of unnecessary exposure for those living in poverty and to protect the rights to utilize chemicals to enhance one’s livelihood.
Chronic hunger afflicts millions of people and is directly
linked to their weakened immune system. In 2002, the number of
chronically hungry people in the developing world was 815 million, which is a decrease from 824 million in 1990; however, the
amount of persistently hungry people has increased by tens of
millions in some of the most critical regions.16 For example, an
increase in hunger is prevalent in areas such as sub-Saharan
Africa and Southern Asia.17 According to the United Nations
World Food Programme, sixteen percent of the total population
in the developing world is chronically hungry.18 Exposure to

dangerous chemicals contributes to chronic hunger because
those with suppressed immune systems must constantly battle illnesses: this leads to a vicious cycle where the poor are too weak
to proactively fight against hunger and rise out of poverty.
Hunger and poverty are pervasive. The effort to eradicate
poverty and hunger will prove fruitless if the poor are forced to
live in a world contaminated by chemicals. Unless those in
poverty and hunger have an opportunity to live in a less toxic
environment through sound chemicals management, the cycle
will never be broken.

GOAL TWO: ACHIEVE UNIVERSAL PRIMARY EDUCATION

Over 121 million children do not attend school worldwide,
and this number has increased since 1990.19 In developing countries, one in three children do not complete five years of primary
education; the majority of these children are girls.20 Although a
child’s right to education was officially recognized in 1959
when the UN General Assembly
adopted the Declaration of the
Rights of the Child,21 many
children are still denied their
right to a primary education.
The failure to manage
chemicals safely impairs the
achievement of universal primary education in numerous
ways. First, exposure to toxic
substances can have serious and
irreversible, adverse effects on
children’s mental development.
Neurodevelopment disorders
have been linked with exposure
to several common toxic substances. For example, children prenatally exposed to mercury
may have decreased intelligence, memory impairment, poor
attention spans, limited language capabilities, and, in some
cases, mental retardation.22 Exposure to polychlorinated
biphenyls (“PCBs”) have been connected to lowered aptitude
and behavioral deficits.23 Additionally, children exposed to lead
suffer from cognitive deficits that persist throughout their
lives.24 Goal Two’s target is to have all children complete a full
course of primary education. However, the achievement of universal primary education cannot happen if chemical exposures
continue to interfere with children’s emotional maturation, intelligence, and ability to focus.
Achieving universal primary education is closely linked to
poverty. Many children are robbed of their right to an education
because their families need them to work for income, school
fees cannot be afforded, or no community resources exist to
build education facilities. Children from the wealthiest twenty
percent of households in developing regions are three times
more likely to attend school than children from the poorest
twenty percent of households.25 Since it is clear that poverty
will not be alleviated until a process of sound chemicals management is established, universal primary education will not be
reached without better chemicals management.

It is projected that by
2020 one-third of the
world's chemicals
production and
consumption will occur in
developing countries.
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GOAL THREE: PROMOTE GENDER EQUALITY AND
EMPOWER WOMEN

Chemical pollution has a disproportionate impact on
women because of different susceptibility and the likelihood of
exposure. Biologically, women have a higher percentage of fatty
tissue in which chemicals accumulate and are stored in the body.
Traditional gender roles have also left women in a world saturated by chemicals. Cleaning products, cosmetics, and personal
care products expose women to hazardous substances on a daily
basis.26 Additionally, women’s necessary participation in various kinds of labor increases their exposure to chemicals. For
example, in developing countries, women represent approximately 60 percent of the agricultural work force, thus exposing them to dangerous agrochemicals.27 Women cannot be
empowered if toxic substances
are poisoning them, leaving this
goal unobtainable without the
acceptance of a process of
sound chemicals management.
Goal Three’s target is to
eliminate gender disparity in
primary and secondary education. However, there is still a large gender gap in school enrollments. Southern Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, and Western Asia
greatly lack gender equality in primary schools.28 According to
data gathered from approximately 65 developing countries, gender parity is attained in about half of primary schools, twenty
percent in secondary schools, and only eight percent in higher
education.29 Once again, this goal is directly linked to poverty
because families that can afford to send only one child to school
will most likely overlook girls. Sound chemicals management is
needed to preserve women’s intellect, maintain health, and continue the hard work necessary to lift herself out of poverty and
reach gender equality.

infants, the contamination of this vital resource is of great concern. Child mortality cannot be reduced sufficiently if babies are
being contaminated in the womb.
Toxic substances continue to bombard children after infancy. For example, some children are exposed to industrial pollutants at worksites or ingest pesticide-laced food. Pesticide poisoning is a major public health problem in many countries. In
1999, a group of children in Peru between the ages of three to
fourteen ate a government-donated breakfast that was contaminated with the insecticide parathion.32 At least 24 children died,
and another twenty required medical treatment.33 Records from
eight regional hospitals in India
indicate that accidental pesticide
poisoning occurs in 50-90 percent of children less than five
years of age.34
Conversely, a reduction in
child mortality is related to
nourishment, and the sound use
of chemicals can play a vital
role in ensuring a safe and adequate food supply. Proper nutrition is a preventative step in the
fight against child mortality
because malnutrition increases a
child’s susceptibility to disease. The sound use of chemicals is
needed to assist in providing nourishment to children, without
contributing to their early deaths.

The transboundary
properties of many
pollutants allow . . .
poisons to spread
worldwide.

GOAL FOUR: REDUCE CHILD MORTALITY

Child mortality cannot be reduced if children are exposed to
chemicals in the womb, and then later born into a world polluted by chemicals. In 2003, 10.6 million children worldwide died
before they were five.30 Globally, an estimated 29,158 children
under five die daily.31 The poisoning of fetuses and children
with hazardous chemicals will prevent countries from reaching
the target of this goal of reducing the under-five child mortality
rate by two thirds.
Persistent organic pollutants (“POPs”) are long lasting, bioconcentrate in the food chain, and bioaccumulate in the body.
Mothers exposed to these chemicals pass the toxins to their children through prenatal exposures and through breast milk. Thus,
virtually all children are born into this world having already
been exposed to toxic chemicals. Exposure to chemicals weakens the immune system, leaving these babies more vulnerable to
childhood diseases. Since breast milk is the best food for
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GOAL FIVE: IMPROVE MATERNAL HEALTH

The sound, effective use of chemicals can be important for
maintaining maternal and fetal health during pregnancy. Proper
chemical use can improve nourishment, help facilitate prenatal
monitoring and testing, and provide other services needed during
a healthy pregnancy. Yet chemical pollution can impair the health
of mothers, as it does the health of men and other women.
Mothers weakened by chemical contamination are slower to
recover from childbirth and more likely to contract other ailments.
Pregnant women exposed to chemicals at work can have
serious impacts on maternal health. Exposure to chemicals in
the workplace during the last six months of pregnancy may
impact the development of the fetus and cause premature
labor.35 Additionally, continual workplace exposure reduces the
amount of nutrients delivered to the baby.36 In the United States
alone, over 75 percent of individuals employed are of reproductive age, potentially exposing these women to workplace contaminants that may lead to reproductive dangers.37
The workplace is not the only pathway to chemical exposure.
A recent study confirmed the link between exposure to lead and
the occurrence of pregnancy-induced hypertension.38 Additionally,
a small groundwork study by scientist in Japan linked the chemical bisphenol-A, which is widely used in plastics, food packaging,
cans and dental sealants, to recurrent miscarriages.39
Goal Five’s target is to reduce maternal mortality by three
quarters. Global progress is being made on this goal—but not in
the countries most affected. Women of childbearing age must be
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

educated about the dangers of unsafe chemicals surrounding
them at home and at work, and the amount of hazardous chemicals must be reduced. In 2000, an average of 450 women out of
100,000 live births did not survive.40 Developed regions experience less maternal mortality. In order to reduce maternal mortality, and prevent the devastating loss of a parent to a child,
sound chemicals management needs to be able to protect
women from the hazardous chemicals that currently surround
them in many parts of the globe.

GOAL SIX: COMBAT HIV/AIDS, MALARIA, AND
OTHER DISEASES

Toxic chemicals contribute to cancer, respiratory distress,
birth defects, chronic diseases, and neurodegenerative diseases.
Toxic chemicals are most harmful to those with poor nutrition
and concurrent diseases. This creates another linkage between
the reduction of poverty and the attainment of this goal— those
living in poverty are exposed to higher amounts of chemicals,
making them more susceptible to disease. As a result, disease
can act as a cause of poverty. For example, countries with a high
rate of malaria tend to have lower economic growth than countries without malaria.41 Thus, sound chemicals management is
needed in order to improve the health of individuals and help
stimulate the economy of developing nations.
Chemical exposure can have serious implications for
human health. Studies demonstrate that exposure to some chemicals decreases a person’s ability to fight infections. For example, a recent study found individuals infected with the EpsteinBarr virus had been exposed to
PCBs more than those not
infected with the virus.42 Other
hazardous chemicals, such as
dioxin, have also been shown to
have adverse immune effects.43
Impairment of the immune system by chemical exposure can
lead to a decreased quality of
life, and might not be recognized in developing immune
systems until years later.
Each year, diseases extinguish the lives and hopes of millions. Malaria is an example of a global disease. An estimated
350 million to 500 million people are affected by malaria each
year.44 Restricted use of some toxic substances, such as
dichloro-diphenyl-trichloroethane (“DDT”), is vital for disease
control in many regions. However, without a process to globally manage chemicals, hazardous substances will cause more
harm than good.
Another target of this goal is to halt and begin the reversal
of the spread of HIV/AIDS by 2015. Chemicals in the form of
medicine and vaccines are essential to controlling the HIV/AIDS
pandemic. However, exposure to certain chemicals can impair
immunological function, exacerbating HIV/AIDS. Over twenty
million people have died since the HIV/AIDS epidemic began;
at the end of 2004, an estimated 39 million individuals were living with HIV.45 If chemicals are allowed to continue to weaken

the immune systems of individuals worldwide, this is one more
factor that will impede the reversal of HIV/AIDS.

GOAL SEVEN: ENSURE ENVIRONMENTAL
SUSTAINABILITY

Toxic chemicals contaminate our air, food, land, and water,
including our drinking water, rivers, and oceans. Currently,
chemicals are present in all complex ecosystems and most of the
world’s natural resources. Plants, animals, and humans are all
harmed by exposure to chemicals; most of these effects are irreversible. On the other hand, the sound use of chemicals can be
essential in achieving environmental sustainability. For example,
chemicals in the form of pesticides are often used to combat
invasive plant species.
The transboundary properties of many pollutants allow these
poisons to spread worldwide, leaving no ecosystem untainted
and poisoning communities where use of the chemical is
unknown. POPs have been discovered accumulating in the fatty
tissues of arctic mammals. The levels of some of these chemicals, such as brominated flame retardants, have recently been
found to be increasing.46 As a result of their diet, indigenous people in the arctic are among the most heavily exposed to POPs in
the world. For example, the breast milk of females in
Greenland’s Inuit population is so heavily polluted with chemicals that it could be classified as hazardous waste.47 One of the
targets of this goal is to incorporate the principles of sustainable
development into country policies and reverse the loss of environmental resources. The situation in the Arctic is a prime example of the pressing need for
sound chemicals management in
reaching this target by 2015.
Another target of this goal
is to halve the proportion of the
people without sustainable
access to safe drinking water
and basic sanitation. There was
an eight percent increase in the
percentage of the population
using safe sources of drinking
water between 1990 and
2002.48 Although this figure sounds promising, as of 2002, over
one billion people were still using water from unimproved
sources.49 Preventing drinking water contamination and, where
that is not possible, purifying drinking water of toxic chemicals
will not occur unless a process of sound chemicals management
is established.
The final target of this goal is to improve the lives of at least
one hundred million slum-dwellers by 2020. About one hundred
million people are added to developing countries’ urban communities through migration or birth each year; this equates to
almost one billion people living in urban slums.50 The hazardous materials that wealthier populations do not want in their
backyard surround those living in urban slums. To help improve
conditions of this rapidly growing population and to allow them
to maintain their health and strength, toxic chemicals must not
be allowed to contaminate their air, water, or land.

Traditional gender roles
have also left women in a
world saturated by
chemicals.
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GOAL EIGHT: DEVELOP A GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR
DEVELOPMENT

Establishing a global partnership for development is
dependent on fair and open trade. Yet the global trading rules
would collapse if they did not allow countries to protect their
citizen’s health and environment, including from the effects of
hazardous chemicals. Existing and emerging international
chemical agreements, such as the Montreal, Stockholm, and
Rotterdam Conventions, regulate trade in chemicals in order to
deal with safety concerns and ensure availability, where appropriate. Implementation at the national level is necessary for
these agreements to be effective, and such agreements frequently include provisions for technical and financial assistance to
developing countries.
SAICM plays an essential role in assisting developing countries balance a rapidly growing chemical industry with protection
of the environment and human health. In order for developing
countries to reap the financial benefits of the chemical industry –

helping alleviate poverty and improve their fiscal economy –
international guidelines and support are critical. A process of
sound chemicals management can help both developing and
developed nations safely benefit from the chemical industry. It
can also help maintain our current standard of living. All of this
can be achieved without the dire consequence of toxic chemicals
suppressing the poor and inhibiting productive development.

CONCLUSION

The nexus between sound chemicals management and
development goals must be acknowledged in order to give
impetus to fulfilling the MDGs by 2015. Sound management of
chemicals should be given consideration in achieving all eight
of the MDGs. Progress in each area will depend on the safe and
affordable availability of chemicals. The establishment of an
integrated approach for international chemicals management
will allow for the safe availability of chemicals, when needed,
while protecting the environment and health of humans.
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THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND HIV/AIDS

O

by J.C. Sylvan*

f the eight Millennium Development Goals (“MDGs”)
set forth by the United Nations, half pertain to public
health: Goal Two (education), Goal Four (child mortality), Goal Five (maternal health), and Goal Six (HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis and malaria).1 A failure to address HIV/AIDS, in
particular, would compromise the ultimate success of the entire
MDG agenda.2 The HIV/AIDS pandemic consistently undermines efforts to fight poverty, illiteracy, and mortality in lowand middle-income countries.
In the countries hardest hit by the epidemic, the problem
is compounded by the reality that many national health care
systems, which will bear the burden of improving available
treatments, are themselves in crisis. In years past, many developing countries, encouraged by international financial institutions and trusting in privatization, cut their health care budgets.3 As a result, health care has been chronically under-funded
in many of these countries.4 According to a recent report by the
UN Millennium Project, “[p]overty, misplaced priorities, and
years of externally imposed restrictions on social spending
have left health services for over two billion people dysfunctional, inaccessible, or priced beyond the reach of the poor.”5
Thus, halting the spread of HIV/AIDS in the developing world
will depend to a great extent on success in overhauling health
care systems in the world's poorest countries.
Forty-years of gains in public health have been offset in
recent years by two factors: the HIV/AIDS pandemic, and the
widening health gap between rich and poor nations.6 The
under-five child mortality rate for the poorest quarter of the
world is ten times that of the richest quarter.7 In twenty years,
AIDS has claimed twenty million lives; 39 million individuals
carry the virus worldwide.8 If nothing is done, some studies
predict 45 million new infections by 2010.9 The high prevalence of AIDS and limited availability of treatment reflect the
same disparity between rich and poor. A recent World Health
Organization (“WHO”) report finds that “globally, 78 percent
of mortality from AIDS and 89 percent of people needing treatment” live in the poorest countries.10 To date, there is neither a
cure nor a preventative vaccine for HIV/AIDS. The most effective treatment is antiretroviral therapy (“ART”),11 but only
eight percent of people in developing countries who need ART
receive it.12 Some initiatives to provide treatment in low- and
middle-income countries have found success. Brazil has provided free ART through its national health care system since
1996.13 In December 2003, the WHO and UNAIDS14 launched
the “three by five” initiative to provide ART coverage to three
million of the world's poorest by the end of 2005.15 At that
time, 400,000 people were receiving ART. Today one million
are under treatment. That figure is well short of the “three by
five” target, but these gains show both that progress is possible
and that global goal-setting can be a productive enterprise.16
Meeting the MDG objective of halting and reversing the
epidemic will be expensive. Of the $45 billion needed for globFALL 2005

al HIV/AIDS treatment, care, and prevention over the next
three years, donors have so far pledged only $27 billion.17
Even if funding catches up, money alone will not stop the epidemic. The correlation between levels of government health
spending and reduced mortality rates is tenuous.18 Countries
must also increase the productivity of current spending levels
by carefully targeting expenditures to services with “spillover”
benefits.19 In order to ensure the long-term viability of AIDS
treatment, care, and prevention, governments will have to act
strategically in order to make ART more affordable,20 eliminate user fees for such services, provide social insurance,
remove bottlenecks in the system, focus on primary care health
care, and make a political commitment to populations historically excluded from care, like drug users and sex workers.21
As they implement their AIDS treatment plans, developing
countries will face very real human resources limitations. For
example, countries in Europe and Central Asia have 3.1 physicians per 1,000, while countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have
only one for every 10,000.22 Some countries are taking steps to
correct for this: Zambia has doubled nursing salaries, and
Thailand has financed a “reverse brain-drain program to keep
doctors.”23 Other policies include training community health
workers to reduce strains on the system,24 and developing simpler and less costly interventions to extend the reach of local
health providers and to reduce mortality in the poorest countries.25 Finally, ART pilot projects have demonstrated the value
of the primary health care ("PHC") model. PHC integrates all
aspects of direct health care from prevention to treatment to palliative care. Studies suggest a shift to this integrated approach
would promote equity, universal access, and community participation.26 Studies also show that as treatment becomes available, and patients have cause for hope, general interest in
HIV/AIDS counseling and testing services also increases.27
HIV/AIDS is a development issue. More than money for
treatment is required. A targeted investment in the health systems of the hardest-hit nations is needed to close the global
health gap between rich and poor. This sustainable long-term
approach represents a paradigm shift for the international community, but supporting the poorest countries in efforts to
rebuild their health care infrastructure may help to halt and
even reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS.

ENDNOTES:

1 Adam Wagstaff & Mariam Claeson, World Bank Group, THE MILLENIUM

DEVELOPMENT GOALS FOR HEALTH: RISING TO THE CHALLENGES, (2004), at xi,
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PublicationsandReports/20306102/296730PAPER0Mi1ent0goals0for0health.
pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2004).
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HARMONIZATION AROUND RESULTS REPORTING:
A SYNTHESIS OF FOUR COUNTRY STUDIES

T

by Elizabeth M. White, Rosalía Rodriguez-García, and Rema Balasundaram*
INTRODUCTION

his article discusses “harmonization around results
reporting” within the international context of improving
aid effectiveness. It seeks to shed light on the inter-relationship between external reporting for donors and internal
reporting for national accountability. Harmonization refers to
increased coordination and stream-lining of activities by different aid agencies based on the sharing of information in order to
promote transparency and improve coordination; gradual simplification of procedures and requirements to reduce their burden on partner governments; and development of common
arrangements for planning, managing, and delivering aid. The
concept is often expanded, like in this article, to also include
issues of alignment and ownership. Examples of such issues are:
(1) the government taking the lead in coordinating donor efforts;
(2) donors relying on country systems and procedures; and (3)
development agencies delivering aid in accordance with partner
country priorities.
Section I provides a brief description of the international context for harmonization around results reporting. Section II summarizes the evolution to harmonization in four country cases –
Uganda, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Madagascar. Section III
proposes three critical factors that shed light on how to deepen
efforts for harmonization around results reporting. Each country
context is unique and has unique leverage points for action around
harmonization. Therefore, this article does not attempt to provide
operational steps for moving toward harmonization. Instead it
captures experiences and draws lessons that might be applied to
these and other countries; mainly, that there is progress, but it is
slow and not easy. Additionally, this article assesses three critical
factors found to deepen efforts for harmonization around results
reporting: (1) developing a reliable basis for reporting; (2) fostering country ownership of results reporting processes – the primacy of country defined results, as opposed to externally driven
results; and (3) providing programmatic, rather than project only,
coordinated support for national systems.

GLOBAL CONTEXT FOR HARMONIZATION

At the Monterrey International Conference on Financing
for Development1 in 2002, as donors pledged significant
increases in aid levels, they recognized the need for development agencies and partner countries to strengthen their focus on
results and development effectiveness. They also acknowledged
that achieving results requires better use of resources, and that
better aid, not just more aid, is part of donor responsibility.
Since then, the need to better manage for results—to use information to improve decision-making and steer country-led devel33

opment processes toward clearly defined goals—has become a
central element of the global development agenda. This commitment to better manage for results was renewed and increased
in the 2004 Marrakech International Roundtable on Managing
for Development Results,2 the 2005 Paris High-Level Forum on
Harmonization, Alignment, and Results,3 and the 2005 G8
Gleneagles Summit.4
The 2004 Global Monitoring Report5 shows that many
developing countries have made progress in accelerating
growth and reforming policies,6 for instance in the areas of
budget, financial management, and corruption in the public
service. Yet, while progress has been made, enormous development challenges still face low-income countries, especially in
Africa. This is coupled with new commitments to the doubling
of aid for Africa, recently made at the Gleneagles Summit, and
estimates that aid to all developing countries will increase by
around $50 billion per year by 2010. Much of this will go to
low-income countries, through the framework of their national
strategies (second generation poverty reduction strategies).
There will be increased expectations that these funds will be
effectively used in countries and will be driven by participatory and transparent development processes. The resounding
theme is that country-owned and -led development is critical to
achieving and sustaining results.

EVOLUTION OF HARMONIZATION AROUND
RESULTS REPORTING

Efforts to coordinate monitoring and reporting in programs
and sector wide approaches (“SWAPs”) played a significant role
in the move toward harmonization around results reporting.
Traditionally, reporting was concerned mainly with inputs
(finance) and outputs according to different donors’ formats and
reporting needs. With the introduction of SWAPs, donors were
increasingly confronted with more budget-wide financing than
project-specific financing. Donors were also faced with the need
to better coordinate reporting and use country systems, given the
situation that several donors support the same broad sectors or
programs in the public sector. This led to reporting requirements
at higher, more centralized levels as opposed to reporting in a
project-by-project manner. It also led to an enhanced appreciation of the need to strengthen country monitoring systems.

* This study was conducted for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development-Development Cooperation Directorate (“OECD/DAC’) Joint
Venture on Managing for Development Results. Elizabeth M. White is a Senior
Results Management Specialist at the World Bank. Rosalia Rodriguez-Garcia is
a Senior Specialist and Consultant to the World Bank. Rema Balasundaram is a
Consultant to the World Bank. The views expressed in this article are those of
the authors and cannot be attributed to the World Bank.
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Numerous other strategies to harmonize reporting results
followed SWAPs. The preparation of national development plans
(“NDPs”) and/or Poverty Reduction Strategies (“PRS”) provided both an opportunity and a vehicle to expand the dialogue on
results reporting to additional sectors and donors. It offered a
common basis for donors, government, and civil society to identify a strategic approach to poverty reduction, an operational
framework to achieve national goals, and a mechanism to develop cross-sector linkages. Conceptually, the strategy and programs in the PRS could easily translate into a monitoring system
for tracking progress. This would enable donors to select indicators associated with policy areas and use these for external
reporting. While the principles of the PRS promoted country
ownership, participation, and a focus on results, the demand for
results reporting was externally driven. During implementation,
efforts to harmonize around results reporting had mixed results.
The PRS process underscored the need for good reporting and
for strengthening countries’ capacity to report on results.

COUNTRY CONTEXT FOR RESULTS REPORTING

Many countries lacked monitoring and evaluation systems for
reporting, or the systems that were in place were fragmented and
overlapping. There was inadequate institutional and organizational capacity to establish coordinated monitoring systems,7 even
though for several years prior, donors had supported project monitoring and evaluation. Since few countries had taken a programmatic perspective in developing monitoring and evaluation systems, there was little analytical work on how to coordinate donor
support for strengthening country systems in a sustainable way.
Many countries did not yet recognize the value of using
results information in policy making processes or in program
management.8 Instead, they focused on tracking expenditures,
monitoring high order socio-economic indicators, and reporting
to donors. Countries concentrated less on how results information could be valuable for effective and efficient public sector
management. There was little experience to draw on for using
results information as part of public sector management and for
understanding the different requirements for information and
organization in results based approaches.
The introduction of PRS acted as a catalyst for a more coordinated approach to poverty monitoring. The increased demand for
reporting on results helped put governments and donors on a forward track in addressing data constraints. This translated into support for poverty monitoring systems, including efforts to increase
the participation of civil society and improve access to information. Much of donor support focused on the supply and coordination of data, such as conducting surveys or supporting the census.
Donor support otherwise tended to focus on each donor’s own
reporting requirements and priorities.9 Less attention was paid to
how results information would be used for government purposes,
such as policy making, budgeting, or management.

ADVANCEMENT TOWARDS A MORE HOLISTIC
UNDERSTANDING

There was little apparent recognition that harmonization
around results reporting could facilitate or impede progress in
FALL 2005

establishing sustainable country systems. Later, analytical work
began to evolve that assessed the use of information and the
broader institutional setting for monitoring. This included
increased attention to expenditure management, the flow of
information, and analytical/evaluation skills. This work helped
deepen the debate and understanding of the complexities of
developing a poverty monitoring system and the importance of
balancing the various roles that the monitoring system was
expected to serve, such as external accountability to donors, a
country tool for policy decisions, and in-country accountability
to citizens.
Over the same period, the international community intensified efforts for broadly improving aid effectiveness through better aid coordination and improved harmonization and alignment
across a range of activities. At the country level consultative
group meetings and other mechanisms for government-donor
coordination, such as sector working groups, offered a vehicle
for dialogue across specific subsets of donors. At the global
level, critical issues of aid effectiveness were being discussed
through high level round-tables and the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development-Development
Cooperation Directorate (“OECD/DAC”) collaborative actions.
Important topics included improving the predictability and
reducing the volatility of aid, rethinking conditionality, and
deepening the understanding of country ownership. The international community also recognized the important role of managing for results as a key tool for countries. These global messages
and debates were increasingly supported at the country level, by
both countries and in-country donors, where the broad principles discussed in the global debates were made operational and
provided a useful basis for discussion of harmonization around
results reporting.

COUNTRY EXPERIENCES IN HARMONIZATION: THE
CASES OF MADAGASCAR, MOZAMBIQUE,
TANZANIA, AND UGANDA

All of the contextual factors outlined above played an
important role in progress toward results reporting in the four
country cases. The evolution of each country was unique and
helped to identify a number of elements that served to promote
and support harmonization around results reporting.
The experiences in these four countries demonstrate that the
development community is evolving in its understanding of the
country and international context that comes together in harmonization around results reporting. The four cases show that
externally driven results reporting systems present challenges to
the country-led model of development, and that a country-led
results reporting system can satisfy both the internal reporting
needs of countries and the external reporting needs of donors.
The cases also show that the donor community and countries are
together putting in place systems that serve country and donor
needs—albeit sometimes through trial and error. The review of
the four country cases shows that harmonization around results
reporting is facilitated by robust technical elements such as:
• Strategies and programs designed to enable continu-
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ous and systematic assessment against results-based
objectives.

• Supporting monitoring systems with well defined
indicators that cover monitoring of resource use
(financial and human), tangible outputs (such as efficient extension of services to farmers), intermediate
outcomes (such as improved use of inputs and new
farming techniques), outcomes (improved yields and
reduced losses from weather shocks), impacts
(improved agricultural productivity), and links to
broader national objectives (such as increased agricultural exports).
• Well defined and reliable data that are feasible to collect and simple to monitor.

• Analytical capacity to translate routine monitoring
information into evidence to support decisions
including cost benefits.

Experience is also showing that technical solutions alone
are not sufficient. Equally important are the following:
• Country ownership of the programs, as well as the
existence of incentives to use information on results
in expenditure decisions (with links to the budget or
medium-term expenditure frameworks). This
includes balancing country accountability with external accountability.
• Institutional arrangements for reinforcing how information flows would be used.

• Understanding of the political nature of results
reporting.

MADAGASCAR

The highly participatory PRS process, harmonization
around sector wide approaches, the drive for enhanced country
monitoring systems, and achievement of sustainable results on
the ground from the National Environmental Action Plan
(“NEAP”) all contributed to an evolution and progress in the
harmonization agenda around results in Madagascar.
Harmonization around results reporting in this country commenced with the implementation and coordination efforts of a
group of donors in the context of environment and biodiversity
in the early 1990s. Madagascar’s unique background as an
island nation, endemic to many of the world’s endangered
species, and highly vulnerable to shocks, provided many lessons
on harmonization in the context of the environment and its
broader application to issues of results and sustainability for
PRSs as a whole. Lessons on harmonization around results
reporting were derived from the environment sector and its
implementation, even in the context of its PRS program and
recent efforts to strengthen the Poverty Monitoring System
(“PMS”).
Madagascar was the first country in Africa to elaborate a
NEAP. This occurred six years prior to the signing of the
Convention on Biological Diversity. The first phase of the
35

NEAP was initiated in 1991 in the face of a limited conservation
baseline with the support of a broad coalition of bilateral donors.
These donors included Germany, France, Norway, Switzerland,
and the United States; multilateral institutions, such as the
United Nations Development Programme (“UNDP”) and the
World Bank; and non-governmental organizations, namely
Conservation International, World Wildlife Fund, and Wildlife
Conservation Society.10 A Multi-Donor Secretariat, which was
co-financed by USAID, France, and the World Bank, was set up
during the second phase of the NEAP to carry out coordination
and enhance implementation of the program. Multi donor supervision missions have been conducted twice a year since 1996.11
Recently, Japan and the Global Environment Facility (“GEF”)
have also joined this group.
Donors began to harmonize budget support assistance in
2003. Several activities in the mid-1990s lay the groundwork for
a coherent PMS in Madagascar.12 Lessons on harmonization
around results reporting, and monitoring and evaluation, in the
environment sector provided useful lessons for donors in shaping results oriented program formulation, planning, monitoring
of results, and evaluation over a period of time. It was not clear
that donors and the Government had taken these lessons into
account in the design of current programs.

MOZAMBIQUE

The evolution to harmonization around results reporting
started with improved links between sector strategies and
national results. Mozambique has a long tradition of planning in
the public sector. This planning is centrally-driven and relies on
a sector-based approach. Historically, sector policies have been
aligned with donor priorities. However, over time donors and
the government observed a weak link between these sector policies and the national budgeting and priority setting process. In
2001, the introduction of the Plano de Acçao de Reduçao da
Pobreza Absoluta (“PARPA”),13 Mozambique’s Poverty
Reduction Strategy Plan (“PRSP”), helped improve alignment
of sector strategies to national objectives. It also brought greater
coherence across sectors and improved policy coherence of sector strategies with the government’s overall policy thrust.14
The PARPA, coupled with the medium-term expenditure
framework (“MTEF”) process, which was first formulated in
1998, included detailed plans, timelines, and indicators. This
formed the basis for developing monitoring systems that built
on already existing mechanisms. Donors supported the PARPA
through budget support, sector wide approaches, and project
financing. While some form of budget support had been delivered through the 1980s and 1990s,15 it was linking budget support to the PARPA that led to increased coordination among
donors and initiatives in support of harmonization and alignment.16 In 2002, preparation of a detailed matrix of PARPA
activities by sector revealed a need to make information about
PARPA priorities more systematic and to monitor a meaningful
number of indicators.17
The Government led a process to define a performance
assessment framework, requesting all PARPA sector ministries
and those responsible for cross-cutting reforms to identify priSUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

orities for the coming three years. This resulted in a 56-page
Matrix, called the long Performance Assessment Framework
(“PAF”), which was then reduced to a short PAF consisting of
two pages of key priorities.
As part of reporting, there were a series of annual exercises
that led to issuances of reports to Parliament on the progress in
PARPA implementation. The government integrated the
required annual progress review (“APR”) of the PARPA into its
own regular reviews of implementation. This dual role for the
Balan o do PES – reporting to Parliament and to donors – simplifies national reporting requirements and “provides an adequate evaluation of the progress made in achieving the PARPA
goals.” Unfortunately, a 2004 independent review noted that
only a few donors comply with government reporting requirements, and donors have failed in attempts to reduce the government's administrative burden. While both donors and government have demonstrated a commitment individually and jointly,
the future will likely require even greater efforts if progress on
harmonization in results reporting is to continue.

the PRS action plan and the PAF over a three year period. In
2002, the government and donors created the Tanzanian
Assistance Strategy, which included guidance on harmonization
around results reporting, such as integration of reporting and
accountability systems. It also attempts to better align donor
support with the use of country systems. There are on-going
efforts to improve the basis for results reporting. However, there
remains a lack of incentive to produce good quality data and to
use results information in policy and budget decisions. Attempts
to link the PMS with public sector management have started.
Finally, in the current budget cycle, the procedure for collecting sector inputs is being modified in a way to put pressure
on all sectors to justify their bids in terms of the relevant cluster
strategies in the PRS. Sector policy makers have thus an
increased incentive to develop outcome-oriented rationales for
what they do with their allocations from public resources and
make use of data on results.21 Tanzania has progressed considerably in moving to a results-based planning and monitoring
reporting system.

Efforts for harmonization around results reporting in
Tanzania started at a low point in government-donor relations in
the early 1990s. At this time there was a large donor community, high aid dependency,18 high transaction costs in dealing with
the range of uncoordinated priorities, and the associated procedural and reporting requirements of multiple donors. In 1995, an
independent evaluation of donor/government relationships
resulted in a commitment to development cooperation and
establishment of a mutual accountability mechanism.19
Tanzania and its development partners were also using sector
wide approaches to create opportunities for coordinated work in
support of sector specific results. However, weak monitoring
systems undermined the utility of the sector wide approaches for
harmonization around results reporting.
The donor community had a good grasp of systems and
technical issues and wanted to deal with the myriad of systems
in place. At the same time, the government was aware that
strengthening public financial management systems and introducing effective poverty monitoring was a precondition for persuading donors to allocate more development assistance through
budget support.20 In 1999, the introduction of the RSP and focus
on PMS provided an opportunity for Tanzania to advance harmonization of results reporting. The PRS included targets and
indicators intended to inform programming decisions, and comprehensive institutional arrangements for assembling, analyzing, and disseminating poverty data. The PRS annual progress
report provided an opportunity for donors to use government
reporting for common results reporting.
In practice, the annual reviews were somewhat insubstantial, resulting in donors working on parallel policy and reporting
matrices. Budget support donors developed a performance
assessment framework to which budget support instruments
were linked, helping to harmonize results reporting for donors.
However, there was a disconnect between the donor-driven PAF
and the government’s PRS requiring further harmonization of

The move toward poverty reduction and reforms in 1986
and international pressures for demonstrating the effectiveness
of aid set the conditions for harmonization around results reporting in Uganda.22 Uganda was able to qualify as the first heavily-indebted poor country (“HIPC”) beneficiary, because as early
as 1997, it had put in place a strong domestically owned poverty reduction and development policy framework locally known
as the poverty eradication action plan (“PEAP”), later transformed into the PRS.
Except for a few exceptional circumstances in which external development assistance is reported to have been managed
below general expectations, Uganda’s case displays a success
story of aid effectiveness. This is evidenced through the gains
made in recent years, especially in the social (education and
health) sectors, where aid resources have had remarkable impact
on growth and social development indicators. Most of the
achievements in these and other sectors are largely attributable
to an improved and enabling policy environment reflected in the
budget process and improvements in public finance management, and a series of anti-corruption initiatives accompanied by
a high degree of transparency and accountability in the use of
public resources.
The evolution of harmonization in Uganda is characterized by a strong country ownership/leadership in undertaking
essential reforms and improving management of the aid portfolio to enhance effectiveness. Uganda was one of the first
countries in the sub-Saharan African region to have fully
developed its own PEAP as early as 1997. This has continued
to play a central role in fostering country ownership of the
development policy process, especially towards ensuring sustainability of the achievements. PEAP objectives have been
increasingly realized through a strong ownership of the development process as led by the Ministry of Finance Planning and
Economic Development. Additionally, the PEAP were coupled
with the development of a holistic national strategy against

TANZANIA
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UGANDA
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hard budget constraints and anchored in a medium term expenditure framework.
These achievements encouraged development partners to
shift their approaches and practices toward a country-led partnership model. Movement toward budget support and sector
wide approaches helped reinforce country ownership and donor
partnerships. There were efforts by the government to enhance
the results orientation of its strategy, monitoring, and processes.23 Efforts to demonstrate results were institutionalized out of
a rational, outcome-oriented budget process focusing on domestic accountability as well as external accountability through
mechanisms such as budget support instruments, e.g., the World
Bank Poverty Reduction Strategy Credit. A hard budget constraint and the MTEF have been the key financing channels for
the PEAP. Uganda’s social economic performance highlights
the fact that achieving results requires better use of resources.
All stakeholders in Uganda’s development process have for the
last four years actively participated in the national budget formulation process with a view to ensuring that public resources
are channeled to those areas where they will have quick and sustained impact on poverty while contributing to sustainable economic growth.
Over time, the quality of the monitoring and evaluation systems supporting results reporting improved and some donors
harmonized around results reporting, especially in budget support, sector programs in health/education, and national multisector programs such as HIV/AIDs. There are also increased
efforts to develop more sector wide approaches in addition to
health and education (i.e., water, energy, agriculture, public
service reform, and procurement, among others). However,
weaknesses in country monitoring and evaluation systems are
still a factor in full donor reliance on Uganda’s monitoring system for results reporting. There has been recent progress in
developing Uganda’s monitoring and evaluation system through
the National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation strategy
(“NIMES”). Challenges remain in how to make best use of
information on implementation of the PEAP in the domestic
policy making processes.

KEY FACTORS IN TURNING HARMONIZATION
CONCEPTS INTO PRACTICE

As the case-studies demonstrate, much work has been
undertaken and countries and donors are moving forward in
tackling technical and non-technical dimensions of harmonization around results reporting, but progress is slow and the
process challenging. Three critical factors have been identified
that shed light on how to deepen efforts for harmonization
around results reporting: (1) developing a reliable basis for
results reporting; (2) fostering country ownership of results
reporting; and (3) ensuring programmatic support for capacity
building in monitoring and evaluation.

FACTOR ONE: DEVELOPING A RELIABLE BASIS FOR
RESULTS REPORTING

Donors must report on country results of aid financing to
their domestic constituencies. The responsibility of donors is to
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provide information on fiduciary accountability (money spent
and inputs/outputs) and on development effectiveness from the
aid provided (what are the benefits of the money spent). In order
for donors to use information from country systems for external
accountability, the information the systems provide must be reliable. In most countries, the information needed for results
reporting is not captured in country monitoring systems or is
patchy at best.
The absence of a results orientation often translates into
donors – rather than countries – identifying inputs-outcomes
links and associated indicators for results reporting, or reverting
to reporting on activities or disbursements. A recent review concluded that most indicators in monitoring systems for the PRS
are budgetary/expenditure (input indicators) and survey-based
measures of well-being, such as impact indicators for poverty
reduction.24 Less attention has been paid to articulating important intermediate steps that are responsive to shorter term measurement.25 Thus, while there are many issues with the technical
quality of data, a key bottleneck is the weak results orientation
in strategies and supporting processes.26 There are two concrete
actions that the donor community and countries can take to
strengthen this often overlooked dimension of harmonization
around results reporting: (1) develop stronger linkages between
policy actions and results; and (2) tailor results reporting to government policy processes.
In a results-based approach, there would be well established
links between policy choices and intended medium term outcomes, and how these would impact achievement of longer term
goals, such as the Millennium Development Goals (“MDGs”).
These linkages should be based on sound analysis and identification of key constraints and priorities (evidence-based). For
harmonization around results reporting to be useful, indicators
would be responsive to program implementation or short term
policy actions, not only longer-term high level goals. What does
this mean in practice? Take for example a common objective of
countries and donors, “to make progress towards the MDG of
reducing income poverty.” To make progress in that direction,
countries will need to achieve the associated goal of increased
off-farm and on-farm income through medium term outcomes,
such as increased agricultural productivity. Knowing if the
country is on track to increased productivity requires short term
measures to help donors and governments know whether the
interventions, such as new farming techniques, improved land
tenure, and use of micro-finance, are working.
The Uganda PEAP provides an example of the difficulties
in developing a monitoring matrix that is useful for results
reporting and shows how donors and the government worked
together to address weaknesses in the basis for results reporting.
At design, most sectors did not articulate intended chains of causation. This resulted in monitoring matrices that were heavily
skewed toward final outcomes and impacts, missing specification of intermediate results from policy actions. Higher-level
indicators of progress towards the PEAP targets could only be
measured at relatively long intervals. Even when data was available, it was difficult to discern the causal contribution of the
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PEAP to the changes in these indicators or to draw policy lessons from them. Some donors indicated that the PEAP was
insufficiently detailed to influence allocation decisions and was
unable to relate the expenditure on investment (policy and program decisions) to outputs (observable in the short-term) and
intermediate outcomes. This issue was addressed in the latest
PEAP revision, and work was initiated on the development of a
PEAP results and policy matrix. The PEAP matrix specifies the
key developmental results the PEAP is trying to bring about and
the annual policy actions that are expected to contribute to these
results. Indicators and targets are set both at the level of broad
developmental outcomes and at the level of policy actions. The
new matrix should ease both the management of PEAP implementation and the monitoring of progress with PEAP implementation. It will also be a useful tool to inform dialogue
between Government and a range of domestic and international
stakeholders.27
In several other countries, inadequately defined linkages
between inputs and expected outcomes in the PRS resulted in
donors developing performance assessment frameworks primarily for donor reporting purposes. These donors were then challenged with filling in the missing gaps in information needs.
Conceptually, the indicators in the PAF represented a subset of
indicators from the PRS. In practice, other indicators were often
negotiated by governments and donors providing broad budget
support.28 In Mozambique and Tanzania, useful processes for
coming to agreement on a set of results indicators and alignment
of relevant donors to the budgeting and reporting process of
government included discussions on the Performance
Assessment Framework (“PAF”) or donor specific results matrices, such as the World Bank Poverty Reduction Support Credit
(“PRSC”). In Uganda, the 2004 PEAP introduced a Policy
Matrix and a Results and Monitoring Matrix that started to bring
the PRSC and other monitoring and evaluation (“M&E”)
arrangements in line with the PEAP policy matrix. The PEAP
policy matrix will be the only instrument for assessing progress
towards attainment of PEAP objectives. This should result in
future iterations of the PEAP and supporting PMS to encompass
a broader range of results information, thus adding to its usefulness to donors for results reporting.29 These efforts evolved over
the initial years of PRS implementation and have been positive
steps toward harmonization around results reporting on budget
support.
There is a danger that donor negotiations can result in a proliferation of indicators as donors want to include their focal
areas or vertical programs with relevant indicators, into the
matrix. While there are obvious implications of this in terms of
data collection, monitoring, and reporting, the recent World
Bank Conditionality Review 200530 pointed out that this practice could lead to an increase in the number of conditions and
“the quality and relevance of the substance could suffer.”31
Additionally, this practice, if not done properly, could undermine country ownership, duplicate reporting mechanisms, and
miss opportunities to strengthen country capacity to use meaningful indicators for expenditure management and policy deciFALL 2005

sions. While the details of the debt proposal remain to be
worked out, one important result of this initiative will be to shift
more resources towards unrestricted budget support rather than
to specific projects or programs. This underscores the imperative for establishing processes that are supportive of strengthening country systems.
A key consideration for results reporting is how to make
results reporting a subset of a country monitoring and reporting
system that feeds into the policy process. Experience has shown
that: (1) monitoring systems only function where the participants see them as useful and legitimate; and (2) where the monitoring arrangements emerge out of a common commitment to
solving practical problems, they have a much greater chance of
success. Without tailoring results reporting to the policy
process, the risk is that monitoring results becomes more of a
requirement than a useful tool, often precipitating a decline in

BOX 1:

FILLING THE GAP IN POLICY LINKAGES:

TANZANIA POVERTY REDUCTION BUDGET SUPPORT
In Tanzania, the Poverty Reduction Budget Support
(“PRBS”) instrument was launched by eleven bilateral
partners and the European Commission. These donor
partners coordinate support through a Performance
Assessment Framework (“PAF”) and Policy Matrix
formulated in 2001 as a basis for judging the government’s
performance on critical measures. The PAF defines the areas
of budget support dialogue and details monitor-able
actions, against which participating donors (fourteen)
assess progress in program implementation as the basis for
financing decisions. This was complemented by a
Structured Adjustment Loan (“SAL”) from the African
Development Bank and a Poverty Reduction Support Credit
(“PRSC”) by the World Bank. The PRSC policy measures
were coordinated by donors and the Government to the
existing PRBS policy matrix, and the PAF. The PAF was
extended to include a greater focus on rural incomes to
provide an adequate policy matrix for the PRSC1. During
November 2002, a revision of the PAF took place (in an
effort to align the PAF and the PRSC), while requirements
of the PRSC were incorporated into the Framework. The
Framework was expanded to include actions aimed at
poverty reduction (agriculture, private sector development,
and economic and social outcome indicators) and linked to
the MDGs, which are being monitored jointly by
government and donors as part of the annual reviews. This
resulted in the government and development partners
signing a “Partnership Framework Memorandum,”
declaring “…the intention of the parties to harmonize the
PRS action plan and the PAF completely within three years
(by 2005).”

OED/IEO Review of PRSP,
Tanzania Country Study (2004)
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the reliability of the information produced by the system. For
reliable results reporting, this implies that donors need to foster
increased ownership and use of monitoring systems by government by building on country processes.
The PRS established a process for review that provided an
opportunity to strengthen the use of country monitoring and
reporting systems. Each year, participating governments were
expected to produce a review of progress in implementation,
based on evidence, known as the APR. These reviews were originally conceived with donor reporting requirements in mind, but
many APRs have not provided sufficiently detailed information
for donors, focusing primarily on impact and outcome level
data. As a result, the APR has not been systematically used by
donors (see Box 2). Since the APRs were often viewed as an
external reporting requirement, they also were not systematically used by governments. A 2004 evaluation of the PRS noted
that “governments in most countries are monitoring results as a
requirement, and results are not being used to adjust strategies

BOX 2:

THE USE OF THE APR FOR
HARMONIZATION AROUND RESULTS
REPORTING
Donors have indicated that the APR is insufficiently
detailed to influence allocation decisions. Many donors
developed parallel reporting processes. Further
complicating matters, it has been reported that the “timing
of reporting is not always synchronized with other national
processes.” For project based lending, the same survey
showed that only 44 percent of donors use Government
information for monitoring purposes.

OECD-DAC survey (2004).

or to enhance accountability for performance.”32 Many of the
Joint Staff Assessments by the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (“IMF”) stated that a major constraint for the
PRS implementation was weak integration of monitoring systems into the policy making and accountability process. Even in
the more successful cases of Tanzania and Uganda, there was
less focus on strengthening the links between deriving information for donors and how to make this useful for the
Government’s work reporting and policy processes.
There are also examples of harmonization around results
reporting in programs and projects. In many cases, harmonization around results reporting has evolved over time in a sector or
theme. Madagascar’s NEAP provides a good example of how
donors and government have evolved to harmonization around
results reporting. As NEAP moves to its third iteration, there is a
strong relationship between government and donors, based on an
agreed set of expected results and indicators. A joint steering
committee: (1) ensures that government and donor investments
are defined and implemented in a manner compatible with the
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results framework and agreed upon indicators; (2) monitors
progress towards agreed upon results; and (3) provides strategic
orientation and guidance for the overall program implementation
and coordination with other sectoral and development programs.
Participating donors (such as the World Bank, United Nations
Development Programme, and Global Environment Facility;
French, German, Japanese, Swiss, and U.S. bilateral programs;
Conservation International, World Wildlife Federation, and
Wildlife Conservation Society) are then able to use the M&E
system for their own results reporting. The M&E system with
common indicators enables a more direct linkage between financial sources and results on the ground, while avoiding the need
for donor coordination at the activity and input level. The process
is thus conducive to both harmonization around results reporting
and the reinforcement of government systems.33

FACTOR TWO: FOSTERING COUNTRY OWNERSHIP OF
RESULTS REPORTING

Country ownership is essential to achieve development outcomes and to foster continuity in priority setting across political
cycles. The current context of increased aid flows and the associated need for external results reporting presents a challenge to
maintaining country ownership. The MDGs, the G-8 initiative,
and vertical programs to achieve specific outcomes (e.g. infrastructure, health, education)34 will likely increase pressure on
donors to report on progress toward international goals to external taxpayers. This may also encourage a greater funneling of
resources through vertical, sector-specific channels rather than
through country systems (see Box 3). Experience shows that, if
ignored, these pressures can translate into results reporting systems that track data for an external audience, but lack legitimacy
and ownership by those who are setting policies, implementing

BOX 3:

SPACE FOR AFRICAN COUNTRIES TO
INNOVATE THEIR OWN FRAMEWORKS
AND PROCESSES
“We have learnt to come to terms with the reality that
development is a process, and that it can only be sustained
if it is owned and led by the targeted population.
Development cannot be imposed, it can only be facilitated;
it requires ownership, participation and empowerment, not
harangues and dictates. African countries … have to
assume full ownership and responsibility for their
development. Bilateral donors, multilateral agencies and
externally-funded NGOs …are entitled to demand
transparency and evidence of results. But they must be
ready to genuinely concede enough space for the African
countries to innovate, develop and pilot their policy
frameworks and processes.”

Tanzanian President Benjamin William Mkapa Keynote
speech, Africa Regional Workshop, Harmonization and
Alignment (Nov. 2004)
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programs, or monitoring results. A recent development committee
paper on aid effectiveness and aid financing explicitly notes that
“it is important to not undermine country ownership of the development agenda….the use of earmarked funds can cause distortions at the country level in terms of resource allocation, pressure
on implementing capacity, increased transaction costs, and misalignment with country-owned mechanisms such as PRSPs.”35
Uganda provides a positive example where external assistance is
aligned to the national goals and priorities, as reflected in the
PEAP, to ensure aid effectiveness. The government of Uganda has
shown consistent leadership in its mode of receiving aid and identification of areas where this aid will be well managed to make
significant impact on poverty and economic growth.
When the development objectives of the country and
donors overlap, much progress can be made in reporting on
results, and more importantly, achieving them. However, when
the desires are not congruent, this pressure can lead to results
reporting systems with a number of indicators that are not
achievable or reflective of country priorities. When these
become a condition for disbursement, especially in budget support, there is a potential for decreased predictability and
increased volatility, unfocused and perhaps less substantive programs, and erosion of the usefulness of the indicators.
At the agency level, the pressure for measuring progress
toward global goals can result in a disconnect between the
reporting requirements for donor headquarters and the principles of country ownership and partnership at the country level.
This is especially true for bilateral agencies where the pressure
from their Parliament or other politicians can result in a reporting system that is focused on attribution to agency programs/projects and in some cases incentives away from harmonization or more programmatic approaches. Due to the governance structure of the multilaterals, pressure from their
Executive Boards may work in a similar manner. At the same
time many donor agency staff members are being encouraged
to manage for results at the operational level; to use and
strengthen country systems and draw on those systems for
results reporting. This can create a disconnect within the
organization. Corporate reporting therefore needs to strike a
careful balance between providing a common framework for
systematically reporting results and ensuring flexibility in how
results are reported in any given context (see Box 4).36 Often
this is dependent on how well the country office staff has
received the corporate messages and applied them innovatively in a country context.
Ultimately donors and country partners are looking at the
same results; thus results reporting systems can: (1) supply
donors with the reporting for control systems that are fully
aligned with country monitoring and reporting mechanisms; and
(2) supply donors’ Parliaments and general public with knowledge of the national strategy and how support from donor countries is yielding results. The challenge is how to translate the format and the presentation of results to serve the needs for the
country, donors’ agencies, and Parliament/external stakeholders.
This is an area to be further explored.
FALL 2005

Less often discussed is how the domestic political aspects
of reporting results can influence country ownership and in turn
the quality of the underlying systems on which results reporting
is based. It should be recognized that what donors are promoting in partner countries in terms of a comprehensive results
framework is something few Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development members practice. In addition, the
political acceptability of a results framework with a longer term
perspective is correlated to the stage of development of the
political system. It is necessary to understand the political context and how efforts to achieve long term goals (such as universal primary education) can yield, or impede, short term political
gains. Policy making is likely to have a perspective that empha-

BOX 4:

ALIGNING COUNTRY OWNED RESULTS
TO EXTERNAL GOALS — SECTOR
EXPERIENCE IN MOZAMBIQUE
The formulation of the MTEF and the PARPA have helped
sector programs improve alignment to national objectives.
However, a recent report noted that a large proportion of
total assistance coming into the country is made up of a
multitude of uncoordinated, often donor-driven,
development and technical assistance projects. These
projects did not add up to a coherent whole, nor promote
the Government of Mozambique’s (“GOM’s”) priorities. In
addition, it was found that the GoM had incomplete
knowledge of these programs. The same report
recommends that Government “turn down low-priority
offers of 'assistance' [and] be willing to say 'no' to donors
promoting their pet projects and schemes.”
In the health sector, health related policy formulation is
conducted under the lead of the central Ministry of Health,
however, the GOM is struggling to upgrade and strengthen
its capacities to absorb additional funding and work in the
sector. Various vertical projects in malaria, tuberculosis,
leprosy, and HIV/AIDS supported by several donors are to
be integrated into a larger “communicable diseases”
program. There are functioning coordination mechanisms
and a single set of indicators to guide monitoring. Yet
donors continue to conduct separate evaluations, and
separate donor planning and coordination mechanisms also
exist. In addition, funding from newer players like GFATM,
Clinton Fund, and MAP have taken place outside the
MTEF. Multilaterals do not join pools or common funds
and continue with vertical funding arrangements.
Tony Killick, Carlos Castel-Branco, and Richard Gerster,
Perfect Partners? (2005);

OECD-DAC, Survey on H & A, Mozambique (2004);

Swedish Agency for International Development Cooperation,
Mapping of SWAps in the health sector (2003).
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sizes short term benefits. Thus, supporting governments in
developing a sufficient basis for results reporting must respond
to these political dimensions and build political ownership.
Above all, results approaches must illustrate their usefulness for
achieving advances that are politically valuable in the short
term, e.g. an electoral cycle. Otherwise, there are risks that
politicians will develop alternative efforts that are not consistent
with the medium term policy outcomes and, thus, undermine
implementation of a strategy. There are several studies that
highlight the importance of engagement of Parliament and the
cabinet in implementation of MTEF.37 Additional reviews have
pointed out that sustainable monitoring and evaluation systems
require that more attention be paid to the political dimensions
and use of information in the policy process, rather than just
technical considerations.38 Yet, according to emerging evidence
in some countries, there is a rapidly increasing number of policy measures aimed at short-term political gain, with weak sometimes contradicting links to strategy objectives.39 Therefore,
innovative solutions at the country level are needed to inform
how to develop results reporting systems that are responsive to
political needs.
A key driver for harmonization around results reporting has
been earlier efforts to improve aid coordination, increase the relevance of donor programs to country owned goals, and reach
agreement on the use of common processes and procedures.
Strong government leadership has been essential in engaging
external partners in a continuous and successful dialogue
focused on making development assistance more effective. For
instance, clarity on government priorities and expected results
and trade offs made by governments can facilitate donor acceptance of less than total agreement on all strategy dimensions,
while still aligning to the country priorities. The 2005
Comprehensive Development Framework (“CDF”) evaluation
noted that this strong government leadership resulted in “development assistance agencies [being] more likely to align their
support with country priorities, harmonize their working methods with the country’s systems, and avoid supporting overlapping, competing, or non-priority efforts.”40
The translation of international commitments, such as the
Paris Declaration, from agency headquarters and to field staff
is a prerequisite for fostering a conducive environment for
country results reporting that respects country ownership and
priorities. A recent DAC survey noted that donors are basing
their assistance on country priorities, particularly where there
is ownership on the part of the country, government capacity
to lead the donors, and commitment to work differently by
donors. This type of alignment to government priorities is a
first step in establishing a similar results reporting system.
How this is done in practice varies depending on the country
circumstances. In Mozambique, the World Bank country team
responsible for piloting a results based country assistance
strategy (“CAS”) used the opportunity of a new corporate initiative – piloting the results based CAS as part of the results
agenda – to discuss with the Government and other donors
how to harmonize around a common set of indicators at the
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strategy level. This resulted in a series of discussions among
donors and government on the content of the strategy results
framework and alignment of this to the Government PARPA.
It provided the structure for in-depth examination of goals and
expectations from all sides and a discussion of how to monitor
and measure those expectations. In many instances, these

BOX 5:

LEVERAGING THE PARIS AND ROME
DECLARATION FOR MUTUAL
ACCOUNTABILITY – MOZAMBIQUE
In Mozambique, the Government and fifteen donor partners
signed a memorandum of understanding that reflects the
spirit of The New Partnership for Africa’s Development
(“NEPAD”), the Monterey Consensus, and the Rome
Declaration on Harmonization, “in a process of open
dialogue and mutual accountability.” The G15 donors
followed up on this commitment with a Programme Aid
Partners Performance Assessment (“PAPPAF”) framework.
The PAPPAF matrix identifies a set of objectives, activities,
indicators, and targets for a number of areas for donor
performance on using country systems (e.g. harmonization
and alignment). The partners are committed to providing
program aid using Mozambique’s instruments, processes,
and systems and follows the Government cycle for
planning, implementation, monitoring, reporting, and
funding. The PAPPAF allows regular monitoring by peers
and GOM to bring discipline and self-management among
the budget support group. A survey of the performance
over 2003 was carried out in 2004 and is serving as the
baseline from which to measure and monitor the trend of
donor performance.
Of fourteen indicators of donor performance set in the 2004
PAF matrix, only half were achieved. Respondents to the
2004 Survey on Harmonization and Alignment indicated
that there are several areas where greater alignment and
harmonization could occur. For example, information about
donor activities is currently widely dispersed across various
departments of the government and could be better
coordinated. The survey noted there is a need to reduce the
overlap between sector reviews and the technical teams of
the joint review if the high transaction costs facing
government are to be reduced. It also found that many of
the donors continued to work in isolation on institutional
areas. Similar trends were noted by other studies and
reviews on Mozambique. These sector study reviews stated
that although there was some progress in individual sectors,
cross-sectoral coordination was lacking in the ministries.
The number of Memorandum of Understanding PAPs have
risen to seventeen, and all PAPs are urged to improve the
overall aid effectiveness in the spirit of the MoU and the
recent Paris Declaration.
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meetings represented the first time that sector representatives
had held technical discussions with other ministries or the
Ministry of Finance. During this process the World Bank and
the Government’s team engaged in a process of prioritization
and selection and settled for trade-offs that were acceptable to
everyone. The team was able to achieve 70 percent alignment
of indicators by the time of presentation of the strategy to the
World Bank Board, while committing to increase this alignment during implementation. At the same time, the team met
guidelines of the corporate reporting system being piloted.
This corporate reporting system allowed flexibility in identification of the targets and indicators, while maintaining technical rigor in the method applied to evaluation.

FACTOR THREE: PROGRAMMATIC SUPPORT FOR
CAPACITY BUILDING IN MONITORING AND EVALUATION

As countries move to a stronger results orientation in their
strategy development and planning processes – supported by
the donor community – their capacity to do so must grow exponentially. On the donor side, the evolution within agencies to a
stronger results orientation in their assistance strategies and
increasing reliance on country monitoring systems further
underlines the importance of coordination for capacity building. This is coupled with the probability of budget support
playing a much larger role in aid disbursements underpinning
the need to strengthen public sector management mechanisms,
including project analysis, budgeting, reporting, and M&E.
Developing monitoring and evaluation capacity is a long term
process and making incremental progress sustainable requires
ownership by government.
Monitoring systems by themselves may not contribute very
much to the enhancement of development effectiveness, unless
procedures are in place for the results from monitoring to feed
into policy making and decision-making processes of governments and donors. Institutionalization of the evaluation function
is equally important for harmonization around results, as much
of evaluation in country is carried out in a somewhat ad hoc
manner. The strategies used to introduce results-based management have varied across countries; however, there are similar
elements that contribute to a successful shift to a results-based
culture, and well-established strategies to move the results agenda forward. These include:
• A clear mandate for deepening the results approach
within the governance system. This may include the
presence of strong leadership, usually through a
strong champion(s) at the most senior level of government. It may also be driven by economic pressures or other incentives for change (often, a concerned citizenry or the need to reduce the cost of burdensome civil service payrolls).

• Clear links to budget and other resource allocation
decisions. This implies greater interconnectivity
between government institutions and more transparent resource management systems.
FALL 2005

• A results oriented culture and supporting organizational structures. The culture within countries may not
value a focus on results. Agencies may lack sufficient
administrative and organizational structures to support
using results-based information for planning, management, and resource allocation decisions.
• Involvement of civil society as an important partner
with government.

• Pockets of innovation that can serve as beginning
practices or pilot programs.

• The capacity to define a national strategy aligned to
sector, regional, and local planning is often weak. The
move to an increasing role for local governments in
service delivery necessitates better linkages to planning and management at lower levels of government
– where capacity may be weak.

• The ability to design and maintain supporting statistical systems is weak and there is not an adequate a
results-based workforce to develop and support
information systems for sustained use. Often, government officials do not have the training or legal
frameworks for modern data management to support
a results-based management system. In many countries development data are collected by different
institutions with little coordination on time periods
and statistical methods, thus undermining reliability
of results reporting.

There are three actions that the donor community and countries can take to foster country ownership while meeting the
need for external reporting. First, the donor community and
country can undertake joint assessment of country capacity for
monitoring and evaluation capacity that are essential for results
reporting. This country capacity should be meaningful in the
country context and develop capacity building and includes the
identification of relevant and viable indicators, the capacity to
organize timely, efficient, “lean” data collection mechanisms,
the capacity to assess in a meaningful way what actual observations on those indicators would tell, the capacity to formulate
meaningful policy advice on the basis of observed trends, and
the capacity to formulate evaluation needs. Second, donors can
operationalize joint work and mutual accountability by scaling
up M&E systems from project to sector to country level; for
example, by supporting the integration of project-level M&E
systems into line ministries structures. Third, the donor community and country can sign a memorandum of understanding with
development partners on how support for M&E, whether project, program, or institutional, will strengthen country systems in
a sustainable manner.

CONCLUSION

The review of the processes and current environment
around harmonization of results reporting reveals that the impetus for building harmonized systems around results reporting is
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not limited to defining indicators and agreeing on measurement.
Instead, harmonization around results reporting is part of a
broader political and economic context, both in country and in
the international community that points to the necessity to balance the external reporting needs with domestic accountability
and position results reporting within the country’s development
agenda, systems, and capacity to deliver evidence of results. The
four cases (Uganda, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Madagascar)
and an in depth literature and documentation review drove to
identification of factors and actions that are needed to make har-

monization around results reporting work in practice. Against
each action the cases provided examples that can be turned into
specific interventions for the development community. These
factors consider the interrelationship between the country context and the international context in a way that is supportive of
improving country systems.
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KEEPING CELL PHONES AFFORDABLE:

REGULATING THE PRIVATE SECTOR’S CONTRIBUTION TO DEVELOPMENT
by Rachael Moshman*

O

INTRODUCTION

ne of the targets of Millennium Development Goal
Eight, “Develop a Global Partnership for
Development,” is to cooperate with the private sector to “make available the benefits of new technologies –
especially information and communications technologies.”1
International development professionals, such as Jeffrey
Sachs, have listed numerous benefits that can be brought to
the developing world through cell phone technology,
including communicating with long-distance family members, increasing communication between different villages,
finding employment opportunities, having more options in
emergency situations, allowing fisherman and farmers to
check market prices before leaving the village, and allowing
quick and easy transfer of funds.2 Cell phones may also
eventually help bring internet into developing countries’
villages and homes.3

THE GROWTH OF THE CELL PHONE MARKET

Attributed to: Reprinted with permission from World
Resources Institute, Washington, DC. See
http://images.wri.org/photo_smartcom_large.JPG.

From 1999 to 2004, cell phone usage in Africa increased
from 7.5 million to 76.8 million users, and one in eleven
Africans is now a cell phone subscriber.4 In South Africa, the
number of cell phone users jumped from zero to ten million
between 1993 and 2003, and the percentage of this cell phone
use in lower-income markets has increased with time.5 The
market has grown enormously in the last decade, but there is
still plenty of available market left to access. Though 77 per-

Customers buy prepaid cards for their cell phones from a sarisari store in the Philippines.

cent of the world’s population is in range of a cell phone
tower, only 25 percent are cell phone subscribers.6
Commentators agree that more people will use cell phones
than fixed land lines for future telecommunications.7
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One reason that cell phone use may be so popular is that
with a low-income budget it is easier to manage a pre-paid
phone card than to pay for a fixed phone line. Pre-paid cards
were made available in South Africa starting in 1997. By
2003, fourteen percent of households making two dollars per
head per day had cell phones.8 Though the lowest cost handset is currently around forty dollars, handsets can be purchased second hand for much less, and some major chain
stores, in South Africa for example, sell cell phones on credit.9 Costs may also continue to go down for consumers.
Phillips, a semiconductor manufacturer, noting that there is
an untapped customer base worldwide of 3.3 million people,
has announced plans for a handset that will cost less than
twenty dollars.10

COOPERATION MEANS REGULATION

However, as the cell phone market grows wider in the
developing world, encouraged by the development goals of the
United Nations, how will the “cooperation with the private sector” help fulfill Millennium Development Goal Eight?
Motorola recently won a contract to provide six million cell
phone handsets to developing markets. While they noted that
profit margins for these inexpensive phones would be “singledigit,” they justified this move based on their intention to make
greater profits from the developing markets in the future:
“Motorola will use the ultra low tier to attract consumers to its
brand and eventually sell up more expensive models.”11 This
inevitable reach for greater profit margins is exactly why the
private market should be regulated by governments as cell
phones are distributed, and come to be relied on, in developing
countries.
According to World Bank figures, the gross national
income average for low-income countries is $510, with some
64 countries included in that category.12 Proponents of distributing cell phones to low-income countries tout a recent
study by the London Business School that found that increasing cell phone ownership by ten percent in the typical developing country boosts gross domestic product growth by 0.6
percent.13 However, when a family is only making $510 per
year, a 0.6 percent growth means only about three dollars
extra per year—this is not enough to allow one to upgrade
their cell phone. Without regulation, it cannot be guaranteed
that private companies will continue to provide affordable
access to the cell phone market.
Tied directly to the need for regulation, another reason
that people may be using cell phones in South Africa and
* Rachael Moshman is a JD and MA (International Affairs) candidate, 2006,
at American University, Washington College of Law and School of
International Service.
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other parts of Africa is because the privatization of the telecom industry has made fixed line phones unaffordable. Since
privatizing the phone company in South Africa in 1997, two
million people have had their phone lines cut because they
could not afford to pay for their services.14 A strong regulatory system implemented by governments to ensure the private sector’s cooperation with development goals can reduce
the risk that basic services, such as a cell phone, become
unaffordable to those who rely on them.
Currently, the private sector is busy setting up more cell
phone towers in remote parts of the developing world.15 They
are also lobbying countries to remove barriers to industry
development, such as taxes. Some countries are taxing imported handsets, as well as placing high taxes on telecom opera-

Without regulation, it
cannot be guaranteed that
private companies will
continue to provide
affordable access to the
cell phone market.
tors and users. It is simple to point to government regulations,
such as Turkey’s 25 percent special communications tax, as
interfering with the growth of the market and impacting consumers as well as the private companies.16 However, there are
other government regulations that can contribute to development goals without stunting the growth of the market. South
Africa currently, for example, has required cell phone operators to contribute to a Universal Access Fund, community call
centers, and free SIM card offers as conditions for licensing
their cell networks.17 Other regulations could include monitoring equitable sector development, and proportional to
income customer fees.
Offering access to cell phones does present many
advantages to people in the developing world. The push to
multiply that access through the growth of private markets,
however, cannot be done at the expense of the governmentcentered regulatory system needed to guide the private sector long-term and cooperatively toward meeting the goals
of development.
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TARGETS, TIMETABLES, AND EFFECTIVE
IMPLEMENTING MECHANISMS:

NECESSARY BUILDING BLOCKS FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

T

by John C. Dernbach*
INTRODUCTION

he concept of “sustainable development” provides a
framework for simultaneously reconciling and furthering
the broad goals of peace and security, economic development, social development, and environmental protection.1
Most observers recognize that we are more likely to protect the
environment when we can show that environmental protection
will further security, economic, and social goals, or at least will
not interfere with them.2 In developing countries, for instance,
where poverty causes or contributes to environmental degradation, and where financial resources are especially scarce, environmental protection is much more likely to be accomplished
when it is combined with economic development. In developed
countries, the greater efficiency and conservation required for
sustainable development are more likely to occur when it is
plainly more economically attractive than current high levels of
materials and energy consumption.3 The concept of “sustainable
development,” moreover, is the internationally accepted framework for making these broad goals mutually reinforcing endorsed through internationally agreed texts such as Agenda
21, a product of the 1992 United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development.4
This framework, however, needs improvement. There is a
virtual absence of effective internationally-agreed goals for
environmental protection and social well-being. Few, if any,
such goals exist in Agenda 21 or in binding multilateral agreements.5 The achievement of sustainable development will
require a long-term, continuing global commitment, which is
not possible without the implementation of long-term international targets and timetables. This article discusses why effective targets, timetables, and implementing mechanisms are a
crucial component in sustainable development.

WHY TARGETS AND TIMETABLES ARE NEEDED

International agreement upon specific environmental and
social goals is necessary to achieve sustainable development.
“Goals,” in this context, refer to specific, measurable targets
achieved by specific dates or according to specified timetables.
Thus, a target and timetable is a goal whose achievement or
lack of achievement can be determined to a reasonable level of
certainty. For example, a target and timetable might be
expressed as “achieving A by Year C” or “reducing B by fifty
percent by Year C.”6
When targets are vaguely defined, timetables can usually be
achieved through minimal activity. A goal of “making efforts
FALL 2005

toward D by Year E,” for instance, can be met by almost any
effort at all. Similarly, without specific timetables, targets are
merely aspirational statements of goals. A goal of simply
“achieving F” is an example. Without a specific date, in a practical sense, there is nothing to achieve and little incentive to
achieve it. There are other ways to water down the commitments
contained in targets and timetables, using a variety of qualifying
phrases and exceptions. Obviously, the strongest targets and
timetables have no built-in escape clauses.
The establishment of effective targets and timetables can
accomplish at least six valuable tasks: (1) identifying priorities;
(2) clarifying objectives of decision makers; (3) demonstrating
commitment to sustainable development and thus giving it
greater credibility; (4) giving operational meaning to sustainable
development; (5) clarifying the role of law; and (6) for difficult
long-term objectives, providing benchmarks of progress
through short-term or interim goals. All of these are needed to
achieve sustainable development, and none are likely to occur
without the establishment of effective targets and timetables.

IDENTIFYING PRIORITIES

The process of setting goals necessarily forces a decision
maker to think strategically about how to set and achieve them. A
strategy for sustainable development7 would identify prioritized
issues or goals. In doing so, decision makers reduce numerous
pressing tasks into a smaller and manageable number of objectives. Priority setting permits governmental and nongovernmental
actors to concentrate their limited time and resources on a smaller number of tasks. Additionally, in principle, priority setting
allows those actors to address tasks more effectively.
A threshold dilemma is the existence of more needs and
problems than any government or other institution can handle at
once. For example, Agenda 21 includes chapters addressing
consumption, air pollution (including climate change), land
resources, deforestation, desertification, mountain ecosystems,
agriculture, biological diversity, oceans, fresh water, toxic
chemicals, hazardous wastes, solid wastes, and radioactive
wastes.8 Agenda 21 also contains chapters on trade, poverty,
human health, housing, and biotechnology.9 It is difficult to
* John C. Dernbach is a Professor of Law at Widener University School of Law.
Professor Dernbach serves as Co-Chair of the American Bar Association
Environment, Energy, and Resource Section’s Committee on Sustainable
Development, Ecosystems, and Climate Change and Sustainable Development.
This article was previously published in a longer form in the William & Mary
Environmental Law and Policy Review, 27 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
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imagine how any decision maker could give priority to all of
these things and still accomplish much of significance.
To address this problem, Agenda 21 states that national
governments “will develop their own priorities in accordance
with their prevailing conditions, needs, national plans, policies,
and [programs].”10 For every country, priorities are different.
Virtually all countries, in varying degrees, are experiencing
worsening problems with poverty and environment because of
unsustainable development.11 The immediate task then becomes
responding to the greatest threats, or “damage control.”
The European Union (“EU”) has adopted a sustainable
development strategy with a significant “damage control” element.12 For example, EU priorities include global warming,
public health, poverty, aging of the population, loss of biodiversity, and transport congestion.13 These priorities resulted from
an analytical process that focused on three criteria: severity of
the problem, the extent to which severe and adverse effects are
likely to be felt by subsequent generations, and the extent to
which the problem is common among EU member countries.14
The methodology is problem-oriented and is directed against
many of the same problems that international sustainable development efforts have targeted, especially climate change, biodiversity, and poverty. For the EU,
then, the first step in the strategic process is problem identification and priority setting.

CLARIFYING OBJECTIVES

International agreement
upon specific
environmental and social
goals is necessary to
achieve sustainable
development.

General descriptions of priorities are useful, but goal setting also requires decision makers to think clearly about what
they want. Clarity moves, or
ought to move, decision makers
beyond rhetoric and generalizations toward goals that are both
precise
and
meaningful.
Clarifying objectives is necessary to ensure that goals make sense, that progress toward goals
is measured reasonably accurately, that goals can be achieved
within the time specified, and that achievement of the goals will
actually address the underlying problems.15
Any serious effort to foster sustainable development
requires the establishment of clearly defined objectives. For
instance, the National Research Council's 1999 report, Our
Common Journey: A Transition Toward Sustainable
Development, identifies five key objectives: (1) accelerating fertility reduction so that the world's current population grows only
to eight billion by 2050 rather than the nine billion currently
projected; (2) providing “adequate water, sanitation, and clean
air” for the expected seven billion people who will live in urban
areas in 2050, which is two to three times the number of people
who now live in urban areas; (3) increasing agricultural productivity in output per hectare by two to three times current productivity levels, on a sustainable basis, by 2050; (4) doubling
the historic rate of efficiency improvements for materials and
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energy use; and (5) restoring and maintaining the functions and
integrity of ecosystems that have been dominated by humans,
and protecting the least affected ecosystems from land conversion.16 The Council describes these goals as necessary, ambitious, and achievable by 2050.17 The Council's five goals represent an effort to convert the broad goals of sustainable development into achievable program elements. Three of the five are
stated in quantitative terms, and the other two (relating to the
urban environment and biodiversity) could also be converted
into quantitative terms.
Similarly, the EU sustainable development strategy contains more precise objectives for each of its six identified priority areas.18 The objectives for one priority area are illustrative.
For climate change, a primary EU objective is reducing greenhouse gas emissions by eight percent below 1990 levels in the
time period of 2008-2012, as specified in the Kyoto Protocol.19
Describing Kyoto as only “a first step,” the strategy states that
the EU should aim for a one percent annual reduction in greenhouse gas emissions until 2020.20 It also calls for a tax on energy products by 2002, the creation of a European system for tradable carbon dioxide permits by 2005, and an end to fossil fuel
subsidies by 2010.21 These objectives are in addition to
increased research and development concerning renewable
energy and more stringent energy conservation standards for
buildings and appliances.22
While these objectives would
need to be carried out in each
individual country within the
EU,23 they nonetheless provide
a concrete set of targets and
timetables for addressing climate change.
The establishment of
achievable objectives moves the
debate from generalized to specific means of addressing problems. As an example of generalized objectives, under the Rio Agreements, countries (particularly developed countries) are to “reduce and eliminate unsustainable patterns of production and consumption.”24 According
to Agenda 21, “the major cause of the continued deterioration of
the global environment is the unsustainable pattern of consumption and production, particularly in industrialized countries.”25
This unsustainable pattern has led to proposals to increase the
efficiency with which materials and energy are used by factors
of four26 or ten27 before 2050. These reduction proposals are
useful indicators of the magnitude of the challenge, but they do
not help answer the question of which materials and energy
sources should be covered. Is consumption of electricity from
windmills the same as consumption of electricity from fossil
fuels? Is consumption of nickel or aluminum the same as consumption of sand? Quite plainly, environmental impacts of consumption depend on what is being consumed, and how it was
produced.28 The underlying challenge is understanding the speSUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

cific types of environmental impacts that consumption creates
and addressing the sources of those impacts directly.29
For the production and consumption of energy in developed
countries, Lynn Price and Mark D. Levine suggest the path
toward sustainability can be measured according to three indicators: (1) the efficiency with which energy is used; (2) the percentage of overall energy demand that is met by renewable energy; and (3) the level of carbon dioxide emissions.30 Policies
addressing energy consumption should directly address these
issues and result in greater efficiency, more use of renewables,
and lower levels of carbon dioxide.31 Progress on the first two
indicators, in fact, is essentially captured by progress on the
third.32 Thus, sustainable production and consumption of energy depends primarily on reducing carbon dioxide emissions
from fossil fuels.33 Put differently, an international or national
objective of reducing fossil fuel emissions by a specific amount
by a specific time (like the EU objective) is also a key means of
moving energy production and
consumption in a sustainable
direction.34 Absent a technological breakthrough, reducing carbon dioxide emissions requires
reducing the use of fossil
fuels,35 particularly fuels like
coal, whose burning creates
more carbon dioxide emissions
than other fossil fuels.36
Clear objectives also help
address issues that might otherwise be polarized by competing
ideological views. By focusing
on carbon dioxide emissions, for instance, decision makers can
move away from an abstract discussion of consumption—often
an ideological and divisive issue. For some, challenges to consumption are also challenges to “the good life” made possible
by a high standard of living.37 Yet for others, challenges to consumption are necessary because gluttony and waste threaten the
planet's future.38 Such debates are not constructive. By focusing
not on consumption itself, but on specific objectives, such as
carbon dioxide emissions, decision makers can ork towards reconciliation among these competing positions.
Targets and timetables provide a way of discussing and
deciding how ambitious we want or need to be. An example
occurred in the Pennsylvania legislature during the mid-1980s.
There, the legislature debated the merits of a proposed program
requiring large-and medium-sized municipalities across the
state to establish curbside recycling programs for glass, metal,
paper, and plastic.39 An important issue in that debate was
whether the recycling rate goal for that program by January 1,
1997 should be ten percent or twenty-five percent. The latter
was eventually chosen40 because it was more serious, seemed to
better correspond to the magnitude of the waste problem, and
was achievable, even though it was more difficult than the ten
percent goal. When the twenty-five percent goal was later
achieved, the state set an even higher goal.41

Specific objectives also focus efforts of governmental and
nongovernmental actors over the long term.42 Political and other
leaders enter and leave office, but properly established targets and
timetables remain in place.43 Targets and timetables are particularly important when there are many public and private decision
makers whose activities need to be coordinated or, at least, consistent.44 Goals are a management tool for focusing the efforts of
administrative agencies, corporations and other organizations,
and even national governments and the international community.
Goals become the basis around which budgets are developed and
implemented; personnel are hired and allocated; programs are
created, modified, or harmonized; and rewards and punishments
are meted out. Specificity and clarity reduce the likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding about what the objectives are and thus
increases the likelihood that they will be achieved.
Finally, international targets and timetables help ensure that
individual nations are working together and motivated by a
common objective. While
national targets and timetables
are also necessary, particular
countries or groups of countries
cannot successfully address
global problems such as climate
change or the loss of biodiversity themselves. If some major
emitters of greenhouse gases
reduce their emissions, and others do not, it may be impossible
to prevent major climate
change. The international cooperation that comes with international targets and timetables may also provide developed countries with opportunities to reduce compliance costs and provide
a means for developing countries to receive financial or technical assistance.45

Political and other leaders
enter and leave office, but
properly established
targets and timetables
remain in place.
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DEMONSTRATING COMMITMENT

Goals are necessary to measure whether a particular effort
succeeds.46 Targets and timetables also provide a way of measuring progress or lack of progress toward goals.47 Thus, an
agreement to a target and timetable is ordinarily a commitment
to achieve it.48 When a country agrees to adopt a specific goal,
it is essentially agreeing to achieve it. For legally binding agreements, the reason is simple: failure to achieve a specific goal or
target would put a nation in noncompliance with the agreement.49 Failure to comply with specific goals in nonbinding
agreements subjects a country to political penalties and other
repercussions.50 By demonstrating greater commitment, targets
and timetables are a way of providing additional credibility to
decision makers when they claim to be interested in moving
toward sustainability.51 Perhaps conversely, quantitative targets
are so significant that the United States ratified the Climate
Change Convention because it did not contain quantitative and,
therefore, enforceable targets.52 The United States also filed
reservations to portions of Agenda 21 (a nonbinding agreement)
that contained a quantitative goal.53
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GIVING OPERATIONAL MEANING TO
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Specific environmental and social goals also provide a way
of clarifying the meaning of sustainable development. Much of
the criticism directed toward sustainable development is based
on the claim that it has multiple meanings or no core meaning at
all.54 Sustainable development requires the integration of social,
economic, and environmental goals in decision-making.55 But
what, specifically, are those social and environmental goals?
Providing context-specific answers to that question, for particular economic sectors, natural resources, countries, or the world,
would provide a more precise definition of sustainable development. More basically, goals would provide a way of putting the
sustainable development framework into effect.
Another source of ambiguity is the tension between procedural integration and substantive integration, particularly for the
environment.56 At times, Agenda 21 and the other international
texts suggest that sustainable development requires the environment to simply be considered in decision making processes
(procedural integration), whatever the substantive outcome.57 At
other times, the same texts suggest that sustainable development
requires not only consideration of the environment, but also the
achievement of substantive environmental goals.58 Because the
transition to a sustainable society is likely to take at least two
generations (or fifty years),59 and because the substantive goals
required for sustainability are in many cases extremely challenging, it is tempting to describe procedural integration as sustainable development.60 Specific, substantive environmental
and social targets and timetables can correct that tendency by
providing a precise method for assessing claims that particular
activities are sustainable, and for measuring progress (or lack of
progress) in achieving sustainable development. In that way,
specific targets and timetables can give credibility, or added
credibility, to sustainable development.
Targets and timetables, however, are not a substitute for the
conceptual framework provided by sustainable development. In
fact, goals can and should be measured against the framework,
as set forth in international texts for sustainable development,
including Agenda 21 and relevant treaties. Additionally, goals
can and should be evaluated by the likelihood that they will
achieve the purposes of sustainable development reversing environmental degradation, reducing poverty, and reducing the gap
between rich and poor.61 Still, targets and timetables, if properly established, provide a specific and measurable way of putting
the conceptual framework into effect.

CLARIFYING THE ROLE OF LAW

Use of specific objectives clarifies the role of legal and policy instruments. In general, legal and policy instruments provide
a means of achieving specific objectives; the instruments themselves are not the ends. As obvious as that may sound, a major
problem with the environmental debate in the United States is
the extent to which specific legal instruments have become
associated with specific positions and objectives. All too often,
regulatory reinvention debates in the United States are about
economic instruments versus environmental regulation, with
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relatively little specific discussion of other instruments.62 These
debates often sound like, and are, debates about less environmental protection versus more environmental protection, even
though specific and substantive environmental goals are often
not discussed. The means, in other words, are all too often a
stand-in for some unstated environmental objective. This is an
extremely confusing and unhelpful way to proceed, and yet it
happens all the time.
When we can agree on substantive environmental goals, it
becomes reasonably clear that the cheapest, most effective
instruments will do just fine, regardless of what they are.63
Successful implementation is more likely if decision makers are
willing to be both creative and flexible in understanding what
legal and policy tools are available, and in choosing the right
mix of laws and policies for their particular purposes.

ACHIEVING LONG-TERM OBJECTIVES
THROUGH INTERIM GOALS

Achieving sustainable development is not a short-term
objective. The National Research Council's conclusion that a
transition to sustainability is possible by 205064 is a daunting
statement about the length of the journey. This two-generation
period is a realistic time frame within which to set targets,
attempt to change course, and measure success or failure. Yet
many environment and development stresses will become much
more challenging during this period.65 A transition toward sustainability is not the same thing as sustainability itself.
Achieving this transition would mean, by 2050, that the
world would be in the midst of a “gradual and continuous” shift
from an unsustainable society to a sustainable society.66 While
long-term objectives are important, they are fraught with difficulties. The obstacles appear to be, and often are, extremely challenging. As a result, people can be dissuaded from trying to
achieve them. Long-term objectives can also seem so overly
ambitious as to suggest that sustainable development is impossible. In addition, long-term objectives are often beyond the time
range that decision makers are even willing to consider – beyond
their retirement date, beyond their political term of office, and
beyond the immediate problems they confront on a daily or weekly basis. For many issues, too, we do not have a very clear idea of
what the final sustainable development objective should be. The
purpose of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, for instance, is “stabilization of greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent
dangerous anthropogenic [human caused] interference with the
climate system.”67 No one is particularly sure what that level is.
Interim or short-term goals are a way of addressing these
difficulties. They divide a larger problem into smaller and (if the
interim goals are properly set) achievable pieces. They help
steer society in a general direction even if the precise destination
is not yet known. Thus, the goal-setting process can result in
interim goals, whether or not long-term targets and timetables
are also established. Interim goals also provide an answer to the
claim that sustainable development is impossible. By achieving
discrete goals, we can learn how to better address specific problems and gain the confidence and experience necessary to build
on initial achievements.
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IMPLEMENTING MECHANISMS FOR
TARGETS AND TIMETABLES

Targets and timetables are useful only if they are effectively implemented – if the targets and timetables are actually
achieved. Monitoring and public reporting of progress (or lack
of progress) toward targets and timetables is one way to help
ensure that they are met. Legal mechanisms to ensure compliance are also important, and it is far from clear that political
commitments are an effective substitute for such mechanisms.

MONITORING AND PUBLIC REPORTING

A widely recognized means of inducing desired environmental outcomes is to require and publicly report information about
specific activities.68 Public reporting of releases of toxic chemicals
into the environment is required under the Emergency Planning
and Community Right-to-Know Act in the United States, even
though the releases themselves are likely to be legal.69 Public
reporting of these releases has led companies to significantly
reduce the amount of these chemicals released into the environment.70 Consequently, the implementation of goals should be
accompanied by an effort to gather and publicly disclose information that measures progress in meeting goals.71 Specific goals,
including public reporting of data concerning success or failure in
achieving goals, also provide a basis for resisting efforts to undermine those goals by weakening implementation.72

LEGAL VS. POLITICAL COMMITMENTS

The appeal of placing targets and timetables into international treaties is undeniable. The ratification process for a treaty, by
which individual countries agree to be bound under international
law by its provisions, helps ensure that countries take the commitments in the treaty seriously and have the domestic legal means of
implementing it.73 Beyond that, a treaty may contain any number
of mechanisms to enhance the likelihood of compliance. These
include regular meetings of the conference of the parties; the use
of technical bodies to resolve scientific, technical, financial, and
other issues; the required use of dispute resolution mechanisms;
procedural mechanisms to encourage parties to come into compliance; financial assistance to developing countries to assist their
compliance; and even trade restrictions and sanctions.
The challenge of international targets and timetables is that
nations usually are unwilling to agree to be bound by them under
international law. Benchmarks or measurable standards of environmental performance are used only on a limited basis in international environmental law.74 The relatively recent adoption of
framework conventions for biodiversity, climate, desertification,

stratospheric ozone, and other problems masks the reality that
only one convention (on stratospheric ozone) has
resulted in effective and widespread use of targets and timetables.
Targets and timetables contained in other agreements, particularly plans of action adopted at international conferences,
tend to lack most of these compliance-inducing mechanisms.
Ordinarily, these conferences or meetings result in goals, an
action plan to achieve those goals, and perhaps a statement of
principles. The lack of a treaty structure makes it impossible to
induce compliance through any kind of required procedure, and
thus such mechanisms are not used.75 While it is true that
nations negotiate such agreements, and give their assent to these
agreements at conferences, they are not subject to a ratification
process and are not legally binding. They are “soft law,” not
“hard” or real law. Their effect, if they have one, is primarily
political, not legal.76 Still, there are reasons to believe that nonbinding agreements may work to some degree. As already suggested, the precision of even nonbinding targets and timetables
sets them apart from general goals or goals without timetables.
Targets and timetables are likely to have greater political importance than vaguer objectives because they make it possible to
determine whether the goal has been achieved.77 They can also
be a focal point for international cooperation even when these
targets and timetables are not legally binding. Targets and
timetables directed at poverty, for instance, appear to have had
some positive effect in reducing global poverty.78
Finally, whether binding or nonbinding, the achievement of
targets and timetables ordinarily requires some kind of institutional mechanism to monitor and ensure compliance.79 For a
treaty, this is likely to be the secretariat or administrative body
for the treaty. For nonbinding agreements, there often exist
agreements to meet again in five years to discuss progress, and
a United Nations body may be obliged to monitor and report on
efforts in the meantime.

CONCLUSION

Sustainable development will require time and concerted
effort to come to fruition in the real world. But this effort is essential because there is no alternative to addressing global poverty
and environmental degradation. The challenge is not to simply
identify the missing pieces in the framework; the challenge is to
fill them in – at the international, national, state or provincial, and
local levels. Targets and timetables focus the quest for sustainability on discrete, achievable tasks, and thus should – and hopefully will – provide a means to successfully address the world’s
pressing poverty and environmental challenges.

ENDNOTES: Targets, Timetables, and Mechanisms
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THE MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE ACCOUNT AND
THE PROGRAM ASSESSMENT RATING TOOL:
THE DIFFICULTIES OF MEASURING ACCOUNTABILITY
by Ayako Sato*
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INTRODUCTION

ew people, no matter their political affiliation, would likely disagree with President George W. Bush’s statement
that “[t]axpayer money should be spent wisely or not at
all . . .”1 No one wants taxpayers’ dollars to go toward ineffective and inefficient programs. As such, President Bush has instituted a variety of accountability measures within his administration to ensure that taxpayers’ dollars are well spent. Two of
these mechanisms are the Millennium Challenge Account
(“MCA”) and the Program Assessment Reporting Tool2
(“PART”). This article will compare and contrast the PART and
the MCA indicators in hopes of identifying common problems
associated with performance measurements generally.

TOOLS TO MEASURE ACCOUNTABILITY

The MCA is an U.S. initiative3 designed to address global
problems such as poverty and health by promoting economic
development.4 The Millennium Challenge Corporation
(“MCC”), a government corporation led by a Chief Executive
Officer and a Board of Directors (“Board”) composed of senior
government officials, will administer the MCA. The MCA provides assistance to needy countries in the form of grants, cooperative agreements, or contracts,5 and thus far, Congress has
appropriated approximately $2.48 billion to fund the MCA.6
However, not all developing countries qualify for MCA
funding. Not only does the MCC require per capita income
thresholds,7 but it also requires a country that receives assistance to demonstrate that it is “ruling justly, investing in [its]
people, and encouraging economic freedom”8 by scoring above
the median on half of sixteen indicators in each of the three
areas mentioned.9 The MCA also includes an additional indicator for measuring corruption that is scored on a pass/fail basis.10
Countries must meet or exceed these indicators to obtain funding because, as President Bush stated, “[w]hen nations refuse to
enact sound policies, progress against poverty is nearly impossible.”11 The Board will then re-evaluate those countries that
meet or exceed the indicators and select the finalists that qualify for eligibility.12 Some organizations, such as the Heritage
Foundation, have lauded President Bush’s efforts at holding
nations accountable for the foreign aid they receive.13 Various
individuals claim that the MCA has the potential to ensure that
foreign aid money is not squandered.14 Additionally, supporters
contend that the MCA may create incentives for governments
that did not initially qualify for assistance to make the necessary
improvements to qualify for funding in the future.15
Critics of the indicators, however, raise concerns that funding is not going to the countries that need it most, and they may
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be right. For example, Bhutan, one of the countries disqualified
from funding during the Fiscal Year 2004 cycle,16 had one of the
lowest literacy rates among the least developed countries in the
past.17 Yet, education is one of the key areas of focus for the
MCA.18 Moreover, critics claim that needy countries, like
Bhutan, are not qualifying for funding because the indicators are
flawed, and not because these countries are incapable of managing aid assistance.19 Some of the most common complaints
about the indicators are:
• Too simplistic – sixteen indicators to measure
something as complex as national governance are
inappropriate;

• Not enough data or poor quality of data – data available is either insufficient or too poor or outdated to
accurately assess government performance;
• Selection for assistance is arbitrary – some countries that meet the indicator thresholds are not
selected, while countries that fail to pass are selected for assistance;

• Outcomes are difficult to measure – each of the compacts have performance measures built in, but it is
difficult to measure the project’s results during the
lifetime of the project, and it is equally difficult to
attribute the project’s success to the MCA.

Since the MCA is relatively new,20 one could assume that
the Bush Administration is simply struggling with a new concept of measuring performance through accountability.
However, accountability measures have a long and varied history in the federal government.21 The Bush administration, like
previous administrations, has developed mechanisms to maintain accountability in federal government programs. PART is
one of these accountability measures designed to evaluate the
effectiveness of federal government programs. Still, the PART
suffers from the same flaws as the MCA indicators. Although it
is commendable to attempt to eliminate inefficiency and ineffectiveness, a cautious approach is needed to avoid unnecessarily eliminating essential programs that help the most vulnerable
in our global society.

TOO SIMPLISTIC

Developing a methodology for evaluating a system’s effectiveness can be difficult, especially when applied to major programs like the MCA or PART. The PART, for example, is
*Ayako Sato is a JD candidate, May 2007, at American University, Washington
College of Law.
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designed to evaluate such disparate programs within the federal
government as the Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”)
Drinking Water Research Program and the Department of
Labor’s Adult Education and Training Activities Program.22
Therefore, the methodology has to be simple enough to evaluate
significantly different systems, while at the same time, complex
enough to reveal inefficient and ineffective programs.
In the case of the MCA and the PART, the methodologies are
so simplistic that they are often either under- or over-inclusive, or
produce absurd results. For example, the MCA has sixteen indicators in three broad areas – ruling justly, investing in people, and
economic justice.23 The “ruling justly” and “economic justice”
categories each have six indicators, while the “investing in people” category has four indicators.24 A country must score above
the median on half of the indicators in each of the categories in
order to qualify for funding. However, this approach allows countries, such as China, to qualify for funding despite a poor human
rights record.25 This occurs because several of the indicators within a category are highly correlated. For example, as with China, a
country can qualify by scoring above the median on half of the
indicators relating to governance and corruption, “rendering the
remaining indicators that measure political and civil rights in the
governing justly area irrelevant.”26
The PART is no less controversial for its simple formula. The
General Accounting (now Accountability) Office (“GAO”)27
found that it is difficult to use performance measurements in evaluating complex federal programs.28
The PART evaluates various aspects of a program by rating specific performance areas using a series of Yes/No questions.29 The
performance areas include: (1) purpose and design; (2) strategic planning; (3) program management;
and (4) results/accountability.30
Funding decisions can be influenced by a poor rating in the PART
evaluation. In other words, if a program is found “ineffective” or
if “results [are] not demonstrated,”31 the budget for that program
can be slashed or the program can be eliminated altogether. To
demonstrate, the Fiscal Year 2006 budget recommendations
called for funding decreases for 68 percent of programs deemed
ineffective, yet proposed funding increases for 62 percent of programs that rated “effective.”32 Critics of the PART argue that
such a simple Yes/No survey should not determine the fate of a
federal program. The GAO found that the “yes/no format employed throughout most of the PART questionnaire resulted in
oversimplified answers to some questions,” and that the “yes/no
format is a crude reflection of reality.”33

International and the Price Waterhouse Coopers Opacity
Index.34 However, for subjective concepts, such as corruption,
collecting or obtaining accurate data is difficult.35 Additionally,
data does not exist for some of these indicators. For example,
only 87 out of 115 MCA-eligible countries had enough information on the “days to start a business” indicator, and lack of
information was a problem for the indicators measuring education and health spending as a percent of gross domestic product.36 The World Bank notes that some low-income countries
should be “treated with special care” as data is simply lacking
on some of the performance criteria.37 Some countries, such as
Kiribati and Sao Tome, did not qualify for funding, and the lack
of data in several of the indicators may have contributed to their
disqualification.38
Another problem that has been identified with data is that it
may be out of date and does not accurately reflect current conditions in the country. For example, the MCC used the Heritage
Foundation indicator for trade policy to make selections for
Fiscal Year 2005. However, the indicator was based on data that
spanned from 2001 to 2003.39 A difference in a few years may
not seem like it would make a dramatic difference, but when
dealing with developing nations “judging the performance of
the current government, rather
than that of some previous administration, matters a great deal.”40
To illustrate, Bolivia, which qualified for funding under the governance indicator in November
2004, was subsequently embroiled
in a political crisis that may have
lowered its rating under this performance indicator.41
Poor quality data or unavailability of data has also been identified as a problem with the PART.
The EPA is one federal agency that
is struggling with lack of data in
measuring performance. A GAO
report found that the absence of
environmental data has made it
difficult to assess the effectiveness of some EPA programs.42
This does not mean that the programs are ineffective; it simply
suggests that there is insufficient data to accurately assess
whether or not the programs are in fact effective. The EPA has
been struggling with the issue of environmental indicators for
some time. For example, the EPA has executed efforts to
improve water monitoring due to the lack of reliable national
data, and the EPA has continued to work on the “environmental
indicators initiative” in an effort to track and report environmental conditions and trends.43

A cautious approach is
needed to avoid
unnecessarily
eliminating essential
programs that help the
most vulnerable in our
global society.

NOT ENOUGH DATA

Another failing of the MCA and the PART is lack of data,
or the reliance on inaccurate or poor quality data for evaluating
systems. In the case of the MCA, the governance data comes
from such readily accessible and reliable sources as Gallup
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SELECTION IS ARBITRARY

Both the MCA and the PART claim to reward high-performance and encourage poor performers to improve, but in
practice selection is arbitrary. Nations that do not meet the selection criteria are sometimes selected, while nations that would
otherwise qualify are not. For example, in one funding cycle,
even though 24 countries qualified for MCA funding, only six52

teen were listed as eligible, and the MCC gave no explanation
as to why those sixteen were selected.44 Moreover, some countries that did not qualify for funding were selected instead. For
instance, Bolivia did not meet the indicator on corruption, but
somehow qualified for assistance.45 The Board reasoned that
Bolivia was reconsidered and ultimately selected based on the
fact that the country was championing anti-corruption initiatives
in the nation.46
The same can be said of the PART. OMB Watch, a nonprofit government watchdog organization, found that 154 programs that were recommended for budget cuts or elimination in
Fiscal Year 2006 had very little to do with PART scores.47 For
example, more than two-thirds of those 154 programs never
went through the PART reviews.48 Furthermore, twenty percent
of programs that received the two highest PART scores were
eliminated, yet programs that received the lowest possible ratings were not cut at all.49
These inconsistencies have raised some questions about the
two methodologies. For example, critics of the MCA are concerned that nations are selected not based on need or qualification, but on their geopolitical significance to the United States.
For example, Georgia’s and Bolivia’s selections have been questioned because funding these countries seems to be advantageous to U.S. foreign policy objectives, rather than being motivated by financial need.50 Concerns have been raised regarding
Bolivia’s selection because the United States has a strong stake
in Bolivia’s counter-narcotics goals.51 Similarly, critics of the
PART question whether programs are eliminated as a result of
political motivation due to the lack of transparency in how programs are selected for an increase/decrease in funding or for
elimination. OMB Watch is concerned that programs targeted to
low-income and vulnerable populations are selected for PART
review solely in an attempt to do away with them.52

OUTCOMES ARE DIFFICULT TO MEASURE

Even when a country is selected for funding through the
MCA, additional measures outlining the nature of the project
ensure that contract proposals include performance measures.
For example, monitoring and evaluation must be a “part of every
activity for which MCA funds are used.”53 Monitoring and evaluation plans must include baseline data against which the activity’s progress can be measured, as well as benchmarks for evaluating progress.54 The MCA promotes the use of quantitative
measures such as results, outputs, and outcomes. Projects may be
terminated if they fail to meet financial or accountability standards, or if they fail to attain specific benchmarks.55

ENDNOTES: MCA and PART
1 President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Feb. 2, 2005),

available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050202-11.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2005).

2 The Office of Management and Budget released the President’s

Management Agenda that outlined five government-wide initiatives, and
the PART used to judge the effectiveness of federal programs falls under
the initiative for “Budget and Performance Integration.” See generally
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There are several problems with using quantitative data to
measure accountability. First, results are often not available during the project’s lifetime. The Brookings Institution, an independent research and policy organization, found that “the real
impact of any project cannot be evaluated in outcome terms
until after the money has been spent” and that “benefits will
continue to accrue for years after the last disbursement of project funds has been made.”56 Second, even if performance targets
are met, the MCA funds may not be entirely responsible for the
success, as external factors may influence project results.57 On
the other hand, often when projects do not meet their targets due
to external factors, critics will still blame the MCA for funding
ineffective projects.58
The PART has also faced many of these same challenges.
Recognizing these problems, the Office of Management and
Budget (“OMB”) has issued guidance on implementing PART
reviews.59 The OMB guidance acknowledges that results may
not be achieved for many years, and suggests that agencies
develop short and medium-term steps that will ultimately lead to
the long-term outcome goal.60 The guidance falls short of stating that outcomes may never be achieved and emphasizes that
short-term and medium-term steps “are likely to be output-oriented, prerequisite accomplishments on the path toward the outcome goal.”61 The OMB guidance also recognizes that the program may be one of many factors contributing to the desired
outcome. This makes assessment difficult as to whether it is it is
the program or an external factor that is responsible for achieving the results. One suggestion is for the PART to establish a
broad outcome goal for a collection of programs and track the
goal using national data.62 However, as previously discussed,
data gaps and lack of credible and accurate data may prevent
agencies from establishing a meaningful outcome goal.

CONCLUSION

Performance measures have the potential to ensure
accountability. For example, in the first year of the PART, fifty
percent of programs were rated as “unable to demonstrate
results” but this decreased to 37 percent in Fiscal Year 2005.63
Further still, many advocates of the MCA are hopeful that countries that did not initially qualify for funding will strive to make
improvements so that they may qualify in the future. However,
there are still significant flaws with performance measures;
flaws that are serious enough to raise doubts about the suitability of such mechanisms for measuring accountability, especially
when used to evaluate programs that provide aid to those in desperate need of relief.

Office of Management Budget (“OMB”), The President’s Management
Agenda, FY2002.
3 See Millennium Challenge Corporation CEO Paul Applegarth’s

Presentation to African Ambassadors (Feb. 16, 2005), available at
http://www.mca.gov/public_affairs/speeches/021605_African_Ambassado
rs.shtml (last visited Nov. 4, 2005).
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ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE RIGHT TO
ADEQUATE FOOD:
IMPLEMENTING MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOAL ONE
by Marc J. Cohen and Mary Ashby Brown*
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INTRODUCTION

his paper explores the added value of a justiciable right
to adequate food for food security and sustainable development. The world is not on track to meet the
Millennium Development Goal (“MDG”) hunger target, so new
approaches are required. We examine three case studies in this
article involving the use of legal institutions to advance the right
to adequate food and find that the “rights-based approach to
development” is a promising new paradigm.

GLOBAL HUNGER REDUCTION: LOFTY GOALS,
DISAPPOINTING TRENDS

The first MDG adopted by the UN General Assembly in
2000 is to “eradicate extreme poverty and hunger,” with a target
of “[reducing] by half the proportion of people who suffer from
hunger.”1 The 1996 World Food Summit (“WFS”) had similarly agreed on “reducing the number of undernourished people to
half their present level no later than 2015.”2
The reality of the current state of global hunger contrasts
starkly with these solemn pledges. According to the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (“FAO”), 815
million people in developing countries (seventeen percent of the
developing world’s population) live in food insecurity, lacking
assured access to the calories necessary for active and healthy
lives.3 Vitamin and mineral deficiencies afflict over four billion
people, reduce school and work performance, and adversely
affect public health. Five million malnourished preschool children die annually, and those who survive face impaired mental
and physical development.4
The overall proportion of food-insecure people in developing countries has dropped since the early 1990s. However, this
reduction has slowed as the number of food-insecure people in
developing countries increased by twenty million during the
second half of the 1990s.5 With business as usual, there is no
possibility of achieving the 2015 hunger reduction targets.6

THE RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT

The rights-based approach is a new development paradigm
that contrasts with conventional approaches to development.7
The conventional approach focuses on interventions and service
delivery to meet human needs.8 It often regards beneficiaries as
passive objects of development. By comparison, the rightsbased approach emphasizes the realization of internationally
recognized human rights that impose obligations on states and
empowers rights-holders to assert their claims vis-à-vis state
authorities.9
The rule of law is a key principle of the rights-based
approach. Not only must a legal framework protect and promote
FALL 2005

human rights, but rights-holders must have access to competent,
impartial, and independent processes that can adjudicate disputes and rule on claims. Put simply, meaningful rights must be
enforceable.10

THE RIGHT TO FOOD AND JUSTICIABILITY

The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides
both for a right to food and the enforceability of this right
through judicial means.11 The International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”) of 1966
spells out the rights to adequate food and freedom from
hunger.12 In 1996, the WFS reaffirmed the right to food.13
Although such declarations do not create binding international
obligations (“hard law”), as statements of international consensus, they do offer guidance for appropriate action (“soft law”).14
The WFS Plan of Action calls upon the UN system “to better define the rights related to food…and to propose ways to
implement and realize these rights…, taking into account the
possibility of formulating voluntary guidelines for food security
for all.”15 In response, the UN Committee on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights (the monitoring body of the ICESCR)
adopted General Comment 12 (“GC 12”) in 1999.16 While the
Committee’s General Comments do not create legal obligations,
legal experts consider them to have “particular authority.”17 In
addition, GC 12 is unambiguous on justiciability: “Any person
or group who is a victim of the violation of the right to adequate
food should have access to effective judicial or other appropriate remedies at both national and international levels.”18
In 2004, an Intergovernmental Working Group established
under FAO auspices agreed to comprehensive voluntary guidelines on implementing the right to adequate food.19 These guidelines recommend creating “[a]dministrative, quasi-judicial, and
judicial mechanisms to provide adequate, effective, and prompt
remedies accessible, in particular, to members of vulnerable
groups . . . ”20
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OBJECTIONS TO JUSTICIABILITY OF THE RIGHT TO
ADEQUATE FOOD

Critics argue that implementing justiciable economic, social,
and cultural (“ESC”) rights and the right to adequate food in particular would be costly, whereas the realization of civil and political rights entails minimal costs.21 However, the realization of
civil and political rights, e.g., holding periodic free and fair elections, actually requires substantial public expenditures.
Moreover, the costs of establishing institutions are distinct
from the public expenditures needed to implement programs.
The legal institutions needed to enforce human rights facilitate
sustainable development and good governance.22 Legal institutions are also needed to enforce contracts, uphold property
rights, and prevent corruption.23
Some critics believe that implementation of the right to adequate food requires that governments provide food to all their citizens, irrespective of the availability of resources.24 However, the
human rights framework – to respect, protect, and provide –
requires that states refrain from violating human rights and undertake measures to prevent other parties from interfering with those
rights.25 Therefore, fulfilling the right to food does not translate
into the direct provision of food to all citizens but, rather, describes
a broader commitment by the state to create an institutional framework in which citizens can achieve freedom from hunger.
Another objection characterizes the focus on legally enforceable rights as a diversion from achieving food security. For example, in its Action Plan on the follow up to the World Food
Summit, the U.S. government contends that “the best route to
food security, particularly in the most food-insecure countries, is
not through legal instruments, but through adoption of sound policies that expand food production, encourage economic development, and improve access to food.” 26 Yet, those same policies are
needed for the progressive realization of the right to adequate
food.27 Moreover, legally binding rights to food can contribute to
world food security by prescribing sound national and international policies.28 To explore how a justiciable right to adequate
food works in practice, we look at the experiences of India, South
Africa, and Brazil.

INDIA

CASE STUDIES OF JUSTICIABILITY OF
THE RIGHT TO ADEQUATE FOOD

Hunger and malnutrition in India are severe, with 221 million people (21 percent of the populace) considered food-insecure.29 Half of all Indian children are chronically undernourished.30 Hunger persists amid plenty: many Indians cannot
afford food, despite the huge cereal surpluses of recent years.31
India’s courts have sought to hold the central and state governments accountable for this stark contradiction. Constitutional
jurisprudence provides for the justiciability of ESC rights based
on “the right to life.”32 This constitutional right was central to
the case of People’s Union for Civil Liberties (“PUCL”) v.
Union of India.33 In mid-2001, existing public food and employment programs failed to provide food to destitute people in the
impoverished and drought-stricken state of Rajasthan. PUCL
petitioned the Supreme Court of India to compel the government to respond to the hunger emergency.34
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The Court agreed that “it was the primary responsibility of
the Central and State governments to ensure that . . . food grains
reached the starving people.”35 Additionally, the Court held that
a shortage of funds could not excuse the government’s failure to
fulfill obligations.36 Although the case still awaits final judgment, interim court orders have directed the central and state
governments to provide food to vulnerable groups through
existing programs and enroll unemployed, food-insecure people
in food-for-work programs.37 The interim orders have elevated
the benefits of public food programs to legal entitlements. The
case also sparked creation of the Right to Food Campaign,
which seeks to foster greater public awareness of the right to
food in poor areas.38

SOUTH AFRICA

Although South Africa is food-secure in aggregate terms, 35
percent of all households (14.3 million people) are classified as
food-insecure.39 The post-apartheid government’s Integrated
Food Security Strategy focuses on both short-term food assistance and long-term capacity building, and intends to implement
a constitutional right to food.40
The 1996 Constitution makes explicit that the state is obligated to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights. Lawmakers
and lobbyists in South Africa were divided regarding the inclusion of ESC rights in the Constitution, concerned that the inclusion of these rights would create expectations by the people that
could not be fulfilled. However, the inclusion of ESC rights was
strongly supported by South African president Nelson Mandela:
The key . . . to the protection of any minority is to put
core civil and political rights, as well as some cultural and economic rights beyond the reach of temporary majorities, and to guarantee them as fundamental individual rights… A simple vote, without food,
shelter, and health care, is to use first generation
rights as a smokescreen to obscure the deep underlying forces, which dehumanize people. It is to create
an appearance of equality and justice, while by
implication socio-economic inequality is entrenched.
We do not want freedom without bread, nor do we
want bread without freedom.41

The South African Constitution recognizes the justiciability of the right to food, and requires that the state take reasonable
measures to achieve its progressive realization.42 Like the
Indian Constitution, South Africa’s Constitution includes a provision for the right to life.43 The Constitutional Court has upheld
the justiciability of several ESC rights; however, thus far, litigation has not addressed the right to food.
Cases have focused on housing (Government of the
Republic of South Africa and Others v. Grootboom and Others,
1999)44 and health (Treatment Action Campaign (“TAC”) v.
Minister of Health, 2002).45 In both cases, the court’s opinion
centered on whether the government acted “reasonably” in
designing, implementing, and budgeting for programs to
address the progressive realization of these rights; this determination was held to outweigh the availability of resources.46
In TAC v. Minister of Health, the court ordered the government to provide drugs “without delay” to public hospitals and
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clinics when medically indicated and to take reasonable measures to provide testing and counseling.47 This case not only
assures poor people access to HIV/AIDS treatment, but also
establishes a conceptual framework for court review and
enforcement of ESC rights, including the right to food, in South
Africa and elsewhere. The Court faulted the government for not
having a plan to address the transmission of HIV/AIDS to
infants, since formulation of a plan facilitates resource mobilization.48
Despite the court’s focus on the state’s duty to take “reasonable” actions to realize ESC rights, the reality in South
Africa is that unreasonable administrative and bureaucratic hurdles exclude many people from public benefit programs.
Critics argue that a framework law on the right to food would
provide a firmer political commitment and a comprehensive legislative response to rectify current fragmented, poorly coordinated policies, programs, and legislative measures.49

BRAZIL

According to FAO, 15.6 million Brazilians (nine percent of
the population) are food insecure.50 Brazilian government data
indicate that 44 million low-income people are vulnerable to
food insecurity.51 As in India and South Africa, food insecurity
is not primarily due to lack of availability, with farm output
growing rapidly during the 1990s.52
Unlike India and South Africa, Brazil follows the civil law
tradition.53 The country ratified the ICESCR in 1992, and the
Constitution automatically incorporated the treaty into national
law. Brazil’s Constitution also guarantees “inviolability of the
right of life” and a 2003 amendment explicitly recognizes the
right to food.54
Although Brazilian courts have tended to defer ESC rights
to the executive and legislative branches, the country’s “Public
Civil Suit Law” permits municipalities and non-governmental
organizations (“NGOs”), for example, to sue government agencies, in order to advance individual or collective ESC rights.
Suits have secured access to health care, but public prosecutors
have yet to file on the right to food.55
Since 1988, state and federal prosecutors have also used
public civil “inquiries” to protect and promote human rights.
These allow prosecutors to investigate violations of human
rights and submit evidence to courts for inquiry. Through this
mechanism, public prosecutors are able issue recommendations
to government agencies on human rights issues.56
A number of these inquiries have focused on the right to
food. In 2002 and 2003, prosecutors recommended that the
Ministry of Health expand food assistance to children uncov-

ered by the state’s Bolsa Alimentaçiao program, which provides
funds to nutritionally vulnerable families in exchange for participation in health and nutrition education. Public prosecutors
also pressed the federal government to extend school feeding
programs to 2.5 million children excluded due to mismanagement. In 2003, federal prosecutors used a public civil inquiry to
join with civil society organizations to monitor policies and
expenditures aimed at realizing the right to food.57

JUSTICIABILITY VS. POLITICAL MOBILIZATION

In all three cases discussed above, civil society campaigns
(such as the Right to Food Campaign, the Treatment Action
Campaign, and a broad array of Brazilian civil society organizations) and public interest lawyers (including Brazil’s public
prosecutors) played an important role in the efforts to protect
and promote the right to food and other ESC rights. Often, such
groups pursue other means instead of or in addition to litigation,
including legislative lobbying, demonstrations, and public
awareness activities.
Political mobilization around the right to adequate food can
prove especially important in the absence of justiciability, wellfunctioning legal systems, and in difficult political circumstances. For instance, in Chile during the Pinochet dictatorship,
societal pressure prevented the government from abolishing public nutrition assistance.58 Obviously, where an independent and
effective judiciary exists, a reliance on courts offers an effective
and less risky means for redressing rights-related grievances.
Even where the rule of law prevails, other public action is likely
needed to complement reliance on the justice system.

CONCLUSION

All three country cases examined here illustrate that in very
different political contexts and levels of development, constitutional, economic, social, and cultural rights have helped promote poor people’s right to adequate food and expand access to
public social assistance. In India and South Africa, single cases
had far-reaching effects. In all three countries, the existence of a
thriving public interest bar proved crucial in assuring poor people’s access to justice.
Effective access to legal institutions facilitates the inclusion
of marginalized people in the development process, and provides citizens with a means to file actionable grievances against
the government for the failure to progressively meet economic,
social, and cultural rights. The rights-based approach therefore
offers added value in the quest for food security and sustainable
development, as well as a very promising tool for achieving the
MDG hunger target.
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WATER PRIVATIZATION AND OBSTACLES TO ACHIEVING MILLENNIUM
DEVELOPMENT GOAL SEVEN’S TARGETS FOR SUSTAINABLE DRINKING WATER

P

by Maria Vanko*

rivatizing water resources in developing countries
calls into question whether Goal Seven of the
Millennium Development Goals (“MDGs”) will be
met. Under this goal to ensure environmental sustainability,
the number of people living without sustainable access to
safe drinking water and basic sanitation should be halved by
2015. Meeting this target would connect 350 million people
to safe drinking water and 650 million people to basic sanitation services.1 At any given time, nearly half of the developing world is afflicted with one or more diseases associated
with the inadequate provision of water and sanitation.2
Access to these infrastructures will not only enable meeting
environmental sustainability and health targets, but will
speed the achievement of all eight goals, including poverty
reduction, disease eradication, and gender equality.3
Water privatization failures across the developing world
highlight the problem of placing profits above public health
and access concerns. For example, militant uprisings in
Cochabamaba, Bolivia in 1999 occurred after the private water
provider implemented a 300 percent fee increase. In 2003, tariffs increased 700 percent while the water operator’s negligence led to cholera outbreaks in West Manila, Philippines.4
Increased prices make safe water unaffordable for vulnerable
populations, forcing families to make trade-offs between
water, schooling, food, and healthcare.5 Private industry is also
less likely to participate in areas where recovery of their
investment is riskier.
Strong worldwide, public resistance to privatization has
made a substantial impact on political leaders’ willingness to
champion water privatization and also on international lenders’
attempts to tie aid to the privatization of state resources.6 The
World Bank’s position that the private sector is more efficient
than public-run utilities has shifted: a recent study in Asia concluded that there is only a marginal difference between public
and private sectors in service efficiencies.7 In an effort to support innovative, grassroots initiatives in solving development
issues, the World Bank is currently holding a competition to
seek new ideas in providing water and sanitation services.8
Generalized alternatives to privatization will unlikely be
developed because local conditions and demands vary; however, a focus on the public interest is crucial in implementing
successful reforms.9 Sustainable and successful water utilities typically share characteristics of accountability, reinvestment of profits to expand connectivity, income differentiated
tariff structures, and government political or financial sup57

port.10 Because the water and sanitation targets are so essential to meeting all eight of the MDGs, exploring alternatives
to the private provision of water and sanitation services is
crucial. A focus on privatization alone presents a multitude of
risks, and calls into question whether meeting the developing
world’s growth and public health needs is consistent with the
full-cost recovery objectives of the private sector.
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THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS,
AID TARGETS, AND THE COSTS OF
OVER-EXPECTATIONS
by Michael A. Clemens, Charles J. Kenny, and Todd J. Moss*

I

INTRODUCTION

n September 2000 at the United Nations, 147 presidents,
prime ministers, and monarchs—the largest-ever gathering
of heads of state—unanimously adopted the Millennium
Declaration, committing themselves to a series of international
development objectives to be reached by 2015.1 Known since
2001 as the Millennium Development Goals (“MDGs”), these
eight goals are widely cited as the primary yardstick against
which advances in international development efforts are to be
judged.2 The official MDG website says that the goals “have
been commonly accepted as a framework for measuring development progress.”3
After the MDGs were established, a priority became calculating what kinds of resources and actions would be necessary
to reach them. There are now several “costing” studies, estimating how much money would be required to reach the goals. In
addition to other conditions, such as higher economic growth
and the improved economic policies, these studies have concluded that something in the range of $40-70 billion in extra
resources each year will be necessary. Fifty billion dollars is the
most commonly cited figure for new annual aid requirements.
Nearly five years after establishing the MDGs, it appears
that the global goal of halving poverty may soon be reached
because of rapid progress by the two population giants of India
and China.4 However, it appears almost certain that the majority
of developing countries will not meet the country-level poverty
targets set by the Millennium Declaration, nor many of the other
goals. Of the 47 African countries, 42 are considered “off track”
for at least half of the targets and twelve are “off track” for all targets. Meeting the goals for the majority of country indicators
would require more than doubling the rate of progress.5 For
instance, Barbara Bruns, Alain Mingat, and Ramahatra
Rakotomalala estimate that 86 out of 155 countries are at risk of
not achieving the goal of universal primary education.6 Twentyseven of these countries are not even expected to break the fifty
percent completion threshold by 2015. These forecasts exclude
the sixteen developing countries with no data—all of which are
likely to have extremely low indicators. In the 2003 Human
Development Report, the United Nations Development
Programme estimates that, on current rates of progress, subSaharan Africa would not meet the hunger, primary education,
and child mortality targets for at least another century.7
This apparently bleak state of affairs is already leading to
complaints that the rich countries are not living up to their end
FALL 2005

of the MDG bargain.8 The eighth goal commits rich countries to
a global partnership for development, wherein they promise to
allow greater trade access, reduce debts, and increase aid.
Although there has been substantial progress in debt reduction,
rich country trade policies have not significantly changed to be
more favorable to developing countries, notably on agricultural
market reform. Furthermore, the estimated levels of mobilized
resources required have not been forthcoming from donors.
Official development assistance (“ODA”) from the main international donors9 totaled $53 billion in 1999, and this figure rose to
just $57 billion in 2002 and $79 billion in 2004, far from the doubling of aid called for by a range of costing studies. If many of the
MDG targets are formally missed in 2015, will we be able to point
to the failure of donors to provide resources as the main culprit?
This article discusses the links in the chain of causality
between increased aid flows and attaining the MDGs, and suggests that, due to several caveats, the MDGs are unlikely to be
reached regardless of new aid flows. The article examines several specific goals to highlight some of these issues. In each
case, it appears that there are limits on the role for increased
financing to accelerate trends, and many countries are very likely to miss the MDG targets, regardless of rapid progress. There
may, in fact, be costs to over-expectations and the manufacture
of “failures” to meet the MDGs.

HOW THE MDGS HAVE BEEN INTERPRETED

From the beginning, the MDGs were interpreted as the need
for greater donor financing.10 The 1990 OECD DAC development policy review, which gave birth to the MDGs, stated bluntly, “Development costs money . . . the high-income countries
need to supply more aid.”11 The United Nation’s Monterrey
Consensus proclaimed that “a substantial increase in [ODA] and
other resources will be required if developing countries are to
achieve the internationally agreed development goals.”12
* Michael Clemens (mclemens@cgdev.org) and Todd Moss
(tmoss@cgdev.org) are Research Fellows at the Center for Global
Development. Charles Kenny (ckenny@worldbank.org) is a Senior Economist
at the World Bank. The authors thank Alicia Bannon for excellent research
assistance, and Colin Bradford, Bill Cline, Kim Elliot, Maureen Lewis, Steve
Radelet, David Roodman, Markus Scheuermaier, Peter Timmer, Kelly Tobin,
Jeremy Weinstein, and John Williamson for helpful comments on an earlier
draft. All judgments, opinions, and errors are those of the authors alone and
do not represent the views of the Center for Global Development, the World
Bank, or either of their respective staffs or boards of directors, nor the countries that the Executive Directors of the World Bank represent. A longer version of this article is available at http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/
detail/2749.
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Several efforts have been made to estimate the cost to
achieve the MDGs. A 2001 study led by former Mexican
President Ernesto Zedillo and known as the “High-level Panel
on Financing for Development”13 estimated that reaching the
MDGs would require an additional $50 billion per year in ODA,
plus three billion dollars more in humanitarian aid, and about
fifteen billion dollars more for “global public goods.” This
brings the total of additional resources to at least $68 billion, or
slightly more than double the current levels of aid. A second
widely cited study by Shantayanan Devarajan, Margaret J.
Miller, and Eric V. Swanson of the World Bank uses two estimates for costing the MDGs.14 First, it calculates the additional
resources necessary to increase economic growth so as to reduce
income poverty. For this it suggests a “financing gap” of $54-62
billion each year. Second, it estimates the cost of meeting specific goals in health, education, and environment by using country-specific unit costs and then multiplying by the uncovered
population. Through this method they find that $35-75 billion
more per year is needed. Based on these two methods, this article concludes that ODA increases in the range of $40-70 billion
are required. Again, this is an approximate doubling of official
aid flows, roughly confirming the Zedillo estimate. A series of
other papers have also tried to quantify the costs of meeting the
MDGs for particular regions, countries, or for meeting an individual goal. Of note are the various estimates for costing universal primary education or Education for All (“EFA”), including nine billion dollars per year15 and between ten and fifteen
billion dollars,16 respectively.
Most of these costing studies are careful to clarify that the
resulting estimates are imprecise and that several caveats apply
to their conclusions. The two most commonly cited assumptions,
and perhaps the most important, are: (1) the policy environment
within developing countries considerably improves; and (2) current bottlenecks and capacity constraints are substantially
relieved. Regarding policies, the Zedillo study, for example,
assumes that recipients are doing “what’s necessary” to improve
policies. Similarly, Alain Mingat, Ramahatra Rakotomalala, and
Jee-Peng Tan, in looking at the costs associated with reaching
universal primary education for 33 African countries, state that
“the implicit assumption is that countries would reform their
education sector policies as needed to ensure that resources are
used to offer quality services in a cost-efficient manner.”17 The
Devarajan study also explicitly leaves aside the question of
developing countries’ capacity to spend aid effectively.
Despite the careful qualifications included in many of these
studies, many in the policy, advocacy, and media world have
inappropriately focused attention on the bottom line figure: $50
billion more in aid is needed to achieve the MDGs. The misuse
and misinterpretation of the costing studies has added to the
impression that resources and aid flows are the critical or even
sole determinant of development outcomes.

almost entirely because of poverty reduction in India and
China.18 At the same time, the majority of countries appear
unlikely to halve poverty by 2015. In addition, it is doubtful that
increased aid will sufficiently accelerate growth rates to meet
the poverty reduction target. Most of the costing studies use the
“financing gap” to calculate the additional aid required for
meeting growth targets, but this approach is problematic and
raises further doubts about the estimates.
Economic growth is central to the poverty reduction goal
because it is the only source of increased income for the poor
that can be (comparatively) rapidly achieved. Poor people in
developing countries can become wealthier either through
receiving a greater share of existing national income (redistribution of wealth from rich to poor) or a similar share of a greater
national income (equitable economic growth). However, it is
historically very rare to see rapid changes in income inequality
(up or down) over time, and so those countries that have
achieved rapid and substantial poverty reduction have done so
mainly through economic growth.19 To achieve meaningful
poverty reduction, economic growth rates will have to accelerate in the countries where the poor reside.
The World Bank suggests that the typical African economy
will need to grow on average at least seven percent for the next
fifteen years in order to halve poverty rates.20 This compares to
an average regional growth rate of just 2.4 percent for the past
fifteen years. High rates of growth are unusual for Africa as well
as for the world as a whole. Between 1985 and 2000 only five
countries managed to sustain a seven percent growth average.21
Figure 1 reveals the stark contrast between UN goals and
performance in least developed countries (“LDC”) growth,
measured by the Penn World Table. The UN General Assembly
resolutions declaring the second and third “development
decades” —the 1970s and 1980s—gave explicit goals for average real annual growth in GDP and GDP per capita in developing countries: 3.5 percent and 4.5 percent, respectively. In both
cases, population growth was assumed to be 2.5 percent per year.
The UN declarations for the first and fourth “development
decades”—the 1960s and the 1990s—only give targets for GDP
growth, but we can approximate the implied GDP per capita
Figure 1: Hope springs eternal: Various growth goals
compared to growth performance.

GOAL ONE: HALVING POVERTY

The first MDG is to halve the 1990 poverty headcount by
2015. On a global scale, this goal is very likely to be reached,
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growth rate by assuming roughly the same rate of population
growth of 2.5 percent. This means that the First Development
Decade goal of five percent GDP growth implies roughly 2.5
percent in per capita growth, and likewise implies that the
Fourth Development Decade goal of seven percent in GDP
growth implies 4.5 percent in per capita GDP growth.
Comparing all of these targets to actual LDC performance in the
latter three decades of the twentieth century shows an arresting
pattern. Every decade or two since the 1960s, the UN has
increased its goal for developing country growth by one percent
while growth in LDCs has not changed much. This “goal inflation” has, with the MDGs, arrived at the point where expectations of LDCs lie at the very extreme of the distribution.
Decades after the first round of goals, we still do not know how
to turn Zambia into Botswana, nor how to turn Laos into Korea.
The expectation that unusually rapid growth rates might
now be achieved more widely is based on two assumptions: (1)
that policy changes will foster growth; and (2) that increased aid
in the presence of those good policies will catalyze faster
growth. There are problems with both of these assumptions,
however. Further caution is required regarding the link between
increased donor assistance and higher economic growth. This
assumption underlies all of the costing studies that use the
financing gap model for estimating how much aid will be needed to reach certain growth targets. These estimates start from a
measurement of poverty-income elasticity and current growth
rates, which suggests a “growth gap”—the rate at which the
economy must grow to see the desired reduction in the poverty
headcount—or in the case of reaching the poverty MDG, to
halve the poverty ratio by 2015. This approach then uses the
incremental capital output ratio (“ICOR”) to calculate the level
of investment required to reach the growth levels, and then subtracts domestic savings to get the external financing gap—or the
amount of required aid. The problem is that, in practice, the
financing gap model does not appear to work.22 As one example, William Easterly demonstrates in a 1999 study that had the
financing gap approach worked as expected over the period
1960-1994, Zambia’s per capita income would have been
$20,000, or 33 times the actual figure of about $600.23
One recent and more positive contribution to the aid and
growth literature is the work of Craig Burnside and David
Dollar.24 This highly influential study has been used to make the
case that aid can lead to growth under the right circumstances—
including the policy environment assumed by many of the costing studies. The results of the Burnside and Dollar study appear
to be somewhat fragile—the results tend to weaken when
changing the time period, adding new country data, or altering
the definitions of “aid” or “good policies.”25 Robert Cassen’s
conclusion some ten years ago still seems to hold:
Inter-country statistical analyses do not show anything
conclusive—positive or negative—about the impact of
aid on growth. Given the enormous variety of countries
and types of aid this is not surprising.... If such a relationship does not emerge overall, it only shows the unexciting conclusion that aid may or may not be strongly
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related to growth, depending on circumstances.26

More recently, Michael Clemens, Steve Radelet, and Rikhil
Bhavnani have found striking evidence of a positive average
effect of development aid on growth, once the type of aid analyzed is matched to the time horizon of its expected growth
effect.27 While this effect is clear on average, it varies greatly by
country and its magnitude is limited to a certain range—two reasons to question whether even unlimited aid could cause a particular high level of growth in any given country.
It seems plausible to assume that the relationship between aid
and growth in the presence of good policies holds, at least under
some circumstances. Does this suggest that significant increases in
aid are likely to help meet the poverty MDG? The answer is still
uncertain. This is because most low-income countries with high
levels of poverty either have poor policies and weak institutions
(and thus are assumed to be unable to use additional aid effectively) or already receive considerable amounts of external assistance.
This second factor may be a problem, because even work that
accepts a link between aid and growth finds that, above a certain
level of aid, the relationship begins to break down.28 Many poor
countries thought to have “good policies” already receive substantial aid. Many top-performing countries—such as Ghana,
Ethiopia, Uganda, Nicaragua, Honduras, Burkina Faso, and
Tanzania—receive aid flows well above ten percent of GDP. Were
total ODA levels to be doubled, as called for in the costing studies,
the countries that are perhaps best able to absorb large aid increases are India and China, which currently receive minimal aid (0.36
percent and 0.13 percent of GDP, respectively). However, these
two countries are both considered “on track.”29 The MDGs do not
change the oft-noted irony of aid: those that need it most are frequently the ones least able to use it effectively.

REACHING THE SOCIAL SECTOR GOALS

We turn now to the social sector MDGs. There is already a
large literature on the complex relationships between conditions, interventions, and outcomes, but this appears to have been
somewhat neglected in public discussion of the MDGs. For
example, most health or education variables are quite closely
related to income.30 However, studies have shown that over
time, progress on these indicators is not correlated with the rate
of growth in that country.31 Given this, it may be difficult to
considerably accelerate progress through policy changes or
alteration in resources.
Adding to the complexity of the causal chain between
expenditures and outcomes is the fact that certain sector interventions can have impacts on other sector outcomes. Michael
Kremer and Edward Miguel, for instance, found that de-worming programs had a strongly positive impact on school attendance in Kenya.32 Gustav Ranis and Frances Stewart, who
found that health expenditures appeared to have little or no
impact on life expectancy, suggest that increased female primary enrollment did.33
All of this suggests that: (1) additional aid may not be the
most important factor in improving social outcomes; (2) sectoral
distribution of aid to maximize progress on any particular social
60

MDG is not clear; (3) unit-cost approaches utilized in costing
studies may be dramatically misleading; and (4) “best practices”
may not be easily exportable because they are dependent on a
range of determining factors that may be difficult to replicate.
Of course, some of the costing study authors have suggested
such problems themselves, but this has not stopped the widespread misinterpretation of their work. To better illustrate these
arguments and the weaknesses in the costing approach to the
MDGs, we turn now to the specific social sector goals and the
historical record, focusing mainly on the second MDG of
achieving universal primary education and, briefly, touching on
the other goals.

GOALS TWO AND THREE: UNIVERSAL
COMPLETION OF PRIMARY SCHOOL AND GENDER
EQUALITY IN EDUCATION

Over the decades, rates of primary enrollment and completion have risen nearly everywhere—even in many of the very
poorest countries—and they have risen at remarkably uniform
rates. Figure 2 gives an overview of what happened to enrollments between 1960 and 2000. The figure answers the following question: If we were to make the assumption that the growth
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Figure 2: Uniformity in the increase of net primary
enrollments, 1960-2000.

Figure 3: What it would take to meet Goal Two.
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of primary enrollment across time in all countries followed the same pattern, based on one particular Sshaped curve (or “logistic” curve), what would that
curve look like? The figure takes the path that each
country followed during those four decades, and lines
up each country individually so that, if following that
single curve, it would have hit the fifty percent enrollment mark in the same year, that is, “adjusted year”
zero.
Two things jump out from the graph. First, our
assumption is not that bad; countries’ idiosyncratic
paths from low to high enrollment cluster remarkably
closely around a single S-curve, whose slope at the
halfway mark (or “transition speed”) is about 0.04.
There is variation around the curve, but remarkably lit-

tle given that the countries there include tropical and arctic, rich
and poor, socialist and capitalist, war-torn and peaceful. Second,
the slope of the curve, or the “typical” transition speed from low
to high enrollment, is low compared to growth rates required to
meet the MDG target. While the extension of mass schooling in
the latter half of the twentieth century was vast, it also took a
long time. If it started at fifty percent enrollment, the typical
country, whether rich or poor, would have risen to 70 percent
after 22.3 years, 80 percent after 36.4 years, and 90 percent after
57.7 years.
Figure 3 shows that for the 90 countries for which we have
data—representing a very broad range of wealth and institutional, political, and geographic conditions—no country has a transition speed above 0.13, the rate required to increase enrollment
from 80 percent to 95 percent over a fifteen year period. There
are 38 countries in this data set that have 2000 enrollment rates
below 80 percent. For these countries, and others for which we
do not have data, reaching 95 percent enrollment by 2015 (still
short of the MDG target) will require historically unprecedented rates of progress.
It appears unlikely that many countries will even manage to
approach the 0.13 transition rate. One reason for, or at least a
related phenomenon to, the strong historical determinism of primary enrollment growth rates is the strong relationship between
parental primary completion and child enrollment. This correlates
with more than ten times the amount of cross-country variation in
transition speeds than does education spending. This suggests a
significant “demand side” element to primary education, with
wealthier, educated parents far more willing to send their children
to school. Deon Filmer estimates that even if all rural people in a
sample of 22 countries lived right next door to a school, enrollment rates would only increase from an average of 49.8 percent
to 53.1 percent—suggesting the dominance of “demand-side constraints.”34 Across countries, there is no significant relationship
between public spending per child on education and the primary
school completion rate, once income is controlled for.35
Given that education expenditures do not appear to be a particularly strong historical determinant of enrollment, that not all
countries will grow rapidly, and that it is very hard, in a fifteen
year period, to dramatically increase parental primary completion
rates, it is unlikely that many countries will achieve high transi-
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tion speeds. Indeed, even most “exceptions to the rule” or “best
practices” of rapid increases are, sadly, related to unique circumstances, considerable reductions in quality, or questionable data.36
Turning to gender equality in education, Figure 4 shows the
path taken by the female-to-male ratio in gross primary enrollments for all 168 countries in the UNESCO database since
1950. The figure is constructed in a manner identical to that of
Figure 2. Once again we see that the assumption that all countries follow the same S-shaped path to gender parity is not strictly true, but neither is it far from the mark. The typical country
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Figure 4: Uniformity in the increase in female-to-male
gross primary enrollment ratios, 1950-2000.

has taken a long time to reach gender parity in primary school
enrollment. The shape of the curve in Figure 4 suggests, for
example, that a country whose ratio of girls’ gross primary
enrollment to boys’ is 0.8 typically takes 28 years to reach a
ratio of 0.95. In 2000, seventeen countries had a ratio of less
than 0.8. Nevertheless, the great majority of developing countries are already fairly close to meeting the MDG target of gender equality in education.37 A substantial majority of countries
will likely reach this particular goal by 2015. The use of static
unit costs in education estimates, as used in the costing studies,
is therefore likely to ignore perhaps the most important determinants of enrollment.

of the maximum—that is, 175—in the same year (“adjusted
year” zero). The lessons are familiar from the previous two sections. Immediately we see that: (1) there is remarkably little
diversity in the rate at which this has occurred; and (2) the typical experience of a country in the twentieth century was that
this transition was slow as compared to the MDG target decline.
The slope of the S-curve running through the middle of the
cloud, representing the experience of the “typical” country
among these 35, is –0.0339 at the inflection point. That means
that a country typical of this group, if it started out at one hundred infant deaths per ten thousand live births, would take 40
years to decrease this level by two-thirds. This figure is relatively insensitive to the starting level.
Nor has the story dramatically changed in the late twentieth
century, despite technology and economic advances. Although
such advances allowed for far lower infant mortality rates essentially everywhere, the speed at which countries made the transition from high to low infant mortality did not change significantly. We will now restrict the sample to the years 1980-2000, and
consider all 176 countries for which the World Development
Indicators provide data. The S-curve will show that a typical
country in this group, starting from an infant mortality of one hundred, would take 42 years to lower this figure by two-thirds.38
This suggests that the forces that primarily determine the
speed of this transition go beyond public health policy and
inputs—a conclusion supported by a number of different studies. It appears that one of the reasons that interventions often do
not have the desired outcome is, as Lant Pritchett showed with
the relative ineffectiveness of family planning aid,39 that supplyside responses do not address the demand components that are
affected by broader social and economic changes. Income
inequality, literacy, ethnic composition, and religion are all factors slow to change, at least within a fifteen-year perspective.
None of this is to say that specific public health interventions and large injections of inputs purchased by aid cannot
Figure 5: The course of Infant mortality in 35 countries
over roughly the 20th century

GOAL FOUR: REDUCING CHILD MORTALITY BY
TWO-THIRDS

In the fourth MDG, governments have committed themselves to reducing child mortality by two-thirds between 1990
and 2015. Assume (as we did with the education goals) that
every country follows the exact same S-curve, in this case
towards zero infant mortality, but (again) that each country goes
through this transition at a different time.
These assumptions once more appear reasonably robust.
Figure 5 shows what happens if we take data for 35 rich and
poor countries covering roughly the twentieth century, assume
that the historically highest level of infant mortality was 350
infant deaths per 10,000 live births, and then horizontally align
all the series so that every country passes through fifty percent
FALL 2005

Infant mortality is deaths before age one per 10,000 live births. Data are
quinquennial and aligned horizontally assuming that all pass through fifty
percent of a maximum value of 350 in “adjusted year” zero.
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the twentieth century, average global literacy increased from
52 percent to 81 percent, while the weighted standard deviation dropped from 38 percent to seventeen percent. Turning to
female literacy as a percentage of male literacy, over the
1970-2000 period, the global average ratio has improved from
59 percent to 80 percent. This reflects a dramatic long-term
improvement in social indicators even for countries that have
seen limited economic growth. For example, average life
expectancy for countries at $300 GDP per capita in 1999 is
slightly higher than that for countries with a GDP per capita
of $3,000 in 1870 (in constant dollars). In other words, it now
takes only one tenth the income to achieve the same life
expectancy as it did 130 years ago.44
It is hard to view this progress as anything other than a dramatic success. Even if divergence continues “big time” with
regard to income,45 other quality of life indicators suggest historically unprecedented improvement. There are, of course, significant clouds on the horizon—the AIDS pandemic is having a
particularly dramatic impact in Sub-Saharan Africa, where life
expectancy in the region as a whole has declined in recent years,
and is likely to level off only in 2010.46 Nonetheless, it is not
clear why we should expect progress to halt more broadly.
A continuation of the progress that has characterized the typical developing country of the last fifty years will, by and large,
leave countries missing the MDGs in 2015, yet still outperform-

affect infant mortality; obviously they can. Lucia Hanmer,
Robert Lensick, and Howard White suggest that while income
per capita, education, and gender inequality are all robust determinants in explaining infant and child mortality across countries
at a single time, some health spending (particularly on immunization programs) can also have a significant impact.40 Rather,
the question is whether the rapid increase in the mortality transition rate needed to meet the fourth MDG is accessible to even
the wisest and best-funded policy interventions.

LEAPS FORWARD?

MAKING THE PERFECT ENEMY OF THE GOOD

Growing concern that the MDGs will not be achieved
should not obscure the bigger picture: development progress
in terms of social indicators has been occurring at unprecedented levels throughout the great majority of the world’s
population over the past thirty or more years. For example,
the divergence in life expectancies between rich and poor
countries, which had been occurring since perhaps as early as
the fifteenth century, has been dramatically reversed in the
second half of the last century. Between 1950 and 1999, the
population-weighted average life expectancy has risen from
51 to 69 years while the population-weighted standard deviation has fallen from thirteen to seven years.43 Data on infant
survival suggests a similar performance. In the second half of
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Figure 6: Many countries unlikely to meet the MDG for
primary schooling are performing strongly by historical
standards

Michael Clemens (2004)

It is not that we cannot imagine a scenario where historically unprecedented progress is made towards the MDGs. If
effective preventative and treatment interventions available for
preventing childhood mortality became ubiquitous, the number
of under-age-five deaths worldwide might fall by as much as 63
percent. For instance, one recent cross-country analysis suggests
that, in countries with good governance, additional health
spending and aid financing can have an impact on health outcomes.41 Yet this same study suggests how difficult it would be
to meet the health MDGs in Africa, and why the MDGs at their
current levels are over-reaching. First, the average quality of
African government institutions, as measured by the World
Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment, would
have to leapfrog to one standard deviation above the mean global score (from significantly below the average today). Then government health expenditures as a percentage of GDP would have
to reach as much as 16.5 percent – an implausible level greater
than that spent by any country in the world.
It may be that progress in meeting some of the other MDGs—
perhaps in halting the spread of HIV/AIDS, reversing the incidence of malaria, and halving the proportion of people without
sustainable access to drinking water and sanitation—could in fact
be rapid enough to meet the MDG timetable. This appears possible because a small number of technological advances, or a significant increase in investment in a particular infrastructure, could
have a major effect on these areas in ways not obvious in the other
goals. The creation of a malaria vaccine, for example, would have
a monumental impact toward meeting the sixth MDG,42 but it is
difficult to imagine a similar single technological advance that
would significantly impact education outcomes.

ing the historical trajectories of now-developed countries. In
Figure 6, for example, we see the trajectory of primary school
enrollment for Burkina Faso. The country is on a trend well
above the typical country since 1960 and even further ahead of
the typical rich-country transition in the nineteenth century. (The
same statement is true of Mali, Senegal, Madagascar, and
Nicaragua, among others.) Surely this is not unambitious performance. Despite this success, however, Burkina Faso will fail
to meet the MDG target. It is perhaps worth asking whether the
success or the target should be questioned.
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

MOVING FORWARD: RE-INTERPRETING THE MDGS

There is a long history of international goal setting for development. For instance, a steady succession of international conferences since the 1940s has declared universal primary education
achievable within a short-time period and pledged to make the
necessary investments to do so.47 Nevertheless, countries all over
the world continue to undergo the slow adjustments of their societies and economies that have allowed more children to go to
school. But in setting unrealistic goals and claiming they can in
fact be universally met, the MDGs may run the risk of creating a
climate of inaccurate pessimism about both development and aid.

THE MDGS AS REAL TARGETS

The MDGs can be understood in two ways. One interpretation is to take the specific goals literally, accept them as the real
targets of the development community, and take the costing
study estimates as reflective of the amount of aid needed to
reach those goals. This view sees the MDGs as an important
mechanism for raising aid flows and ensuring accountability for
donor promises. This literal interpretation of the MDGs and
misreading of the costing studies can lead to the belief that huge
aid flows can quickly produce epochal change in an array of
development indicators across broad regions. Perhaps such outcomes will be achieved, particularly regarding the goals in areas
such as water and sanitation, but, as we have seen, the historical
evidence suggests it is unlikely that the majority of goals will be
reached by the majority of countries.
The determinants of the outcomes embodied by the MDGs
are in fact complex. Time itself clearly is an important factor but
is not accounted for by universal time-bound goals. Many of the
available interventions in terms of policy reforms or increases in
resources are supply-side responses. These interventions do little to increase demand, which is linked to longer-term social and
economic changes. This does not mean that poor people do not
desire better standards of living; rather the range of incentives
faced by many poor people lead them to make choices that
might contradict the outcomes represented in the MDGs. This is
one reason why outcomes seem to change only slowly, and also
suggests that there may be a limited potential role for aid in
meeting extremely ambitious, universal, time-bound goals. This
does not claim in any sense that aid is unimportant or ineffective, but only that aid cannot by itself deliver the MDGs.

THE MDGS AS A SYMBOL

A second understanding of the MDGs is a more nuanced
view—that the goals are a symbol of the kinds of outcomes
toward which the development community should strive.
Similarly, new aid flows are considered just one of several necessary conditions for progress on development indicators. This second interpretation makes the MDGs a tool rather than a practical
target. Goals generate discussion, focus attention, and help assign
accountability for leaders’ pledges. There can be little doubt that
the MDGs helped galvanize the aid community and reverse the
aid declines after the end of the Cold War. The United States, the
European Union, Canada, Norway, and others made promises of
substantial aid increases at Monterrey in 2002, a result doubtlessly influenced by the MDG negotiations two years earlier.
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IMPLICATIONS OF THESE INTERPRETATIONS

In spite of the notable benefits of the MDGs, even when
taken as symbolic rather than literal, there has been almost no
discussion so far of potential costs of the specific form taken by
these goals. These potential costs take two distinct forms: unreasonable expectations about what is likely to be achieved within
a short time period, and unreasonable expectations about the
role of aid in the development process.
The specific targets of the MDGs have set up many countries for unavoidable “failure.” Some governments pursuing
wise policies and historically encouraging progress on development indicators could be weakened or de-legitimized by the
label of “failure” in 2015. The MDGs confuse interpretation of
their performance with universal, time-bound targets that for
many countries are, in practice, impossible to reach. Costing
studies, by positing that such goals are attainable and asking
merely for the resource inputs, contribute to the illusion that the
goals are attainable for all countries. Even if most development
practitioners know this is not true, they must recognize that the
expectations of many have been raised.
Another potential downside is the possibility for adding to
donor fatigue and distracting recipient countries from muchneeded domestic reforms. If donors provide additional tens of
billions of dollars in aid per year sometime in the next few
years, and if subsequently many of the goals are still not met,
this will provide ammunition to interest groups in rich countries seeking to give up on development assistance. Developing
countries will undoubtedly need many decades of sustained
assistance—as Korea, Botswana, and other eventual successes
have received—and this must not be interrupted by declarations of failure in 2015. However, if the increase in aid does not
materialize, a failure to reach the MDGs may help legitimize
leaders in the developing world who pursue policies that are
anathema to economic growth. “What else could we do,” they
will ask, “when the rich countries broke their promises?” The
ensuing finger pointing could also undermine constituencies
throughout the developing world for necessarily slow but
essential reforms toward transparency, accountability, rule of
law, and meritocracy.

CONCLUSION

Moving forward, the donor community should accept that it
is not feasible for the majority of countries to reach the majority of the MDGs. Similarly, the costing studies should not be
invoked as evidence that we can simply purchase outcomes with
more assistance. The studies themselves make no such claims,
and history shows this is highly unlikely to be true. Instead, the
MDGs should be presented as useful benchmarks that publicly
bring out the stark contrast between the world we want and the
world we have, and cause us to redouble our search for points of
intervention to close the gap.
The donor community might also consider ways of institutionalizing the recognition of development success. The
government of Burkina Faso, for example, should be supported and lauded by the international community for raising
school enrollments much faster than most poor and now-rich
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countries did in the past, rather than criticized and delegitimized because primary enrollment is less than fifty percent.
Country-specific benchmarks can help signal when interventions of some kind are necessary, and they can also provide
markers for progress along the way, given a country’s circumstances. Instead of focusing time and energy on compiling lists of “off-track” countries, effort should be spent on
compiling lists of countries that are “on-track” or better after
taking account of their particular circumstances and historical
trends. Some kind of institutionalized response by the international community would thus redefine Burkina Faso as the
educational success it has been. This would not in any way
endorse the fact that half of Burkinabe children still do not
enroll in school, nor imply in any way that schooling is not
their right. It would, however, bring important international
pressure to bear in support of those who for decades have
been working to get Burkinabe children into school at a rate
faster than many far richer countries have managed.
Lastly, future international development goals might avoid
some of these pitfalls. The next round of goals should: (1) be
country-specific and flexible, more like today’s International
Development Association targets; (2) take historical performance into account; (3) focus more on intermediate targets than
outcomes; and (4) be considered benchmarks to spur action in
cases where assistance is not working, rather than technically
feasible goals.
This last point is worth emphasizing: it is useful to know
that a country is raising school enrollments more slowly than the
historically typical rate. It can give political support to constituencies in that country seeking changes in national policies,
spur donors to intervene, and support change through financial
and other means. But this is much different from the effects of
declaring that it is feasible for a country to raise enrollments at
five times the historically typical rates. Country-specific benchmarks carry the benefits of goal setting without the potential
downsides of universal goals. This suggests that goal setting at
the global level should be bottom-up rather than top-down—that
is, the world targets should start from country goals and then
aggregate up, rather than setting global goals and then estimating what countries would need to do to achieve them.
Indeed, for the next round of goals, the donor community
might consider avoiding global-level costing studies, especially

for outcomes known to be only tenuously linked to financial
inputs. Rough back-of the-envelope estimates can potentially be
useful for identifying the hypothetical scale of resources and
also for some limited supply-side interventions. Yet the widespread misinterpretation of the studies suggests that, however
narrowly conceived by the authors, misuse appears difficult to
avoid. A more direct approach might be to advocate cost-specific interventions and link them to intermediate indicators rather
than outcomes; for example, costing an immunization program
rather than child mortality. Calculating financing gaps and unit
costs for final outcomes appear to merely create more illusion
than illumination.
It is worth stressing the caveats attached to our analysis.
None of this is to argue against aid or that goal setting is per se
counterproductive. Aid has clearly been an important part of
developmental progress for many countries. Perhaps aid levels
should increase by $50 billion, but not with the expectation that
this will cause the MDGs to be met. Similarly, goals should
indeed be set to enhance accountability and allocational efficiency, but goals must take history and context into account or
potentially risk malign irrelevance.
Perhaps most significantly, we have based most of our
argument on historical precedent. History can be a fickle guide
to the future. To take two recent development trends as an
example, the spread of the Internet has been more rapid than
the spread of the mobile phone, which was in turn more rapid
than the television, which was in turn more rapid than the fixed
telephone. And the spread of democratic institutions in developing countries over the past fifteen years would have been
poorly predicted based on a trend of declining democratic freedoms over the thirty years previously. It may be (and we hope
it is) the case that policies will improve, that the environment
for the effective utilization of aid becomes friendlier, and that
technology and policy trends combine to allow historically
unprecedented levels of progress across the broad range of
development that is encompassed by the MDGs. Even if that is
not the case, many countries will reach at least some of the
MDG targets. More importantly, it is quite probable that the
significant rate of improvement that we are already seeing in
developing countries will continue in the next fifteen years,
enhancing the lives of billions worldwide.

ENDNOTES: MDGS, AID TARGETS, AND COSTS OF OVER-EXPECTATIONS
1 United Nations Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, UN Doc.

A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 8, 2000).
2 In December 2000, the UN General Assembly requested that Secretary
General Kofi Annan prepare a “road map” of how to achieve the targets of
the Millennium Declaration to which the leaders at the Millennium Summit
had committed in September of that year (G.A. Res. A/RES/55/162, ¶18).
Annan’s response, issued in September 2001 as the Road Map towards the
Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration, proposed the
eight Millennium Development Goals (“MDGs”) in their final form and by
that name (U.N. Doc. A/56/326), drawing only on elements to which 147
heads of state or government had directly agreed at the 2000 summit.
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3 UNITED NATIONS, MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS, at

http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals (last visited Nov. 2, 2005).
4 The leaders at the Millennium Summit committed only to halving global
poverty, regardless of what happens in any given country or region. They
never agreed that each country or region would individually halve poverty
by 2015, though the first MDG has often been given this latter interpretation. The UN’s Human Development Report 2003 (pp. 198-202) and the
World Bank’s World Development Report 2004 (pp. 254-255), for example, both track individual countries’ progress towards halving national
poverty by 2015 as indicators of progress towards the first MDG.
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LITIGATION UPDATES
THE ANTI-PROSTITUTION PLEDGE:
LIMITING SPEECH AND DEVELOPMENT

D

by Rachael Moshman*
INTRODUCTION

KT International is a Washington, DC-based nongovernmental organization (“NGO”) specializing in
family planning and HIV/AIDS services. DKT
International provides such services to parts of South America,
Africa, and Asia and currently serves just under ten million
families worldwide.1 The NGO subsidizes products such as
condoms for poor populations,2 selling some 390 million condoms last year in eleven different countries.3 DKT International
has received United States Agency for International
Development (“USAID”) funding for some of its HIV/AIDS
programming in the past.4 However, in July 2005 DKT
International’s Vietnam program was refused future funding
from USAID because the DKT International Country
Representative in Vietnam refused to sign an “anti-prostitution” loyalty statement for the organization.5

THE LEGISLATIVELY REQUIRED ANTIPROSTITUTION PLEDGE

The United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS,
Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (“Global AIDS Act” or
“GAA”)6 places two limitations on organizations that are eligible to receive funding under this Act. First, funding may not be
used to “promote or advocate the legalization or practice of
prostitution or sex trafficking.”7 Second, any organization that
receives funding must have a “policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking . . .”8 The Trafficking Victims
Protection Act of 2003 (“TVPA”)9 has similar requirements. It
states that no funding can be made available to “promote, support, or advocate the legalization or practice of prostitution,”10
and that any organization receiving funding must state in a grant
application or grant agreement that “it does not promote, support, or advocate the legalization or practice of prostitution.”11
The GAA and the TVPA do state, however, that the funding
limitations do not apply to certain areas such as delivery of medical care, test kits, and condoms.12 Though both the GAA and
the TVPA are laws welcomed by professionals who work to prevent both HIV/AIDS and human trafficking, the impact of these
funding limitations has caused deep concern, ranging from First
Amendment limitations on speech to stigmatization of already
vulnerable populations.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES: FIRST
AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS

The implication on First Amendment rights and U.S. development policies arose in DKT International’s recent lawsuit
against USAID. DKT International filed suit in August 2005 in
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, charging that
USAID had violated its freedom of speech rights by making
“otherwise eligible organizations ineligible for USAID grants or
contracts” because they did not adopt the U.S. position on prostitution.13 An opinion letter written by the U.S. Department of
Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel was issued in September
2004;14 the letter advised the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (“HHS”) that the GAA’s prostitution-opposing
policy guidelines, which previously applied only to non-U.S.
NGOs, could be required of U.S. NGOs without implicating constitutional or separation of powers violations.15 Soon after this
opinion was issued, HHS, USAID, and the U.S. Department of
State began requiring the so-called “loyalty pledge” from all
potential grant recipients, including American organizations.16
USAID subsequently implemented Acquisition and
Assistance Policy Directive (“AAPD”) No. 05-04, which was
released on June 9, 2005.17 The AAPD required that any USAID
contract that provides funds from the GAA to include language
that not only bars funding from being used to support or advocate for the legalization of prostitution, but also asserts that
“prostitution and related activities . . . are inherently harmful
and dehumanizing, and contribute to the phenomenon of trafficking in persons.”18
The Brennan Center for Justice at New York University
School of Law (“Brennan Center”) submitted a memorandum
on the DKT International case that analyzed from several perspectives the constitutionality of the anti-prostitution pledge
requirement.19 The Brennan Center, as “Of Counsel” to DKT
International, conclusively denounced the pledge requirement. At the same time, the memo, analyzing Rust v.
Sullivan,20 also determined that the government retained the
discretion to explicitly oppose prostitution because GAA
funding is meant to provide medical and social services to
communities impacted by HIV/AIDS.21
* Rachael Moshman is a JD and MA (International Affairs) candidate, 2006, at
American University, Washington College of Law and School of International
Service.
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While the majority of organizations that are affected by this
policy state that they do not advocate prostitution, they find the
U.S. government’s new policy requirements more harmful than
helpful to HIV/AIDS and trafficking prevention.22 Moreover,
the limitations on funding in the GAA and TVPA go further than
simply limiting the use of government funds; the acts also prohibit NGOs from using private funds to promote or advocate for
the legalization of prostitution.23
In a response to these limitations, the Brennan Center memo
points to cases like Regan v. Taxation with Representation, in
which the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed that 501(c)(3) organizations could not lobby using federal funds,24 but also affirmed that
they had a constitutionally protected right to lobby using separately-held private funds.25 Similarly, in FCC v. League of Women
Voters of California, the Court found that television stations could
not use federal funds to give editorial opinions, but could use private funds to do so.26 Applying similar standards, the Brennan
Center argues that Congress and federal agencies should not be
able to limit U.S. NGOs from supporting or advocating their positions on prostitution when they use private funds.27
By requiring NGOs to declare an anti-prostitution policy, the
government is, according to Count I of DKT International’s
Complaint, “condition[ing] eligibility for USAID funding for
U.S. organizations on expressly adopting the U.S. government’s
political viewpoint on prostitution.”28 The Brennan Center
memo reiterates this position by pointing to Supreme Court cases
such as West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,
which found that a public school could not require a child to say
the pledge of allegiance in order to maintain the right to attend
school. The government may not “. . . [transcend] constitutional
limitations on their power and [invade] the sphere of intellect and
spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our
Constitution to reserve from all official control.”29
In September 2005, the Alliance for Open Society
International, Inc. (“AOSI”) and Open Society Institute (“OSI”)
filed a similar suit, also charging USAID with First Amendment
violations such as those outlined in the DKT International
case.30 AOSI is a not-for-profit organization that was formed by
OSI in 2003 to work primarily on issues related to Central
Asia.31 Rather than oppose the USAID policy outright, AOSI
chose to sign the anti-prostitution pledge with USAID in August
2005, and then follow that pledge with a lawsuit against the
agency. AOSI’s lawsuit charged that the pledge requirement: (1)
was unconstitutionally vague; (2) violated the First Amendment
by forcing the organization to adopt an “entity-wide policy;” (3)
violated the First Amendment by imposing the pledge on nonUSAID funding; and (4) was too broad to comply with the funding limitation as originally stated in the GAA.32

DEVELOPMENT IMPLICATIONS INTERNATIONALLY

On the international level, HHS, USAID, and the U.S.
Department of State’s requirements for funding HIV/AIDS and
anti-trafficking programs have had a much broader impact than
just limiting NGOs’ freedom of speech rights. Besides the fact
that non-U.S. organizations do not enjoy the protections of the
U.S. Constitution and therefore, cannot argue free speech protections,33 as mentioned by both DKT and AOSI’s complaints, it
is difficult to comply with the regulations, which are unconsti67

tutionally vague.34 This charge is based on undefined terms in
the acts’ funding limitations. For example, it is difficult to
understand what is meant by “promote, advocate, support the
legalization of prostitution.” NGOs that receive GAA and TVPA
funding are at risk of violating their commitments for noncompliance without even knowing it because they have not been
properly informed of the parameters of the pledge requirements.
These NGOs could unknowingly make the wrong policy decision, lose their funding, or have to pay back used funds for inadvertent noncompliance; at worst, they may be prosecuted for
violating their agreement with the U.S. government.35 The policy impacts of the anti-prostitution pledge are of great concern to
all NGOs, but especially those that work with sex workers
worldwide. The threat of violating USAID’s terms has already
caused NGOs receiving USAID funding to cancel otherwise
successful programs, such as one Cambodian program that
attempted to provide English-language training to prostitutes.36
The DKT International Vietnam Country Representative
declined to sign the anti-prostitution pledge because, according
to DKT International’s complaint:
DKT has no policy on prostitution and does not wish
to adopt one. . . In addition, as an organization working to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS, it strongly
believes it can best do that in the many countries in
which it works by maintaining neutrality on the controversial question of how to handle the complex
problems that arise at the intersection of the
HIV/AIDS epidemic and prostitution.37

Many other non-U.S. NGOs face similar pressures. They
believe that adopting anti-prostitution policies will cause a
wedge between them and the populations with which they wish
to work, or will stigmatize already disadvantaged populations
including prostitutes and AIDS victims. Furthermore, as noted,
successful programs – such as those that hire prostitutes as peer
HIV/AIDS prevention educators38 – may not receive GAA or
TVPA funding. The anti-prostitution funding limitations on
these NGOs will have a serious impact on their ability to provide direct services to populations vulnerable to HIV/AIDS,
prostitution, and trafficking. For example, DKT International
was receiving sixteen percent of its funding for their HIV/AIDS
programming from USAID.39 The GAA has now appropriated
three billion dollars for HIV/AIDS programming for the Fiscal
Years 2004 through 2008,40 but by refusing to sign the anti-prostitution pledge, DKT International and other NGOs will have no
access to these funds.

ENDNOTES:

THE ANTI-PROSTITUTION PLEDGE
1 See Complaint for Plaintiff at 2, DKT Int’l v. U.S. Agency for

Int’l Dev. (DKT Complaint), (D.D.C. 2005), available at
http://www.globalaidsalliance.org/docs/DKT_Complaint.pdf (last
visited Oct. 27, 2005).

2 See id. at 4.
3 See Michael M. Phillips, Aids Group Sues U.S. Over Funds, Wall

St. J., Aug. 12, 2005, at B3, available at http://www.globalaidsalliance.org/Wall_Street_Journal_August_12_2005.cfm (last visited
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BOOK REVIEWS

MAKING LAW WORK: ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE & SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT (VOLUMES I & II)

by Durwood Zaelke, Donald Kaniaru, and Eva Kružíková
Cameron May Ltd., 2005
Reviewed by Cari Shiffman*
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s populations grow and environmental problems
become more pervasive at both a regional and global
level, nations must increasingly examine environmental practices and their enforcement. Making Law Work:
Environmental Compliance & Sustainable Development1 seeks
to address this need through its discussion of sustainable development theory and the legal frameworks necessary to promote
environmental goodwill. The book also considers the practical
efficacy of such laws.
The compilation, produced by the Secretariat of the
International Network for Environmental Compliance and
Enforcement (“INECE”), along with the Institute for
Governance and Sustainable Development and the Program on
Governance for Sustainable Development at the Bren School of
Environmental Science and Management, at the University of
California in Santa Barbara, is a two volume collection of literature by both academics and practitioners that details the
strengths and weaknesses of environmental compliance within
legal systems. Editors Durwood Zaelke, Director of the INECE
Secretariat, Donald Kaniaru, Managing Partner of Kaniaru &
Kaniaru Advocates in Nairobi, Kenya, and Eva Kružíková, cofounder and Director of the Institute for Environmental Policy
in the Czech Republic, offer valuable, introductory overviews to
each of the topics and articles included in the book, in addition
to the included literature. These introductions are a helpful synthesis of the included articles as they incorporate background
information on each category and outline the articles.
Furthermore, by having editors from both developed and developing countries, as well as from a country with a transitioning
economy, the book is able to effectively broach topics important
to both the developing and developed world. As such, the book
successfully strives to confront concerns in both the global
North and South.
The compilation first introduces the theory behind compliance and then presents compliance strategies that build on theoretical understanding. The book further incorporates empirical
data on tactics that induce compliance, in addition to discussion
of ineffective approaches. Making Law Work is unique in its
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comprehensive overview of compliance issues relevant to both
scholars and practitioners. By including articles from experts
and cutting edge sources, this book combines textbook and treatise, incorporating a hybrid legal and policy approach to environmental compliance concerns. Making Law Work is arguably
the only book that covers the whole arena of environmental
compliance and enforcement issues. It is an essential read for
practitioners, policy makers, businesses, lawyers, and
researchers who are involved with the enforcement and compliance fields, as it includes insights on how to better design effective laws, regulations, and remedies.
The first volume explores everything from good governance and compliance theories to multilateral environmental
agreements (“MEAs”) and domestic enforcement strategies to
courts, tribunals, and non-governmental organizations
(“NGOs”). This first section raises questions on how to
strengthen laws regarding the environment and what must be
done in order to induce compliance with these laws. The book
discusses pressing environmental and humanitarian concerns,
and then considers what laws and institutions will be most effective in dealing with these threats.
In order to effectively address non-compliance, the included articles examine why different actors choose to comply with
or ignore various environmental laws. The first chapter sets the
stage for the rest of the book. This chapter is essential to understanding what solutions can be developed to assist in compliance with laws. The inclusion of compliance theories in the second chapter strengthens the book, by providing a theoretical
background to all of the subsequent topics covered. The editors
also consider whether MEAs have begun to solve any of the
emerging environmental crises, through specific case studies
and articles that dissect the efficacy of MEAs. The book
includes not only international approaches to environmental
BOOK REVIEW: Making Law Work Continued on page 70
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BOOK REVIEWS

THE END OF POVERTY: ECONOMIC POSSIBILITIES FOR OUR TIME
by Jeffrey Sachs
Penguin Press, 2005
Reviewed by Elizabeth Hahn*

A

n old grandmother sits with her ten orphaned grandchildren in a small, dusty Malawian village. Her home is a
mud hut, her granddaughter is sick with malaria, and
she does not have enough food to feed her family. Her own children, like the majority of their generation in the village, have
died of AIDS. Rather than enjoying a well-earned rest from a
lifetime of work, this grandmother must find a way to provide for
her family. Ill and hungry, she and her family fight for survival
each day.
There are roughly one billion people around the world
(almost one-sixth of the world’s population) in such a position.
These people are the extreme poor. Chronically hungry, unable
to access health care, lacking safe water and sanitation, and even
rudimentary shelter, these people must fight to survive. As
Jeffrey Sachs describes, the areas in which they live are caught
in a “poverty trap” of “disease, physical isolation, climate stress,
[and] environmental degradation.” Many of these individuals
are further ensnared by political instability and lack of access to
capital, technology, medicine, and education. Releasing them
from this trap seems like a daunting task.
However, according to Mr. Sachs, there is a solution. With
the right policies and the correct amount of development aid,
this type of extreme poverty can be eliminated by the year
2025. His recent book, The End of Poverty, provides a comprehensive plan to accomplish that task.
Before explaining his plan, Mr. Sachs provides an historical
account of how the poor countries became so impoverished in the
first place. He begins by noting that, until the early 1800s, almost
everyone worldwide was poor. Then the Industrial Revolution
commenced and Western economies rapidly began to grow.
Why did the Western economies grow so rapidly while the
rest of the world’s growth lagged behind? Some people argue that
Western economies only grew at the expense of the poor countries.
However, Mr. Sachs refutes that argument. Instead, he theorizes
that technology, not exploitation, has been the main force behind
the long-term increases in income in the rich world. According to
Mr. Sachs, this is good news, because it suggests that poor countries need not resign themselves to their positions. All we have to
do, Mr. Sachs argues, is help the countries reach the first rung of
the economic ladder, and from there they can ascend.
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To help them ascend this ladder, Mr. Sachs contends that we
must first overhaul traditional development economic theories
and use a new method called “clinical economics.” This
method, based on clinical medicine, has economists acting as
doctors and diagnosing their impoverished countries as
“patients.” To work effectively, the economists must make a
diagnosis based on a myriad of factors: the extent of extreme
poverty; the economic and fiscal frameworks; physical geography; governance patterns and failures; cultural barriers; and
geopolitics. Then the economists must supply an appropriate
treatment regimen specific to that country.
These treatment regimens, while tailored specifically to
each individual country, are all based on the infusion of additional capital into the countries. According to Mr. Sachs, countries will then use this capital infusion to improve their citizens’
health and nutrition, invest in machinery and facilities for business, improve infrastructure, create healthy soil and arable lands,
improve public institutions, and increase technical knowledge.
Some readers may wonder if this capital infusion differs
from the paternalistic practices that countries have engaged in for
decades. According to Mr. Sachs, that skeptical view is unfounded. The money is not a handout, he argues, and countries will not
become dependent on the foreign assistance. Instead, the capital
infusion is merely a boost up, an investment in the countries to
help them overcome their problems and “get their foot on the
ladder of development.” Once there, the countries will be able to
scale the ladder without additional foreign assistance.
Similarly, Mr. Sachs also refutes the suggestion that his
plan of capital infusion ignores the human factors of greed and
corruption. This suggestion, he argues, is a prejudice against
poor countries “grounded in overt racism.” Although there have
been corrupt leaders in the past, Africa is not poor because its
governance is inept or undemocratic. Rather, “Africa’s governance is poor because Africa is poor,” and thus governance will
improve as countries’ incomes rise.
To finance the treatment regimens, Mr. Sachs’ plan relies
heavily on governments to amass and administer the aid. He
* Elizabeth Hahn is a JD and MA (International Affairs) candidate, 2006, at
American University, Washington College of Law and School of
International Service.
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proposes that each wealthy country contribute 0.7% of its GNP
as official development aid (“ODA”). This is not an arbitrary
amount; rather, it is the amount to which the United States and
other countries agreed at the Rio Summit on Sustainable
Development, the Monterrey Consensus, and the World Summit
on Sustainable Development. Currently, though, the United
States’ ODA only totals about 0.18% of its GNP. To increase
ODA, Mr. Sachs argues that the richest of the rich should make
up the difference through direct contributions or an increased
income tax. The rich, he asserts, will hardly notice the increased
income tax. Moreover, it is their duty and responsibility to con-
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compliance, but domestic strategies as well. This inclusion of
domestic solutions to sustainable development concerns
strengthens the book considerably, as domestic resolutions are
important in addressing sustainable development. Additionally,
the first volume of the compilation presents dialogues on the
role of the judiciary, both domestically and internationally, and
NGOs in ensuring environmental compliance. Although in the
section on courts, the included article on domestic courts focuses on New Zealand, the proposed tactic of a specialized court for
environmental disputes can be applied in other domestic settings. The compilation further succeeds in exploring how compliance issues at both the international and domestic levels are
connected and how they influence each other.
The second volume of this book discusses topics such as
access to information, emissions trading, compliance assistance,
the indicators necessary to measure compliance, and the success
of trans-governmental networks. This section also evaluates the
most useful tools for regulators, as well as how firms can benefit from compliance with environmental rules. In particular,
Michael Porter’s and Class van der Linde’s important and highly relevant article on their “Porter Hypothesis,” discusses how
environmental rules can be designed to induce innovations to
offset the cost of compliance that can create profits or save
money for firms that comply. The book also highlights that
access to information from both governments and the private
sector is essential for a thorough understanding of environmental issues and, as the editors point out, to “empower civil society.” Additionally, Making Law Work successfully explores the
aforementioned emission trading schemes, compliance assistance strategies, and the role of trans-governmental networks.
Finally, the second volume includes a significant discussion on
utilizing indicators to measure when compliance is working in
the sustainable development and environmental continuums.
INECE’s project on environmental compliance and enforcement
indicators, overviewed in an included article, makes INECE, as
one of the sponsors of this book, particularly suited to discuss
indicators for environmental compliance and enforcement.
FALL 2005

tribute because they have disproportionately benefited from the
economic and tax changes of the past two decades.
Overall, The End of Poverty is a fascinating and comprehensive book. It takes many conventional views of economic development and turns them upside down. And
although The End of Poverty can be technical in places, its
moving descriptions of the poorest of the poor inspire and
instill a sense of hope in readers. This book is excellent for
anyone with a desire to learn more about development economics, no matter their background.

The comprehensive selection of topics allows for a thorough discussion in the field of environmental compliance and
enforcement, via articles that examine how nations and individuals can comply with environmental decisions. Furthermore, the
book explores the rationales behind non-compliance and then
builds on the theoretical understanding of compliance to explore
compliance strategies. In terms of improving behavior, the compilation excels at suggesting effective strategies for better
implementation and compliance with international and domestic
governance. The reader can readily understand how the establishment of the rule of law, good governance, and sustainable
development requires compliance. Most significantly, the book
raises the critical questions of implementation and compliance,
without which laws are ineffective.
The articles, while they lay the groundwork for understanding compliance and sustainable development issues, only
overview the key issues and may raise additional questions that
readers desire to understand in more detail. For practitioners or
researchers who want to delve further into a specific area presented in the book, INECE has listed an extensive bibliography,
invaluable for further investigation, with additional readings for
each of the subjects explored in the volumes.2
While the articles in Making Law Work recognize that not
all past solutions to tackle these issues have succeeded, the book
as a whole strives to focus on effective strategies and potential
improvements. Furthermore, the book encourages all sectors of
society to assist in designating successful strategies for environmental compliance and securing future sustainable development. Making Law Work provides an essential starting ground
for exploring the key factors in the struggle to create legal, economic, and social systems to combat environmental degradation
and other dangers to human well-being.

ENDNOTES:

1 Excerpts from Making Law Work: Environmental Compliance & Sustainable
Development and ordering information are available at http://inece.org/makinglawwork.html.
2 The bibliography is available at http://inece.org.
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WORLD NEWS
by Blase Kornacki, Abby Okrent,
Jennifer Rohleder, and Mauro Zinner*

AFRICA

AVIAN FLU POSES IMMINENT THREAT TO AFRICA

The UN Food and Agricultural Organization (“FAO”)
announced that there is an increased risk of the bird flu spreading to North Africa and East Africa.1 The FAO warns that East
Africa in particular will have difficulties containing the flu.2 The
close proximity between humans and animals in East Africa creates an ideal situation for spreading the flu to people.3 A number
of African countries have already responded to predictions of
avian flu. For instance, Congo-Brazzaville banned poultry
imports.4 South Africa’s Department of Health placed an urgent
request for the flu medicine Tamiflu to be approved for use in
the country.5 Kenya has established a surveillance network of
the health ministry, veterinarians, and the livestock ministry to
monitor incidences of bird flu.6

MALAWI FOOD CRISIS WORSENS AND FARMERS ARE
UNABLE TO OBTAIN FERTILIZER

Malawi’s food shortage is now at the level of a crisis,
brought on by the worst drought in a decade.7 During August
2005, the number of people admitted to hospitals for starvation
and malnutrition increased between 29 and 40 percent as compared with August 2004.8 The president of Malawi declared the
entire country a disaster area, and aid agencies are concerned
that half of the country’s population could starve by April.9 By
the time the crisis becomes visible to donor countries it is
already too late to save many people.10
Bad harvests brought on by drought and a delay in seed and
fertilizer delivery last year are blamed in part for the crisis.11
Malawi’s president promised subsidized fertilizers; however,
the government cancelled a $30 million deal for subsidized fertilizer from Saudi Arabia when U.S.-based Citibank refused to
process the deal.12 The United States claims that the Saudi
Arabian company has ties to al-Qaeda.13 Malawi is looking into
other options for fertilizer.14 The UN World Food Programme
estimates that it will require $76 million to feed nearly three
million Malawians until the harvest in April.15

KENYAN NATIONAL PARK
FOR MAASAI

PUT INTO TRUST STATUS

Kenya’s President Mwai Kibaki announced a plan in early
October to hand over a national park to the Maasai community.16 The decision will downgrade the Amboseli National Park
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from national park to national reserve and place it in a trust status for the Maasai.17 Conservation groups oppose the move,
saying that it will harm the country’s international tourism
industry.18 The conservation groups and some government ministers allege that President Kibaki’s purpose in downgrading the
park was to woo Maasai votes in a Constitutional referendum.19
Maasai leaders responded that these conservation groups are
just unhappy because they are no longer needed in the park.20
Kenya’s Shadow Attorney-General Mutula Kilonzo believes
that President Kibaki violated the Constitution by downgrading
the park without the Parliament’s approval.21
Amboseli National Reserve has been handed over to the
county council, though the Kenyan Wildlife Service will continue running the reserve.22 Local and international wildlife organizations will be given a role in managing the reserve as well.23

AMERICAS

LICENSING OF THE SÃO FRANCISCO RIVER IN BRAZIL

The Federal Court of Bahia, in Salvador Da Bahia, Brazil,
suspended the process of obtaining an environmental license to
the Government of Brazil, granting injunctive relief to those
who oppose the government’s desire to take advantage of the
São Francisco River’s waters to conduct a transposing project to
irrigate the north-east desert regions of the country.24 Without
this license, it is not possible for the government to begin the
irrigation program; thus, the government plans to appeal the
court’s decision. According to the Government of Brazil, the
project will benefit twelve million people that suffer from the
region’s desertified conditions.25 The opponents of the project
argue that several major implications of the project were not
debated with the local population.26 These issues include the
revitalization of the river,27 which is completely deteriorated,
and the environmental impact assessment that did not consider
the consequences to the “Bacia do São Francisco” (the flow of
the river) and to the rivers that will receive its water.28
Luiz Flávio Cappio, a Bahia bishop, became a symbol
against the transposition. He performed an eleven day hunger
strike against the project arguing, among other point points, the
politically tinged intent of the project.29 The São Francisco
River runs 1680 miles from the southeast of Brazil to the
increasingly dry northeast, and is responsible for 75 percent of
the water for that region.30
* Blase Kornacki and Jennifer Rohleder are JD candidates, May 2008, at
American University, Washington College of Law (“WCL”). Abby Okrent is a
JD and MA (International Affairs), candidate, December 2007, at WCL and
American University, School of International Service. Mauro Zinner is an LLM
candidate, May 2006, at WCL.
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MOUNTAINS OF WASTE IN NEW ORLEANS AFTER
KATRINA

The largest and most complicated cleanup in American history has begun in New Orleans, Louisiana in the wake of
Hurricane Katrina, which tore through the Gulf Coast in August
2005.31 Although New Orleans authorities want its people
returned as soon as possible, 22 million tons of waste must still
be removed.32 In addition to the material debris, the waste
includes toxic household chemicals such as freon and mercury,
which have made the city look and smell like a landfill.33 Many
of the residents are wearing gloves to protect themselves from
bacteria and germ contamination.34 Authorities estimate that it
will take at least 3.5 million truckloads to haul the chemical and
material waste away.35

ASIA

THAILAND DEDICATES SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS
TO LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

Thailand demonstrates its commitment to Millennium
Development Goal Eight to develop a global partnership for
development through the disbursement of its development aid.
In comparison to wealthier nations like Japan, Italy, and the
United States, which contribute around one-third of their development aid to Least Developed Countries (“LDCs”), Thailand
contributes nearly all of its development assistance to LDCs.36
In addition, among developing countries in Asia, Thailand has
the lowest tariffs on imports from LDCs, and its imports from
LDCs makes up over three percent of its total imports – higher
than any other middle-income country.37

EUROPE

PREVENTING CLIMATE CHANGE THROUGH THE
AVIATION SECTOR

On September 27, 2005, the European Commission
(“Commission”) issued a communication outlining a strategy to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions from air travel by admitting
aircraft operators to the European Union (“EU”) Greenhouse
Gas Emissions Trading Scheme (“ETS”).38 The aviation industry’s overall contribution to EU greenhouse gas emissions is
only around three percent; however, its emissions are growing
faster than any other sector, which risks undermining the
progress made in other industries.39 For example, a roundtrip
flight for two between Amsterdam and Phuket in Thailand, produces significantly more carbon dioxide than the average new
car produces in an entire year.40 The Commission believes that
admittance into the ETS will provide a permanent incentive for
airlines to minimize their greenhouse gas emissions.41 The proposed emissions cap applies to both EU carriers as well as foreign airlines operating in EU airports.42 The Commission claims
that admittance to the ETS will provide the same environmental
benefit with a lesser impact on ticket prices or on the rest of the
economy when compared to imposing a tax on aviation fuel.43
FALL 2005

EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY CLIMATE CHANGE
SATELLITE FAILS TO LIFT OFF

In response to climate modeling that suggests that the
frozen parts of the Earth are the most sensitive to climate
change, the European Space Agency (“ESA”) had planned to
launch an ice-monitoring satellite called CryoSat on October 8,
2005.44 The mission, scheduled to last one thousand days, was
developed to assess the rate at which the ice caps are thinning
and contribute data to the ongoing debate on global warming.45
The satellite’s main payload was a radar altimeter designed for
ice, making it the first of its kind, as altimeters used in previous
missions were designed for use over land and sea.46 Due to an
unfortunate glitch in the launch sequence, the CryoSat launch
failed and the satellite fell into the Arctic Ocean, north of
Greenland near the North Pole, with no damage to any populated areas.47 The ESA may still consider recreating CryoSat
together with industry, depending on cost and other factors to be
decided by ESA’s Program Board.48

MIDDLE EAST

WORLD FOOD PROGRAM’S FUNDING SHORTFALL IN IRAQ

The United Nations’ World Food Programme (“WFP”)
reports that 20-34 percent of Iraq’s population is undernourished.49 The WFP launched aid operations in September of 2004
to remedy food shortages in the war torn country.50 These operations have recently hit a major roadblock. In a September 21,
2005 press release, WFP announced a 56 percent funding shortfall that is jeopardizing its operations in Iraq. The $66 million
U.S. operation aimed at supporting three million people, half of
them children, has only received $29 million thus far.51 The
operation runs until the end of this year; however, with the current financial problems, it is likely to fall well short of its goals.
Funding for security and reconstruction projects in Iraq has
taken precedence over much needed food and health programs.52 “Millions of Iraqis are dying and require urgent action
and support from the whole world, but politics and security
issues have caused people to forget the poor and those desperate
for food,” said Ahmed Abdul Walled, a senior official in the Iraq
Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation.53 If further
funding does not materialize, the WFP may have to cut back or
even cease its operations in Iraq.54

STRUGGLING TO MEET THE MILLENNIUM
DEVELOPMENT GOALS IN YEMEN

The Human Development Report (“HDI”), which measures
life expectancy, school enrollment, literacy, and income, has
regularly ranked Yemen among the world’s poorest countries.55
The recently published 2005 report placed Yemen two points
lower than last year’s ranking.56 Yemen ranks 151 out of 177
countries, and ranks last in the Middle East.67
According to the United Nations Development
Programme (“UNDP”), at its current rate of progress Yemen is
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unlikely to meet the Millennium Development Goals.58 The
Yemeni government blames this year’s shortcomings on insufficient donor support.59 Yemen’s UNDP Resident
Representative Flavia Pansieri supports the government’s
assertions, pointing out that Yemen has only received a third of

the average received by the Least Developed Countries.60
Pansieri suggests a redistribution of government funds to remedy the deteriorating situation and recommends a reduction in
defense expenditures in exchange for increased funding in the
health and education sectors.61
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UPCOMING PUBLICATIONS AND EVENTS
SDLP WINTER 2006 EDITION ON CLIMATE LAW

SDLP’s Winter issue will report on the “Confidence Through Compliance in Emissions Trading
Markets” conference that took place on November 17-18, 2005 at American University, Washington
College of Law in Washington, DC. This event gathered experts from around the world to identify linkage issues, promote effectiveness, and emphasize the importance of achieving high rates of compliance in emissions trading systems. Materials included in this issue from the Conference will be transcripts, background material, rapporteur reports, and articles by participants. SDLP will also include
supplementary articles on current issues in climate law. Submissions are by invitation only.

SDLP SPRING 2006 EDITION ON SOUND CHEMICALS MANAGEMENT

The Spring issue of SDLP will focus on the imperative need for sound chemicals management. The
world's production and use of chemicals is growing dramatically. How to manage chemicals in ways
that protect human health and the environment and contribute to sustainable development has become
a pressing domestic and international concern. The SDLP Spring issue will analyze the emergence of
the global chemicals industry, the effectiveness of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) and
other international approaches to chemicals management, the impacts chemicals have on human health
and rights, and the impacts of chemicals practices on developing countries. If you plan to submit an
article, please send a summary of your paper topic to sdlp@wcl.american.edu by
January 20, 2006.

“FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CHEMICALS MANAGEMENT”
PANEL DISCUSSION – FEBRUARY 22

The program will consist of two panels. The first panel will discuss the current status of the Strategic
Approach to International Chemicals Management (SAICM). Environment Ministers are expected to
adopt SAICM, an international approach to chemicals management in early February at the
International Conference on Chemicals Management in Dubai. Government, industry and NGO individuals will discuss different aspects of SAICM. The second panel will discuss developments in international chemicals management that have, or may, fundamentally change the way chemicals are regulated and managed internationally. For example, the EU parliamentary approved bill on REACH will
be discussed along with present, and future, multilateral environmental agreements (such as the Basel
Convention on Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and the Stockholm Convention on
Persistent Organic Pollutants). For additional information, please visit our website at
http://www.wcl.american.edu/org/sustainabledevelopment.
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